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ABSTRACT

A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICIES:
THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF IDENTITIES, VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS
ON POLICY
TOWARD CUBA
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2003

LANA L. WYLIE, B.A., MCMASTER UNIVERSITY
M.A.,

Ph

D.,

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor

Long-time

friends,

Howard

J.

Wiarda

Americans and Canadians share many world-views and

values. Yet, important differences exist. This study examines one foreign policy where

The United

these differences are striking.

States and

policies toward Cuba, especially since Fidel Castro

Canada have had very

assumed power

different

in 1959.

Canada’s

policy of constructive engagement stands in marked contrast to the isolationist solution

adopted by the American government.

economic or domestic

interest

Much

of the current literature offers traditional

group explanations for the two

policies. This study

challenges these conventional narratives.

By examining each country’s
demonstrates that there

is far

policy toward

more than domestic

Cuba

in

tandem

political or

this study

economic calculations

involved in the formulation of these foreign policies. Adopting a constructivist approach,
this study will

show

different in other

that differences exist

ways- they have

their

over Cuba because the two countries are

own

identities,

values and perceptions that

contribute to the formation of very distinct approaches toward this island regime.

VI

Canadians and Americans perceive Cuba through
different lenses. The American
identity as an exceptional country

well as the perception that

Cuba

is

and

their

corresponding view of Cuba as inferior as

within the American sphere of influence
has affected

the relationship between the United States and

Doctrine.

The American

Cuba

identity as the guardian

construct American policy. After 1959,

since the days of the

Monroe

of freedom and democracy helped

Cuba was seen

to

to

be an anathema to everything

the United States represented. In contrast, the Canadian
identity as “not American” and
the need to assert this in foreign policy, as well as their
identity as a
citizen with

its

good

international

emphasis on values such as dialogue and compromise have greatly

influenced the Canadian perception of Cuba.
In

sum, the examination of identity and

offers an alternative

way of making

sense of

its

related values, perceptions,

US-Cuban and Canadian-Cuban

and norms
relations.

These two case studies reveal how these variables influence foreign policy and enable us
to better understand

Canadian and American foreign policy as well as international

relations.

vii
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

Long-time friends, Americans and Canadians
share many world-views and
values. Yet, important differences exist.

nuclear war over

Cuba

in 1962, the

Even before

the world stood on the brink of

United States and Canada had very different
policies

toward Fidel Castro’s regime. These same differences

and have,
the

49

at times,

parallel.

caused considerable tension between the countries
on either side of

The American

isolationist

approach

Canada’s policy of constructive engagement.

economic or domestic

traditional

persist in the twenty-first century

interest

Much

is in

many ways

of the current

antithetical to

literature offers

group explanations for the two policies. This

study questions these conventional narratives.

It

hypothesizes that ideational variables

have compelling explanatory power.
This study demonstrates

how

each explanation

is

incomplete without an

examination of the normative and cultural influences over these

Americans perceive Cuba through
itself as

that

different lenses.

The United

policies.

States has long thought of

an exceptional nation. The perception of other countries as

Cuba

is

Canadians and

inferior

and the belief

within the American sphere of influence has affected the relationship

between the United States and Cuba since the days of the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore,
after 1959,

Cuba was seen

especially to the

relations

American

to be

an anathema

to

everything the United States represented,

identity as the guardian

of freedom and democracy. Thus,

between the two countries have been tense and,

1

at times, hostile.

The end of the

Cold War did not have the expected
moderating
tact,

American policy has become,
In contrast,

times,

in

effect

on U.S. policy toward Cuba and

many ways, more

hardline since the early 1990s.

Canada has pursued a policy of engagement
with

Canada has been

in

the regime.

At

referred to as Cuba’s closest friend in
the West. Connections

between the two countries are wide ranging.
Ottawa has often encouraged greater
economic, cultural and diplomatic

American and the need

regime. The Canadian identity as “not

ties to the

to assert this in foreign policy has
influenced

Canadian policy

toward Cuba. Likewise, the Canadian self-perception
as a good international citizen and
their identity as a

peacekeeper have shaped the Canadian policy toward
the

By examining each
demonstrate that there

country’s policy toward

is far

more than domestic

Cuba

in

tandem

island.

this study will

political, security, or

economic

calculations involved in the formulation of these foreign policies.
Prior to the ascent of
the

Cuban American community

was

a security based argument.

the threat posed

the

It

most popular explanation put

forth for U.S. policy

asserted that the policy of isolation

was a

reflection of

by the Castro regime. After the consolidation of the Cuban American

community, a domestic

interest

group explanation became the most popular narrative.

argues that the American policy

is

a direct result of the

It

power of the Cuban American

National Foundation (CANF). This theory asserts the electoral clout of the Cuban

American community
dictate policy

in Florida

and

New Jersey practically

toward Cuba.

The most popular explanation
national

guarantees that they can

economic

interest argument.

for the

It

Canadian policy of engagement

is

the

maintains that Canada has engaged with Cuba for

economic reasons. Canadian scholars argue

that the opportunity for

2

Canadians

to invest

in

Cuba, tree ot American competition,
drives Canadian engagement. This
study
1

problematizes these explanations and demonstrates
that the policies are distinct
because
the

two countries are

different in other

ways- they have

their

own

identities, values,

and

perceptions that contribute to the formation of
very distinct approaches toward this
island

regime.

Lastly, this study highlights

how evolving values and

affect each country’s relationship with Cuba.

toward Cuba are changing. Each approach
that

began

strategies

to

emerge

in the late

became more

identities are continuing to

Both Canadian and American

reflects

new

policies

perceptions of the island nation

1990s and are slowly gaining strength. Ironically,
the two

similar as both sets of perceptions about the island
and Castro

evolve.

In

summary,

this

study demonstrates that the traditional narratives of both

policies have ignored ideational and cultural factors.

policies,

one

that reveals the importance

It

offers an alternative

view of both

of perceptions, culture, norms, ideas and

identities.

The Outline of the Study

The following chapters

Cuba

will

examine Canadian and American policies toward

in detail, highlighting the socially constructed elements.

the stage for the rest of the study. Chapter

Two

briefly traces

The next two chapters

Cuban

set

history and Chapter

Three reviews the history of Canadian and American relationships with Cuba. Chapter

Four explores the connection between

1

See tables

in

identity, values,

and culture and American foreign

chapter 3 for more information on Canadian trade and investment

3

in

Cuba.

policy. Chapter Five analyzes the U.S.
approach toward the island, demonstrating
the

relevance of ideational factors and the failings
of other paradigms to offer complete
explanations. Chapter Six similarly ties
identities, values, and perceptions
to Canadian

foreign policy. Chapter Seven examines the
Canadian approach toward Cuba, revealing

Canadian

that the

identity,

norms, and ideas have greater explanatory
power

in this case

than the traditional accounts. Chapter Eight directly
compares the Canadian and

American reactions

to

first,

possibility that Castro’s

developments

the Brothers to the Rescue shoot-down
and, second, to the

regime supports terrorism. Chapter Nine reviews
recent

in the bilateral relationships

and looks

at

where U.S.-Cuban and Canadian-

C'uban relations are likely to head in the next decade. However,

examine the treatment of these ideational variables by

first, this

chapter will

International Relations,

Comparative Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis scholars.

The Study of International Relations and Comparative
In the

1980s and early 1990s, both the

fields

of International Relations (IR) and

Comparative Politics eschewed studies based on “soft” explanations

IR was dominated by

culture.

Politics

like ideas

and

varieties of Realism, an approach that dealt in hard

calculations and notions of balance between powers.

had dismissed most of the early

2

By

that time,

Comparative

political culture studies as ethnocentric.

2

The

power
Politics

field

of

However, it is necessary to note that European scholars of international relations did not abandon
The rise of realism and behavioral methods in the study of IR was never as popular in Europe.
Thus, when we speak of the “return” of the study of culture and identity we are speaking of primarily a
change in American scholarship.
these factors.

4

Comparative Foreign Policy was focused on
behavioral studies
cultural or ideational factors in a cursory

Yet, the end of the Cold

that only

touched on

manner.

War and

the failure of Realism and other models
to

explain the seemingly sudden change in Soviet
domestic and foreign policy, and the rapid
reconfiguration of global politics that followed, forced
scholars to take another look
earlier “soft” explanations. 3

They found

that cultural

them understand the demise of the Soviet Union and

Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen’s
and the End of the Cold War examines
explain the end of the cold war.
factors

had a central role

in the

at the

and ideational factors could help
the end of the Cold War. Richard

edited volume, International Relations Theory

the failure of International Relations theory to

Many of the

authors in this volume reveal that ideational

formulation of foreign policy and were crucial factors in

the transformation of the international system in the early
1990s.

Furthermore, the questions that had dominated the study of world politics for
decades: superpower rivalry, and the arms race and bipolarity became, almost
overnight,
the relics of an earlier era. Instead, the oft-considered secondary, or even irrelevant,
issues of international relations

drew increasing scholarly

attention.

The increase

in

ethnic tensions, questions of nationality, and the spread of democratic values that were
the byproducts of the collapse of the Soviet

alliance,

came

to the forefront

the heart of these

now

Union and

the breakup of the

Warsaw

pact

of political science. Culture and identity variables were

at

important issues. Political cultural studies enjoyed a “renaissance.”

3

See Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the
End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) for an excellent analysis of this topic.

5

Realizing the relevance of these variables,
a greater number of political scientists

began

As

to apply

the 1990s

norms, beliefs,

drew

identity,

and

cultural factors to other research
questions.

to a close, these variables

were being increasingly used both

in

conjunction with traditional explanations or to
provide alternative hypotheses for a widevariety of international behavior.

The next

sections

examine the treatment of these

variables in greater detail.

International Relations (IR)

Culture and other ideational variables have been studied
by a number of
International Relations scholars over the years. For example,
during the 1950s and 1960s,

Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, and other functionalists discussed the role
of values and
culture in the integration of Europe. Deutsch argued that contact
between peoples (trade,

communication

which

in turn,

etc.)

produced similar values

in the

two

societies.

This created trust

produced increased cooperation, economic integration and eventually

political integration.

Though

not focusing on ideational variables like culture or identity,

the neoliberal and regime literature that rose to challenge neorealism in the 1970s and

1980s, also addressed

some of these

factors. In fact, Jennifer Sterling-Folker argues that

neofunctionalism, neoliberalism and constructivism have far more in

4

See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge:

MIT

Press,

1

952). Also

Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton
and
Ernst
Haas,
The
Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1957);

important are Karl Deutsch
University Press,

common than most

et al., Political

1958).

6

scholars acknowledge. 5 She argues
“rely

on the same

Though

three

come

to

many of the same

conclusions and

functional-institutional logic to explain
social change.” 6

these are excellent research programs,
the main goal of neofunctionalism

and neoliberalism was not
Relations.

all

They often

to integrate these variables into
the study

of International

treated these variables as secondary.
Thus, IR scholars interested in

these variables often had to turn to other
disciplines. Anthropology, sociology,
and

psychology, as well as comparative
variables. For

politics, all

produced works

that integrated these

example, many International Relations theorists
drew from Clifford

Geertz’s 1973 work in anthropology. 7 International
Relations scholars would often turn to
these works to supplement their cultural discussions.

However, IR scholars no longer
ideational variables. There is

past

two decades,

cultural studies

International Relations.

that culture

now

Known

and identity are

rely

for information about

a rich literature in International Relations

itself.

In the

have been embraced by a new scholarly tradition

as constructivists, or

intregral to a

international relations. Unlike

on other disciplines

sometimes as

in

refectivists, they posit

complete understanding of the dynamics of

most other IR theories (such as neorealism or

neoliberalism) constructivists do not treat the identity and interests of international
actors
as given. Constructivism problematizes the identities and interests of actors, revealing

5

Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and
Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared,” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000), 97-1 19.

6

Ibid.

’Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation

of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

7

that they are socially constructed.

These scholars emphasize

assumptions, ideas, actions and interactions
create the world

that our perceptions, beliefs,

we

live in.

Constructivists claim to occupy the ground
between rational choice and

postmodern theones of International Relations.
Rational choice scholars argue
and

that

norms

ideas, at the most, limit the choices of
rationally behaving states. Neorealism,
the

reigning IR theory, and one that treats states
as rational actors, marginalizes
norms,

arguing

that, if

anything, norms merely reflect existing
power structures. In contrast,

constructivists assert that variables like norms,
culture, ideas and beliefs can

fundamentally change the interests of states. Constructivists
maintain that social
structures

mold

the identity and interests of actors

through their interactions and beliefs.
significantly

beyond even

It is

who,

in turn, create social structures

a mutually constituting process. This goes

the neoliberal and regime literature that contend
that

norms are

important because they are capable of constraining or facilitating
choices of states and
thus have a role in explaining the behavior of states. However,
unlike their constructivist
cousins, neoliberal theorists do not believe that

interests

norms can

affect the very identity or

of states.

Constructivism shares a number of significant similarities with postmodern or
critical theory.

As Richard

Price and Christian Reus-Smit maintain, like postmodern

scholarship: “constructivism problemizes both agents and structures,

dynamics of change as well as the rhythms of stasis, and
understandings of world

8

politics,

it is

analytically

it

it

explores the

calls into question established

open not closed .”

8

Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and

Constructivism,” European Journal of International Relations 4, 2(September 1998): 259-294.

8

However, there

are important differences. Critical
theory

Friedrich Nietzche and on the

whereas, constructivism finds

more recent work of Michel Foucault and
Jacques Derrida
its

roots in

Max Weber

postmodern scholars, most constructivists do not
interactions.

Postmodern writings

contrast,

John Gerard Ruggie) believe

and Emile Durkhiem. Unlike

reject the scientific study

reject social science

and question the possibility of being able

postmodern research. In

draws on the writings of

most

to truly

and

“know”

positivist research as suspect

anything. There are no truths in

constructivists (for

example Alexander Wendt and

that there is an objective reality.

might be on social construction,

it

does exist and

it

of political

However dependent

it

can be understood.

The Rise of Constructivism

The

intellectual roots

of constructivist thought have been traced

Emile Durkheim, and other sociologists. Ruggie argues

to

Max

Weber,

that social constructivists

owe

a

debt to Emile Durkheim for his elucidation of social facts (“linguistic practices,
religious

moral norms, and similar ideational factors”) and

beliefs,

behavior. Ruggie explains that

Max Weber took this

processes whereby certain ideas had
In 1989 Nicholas

Onuf gave

World of Our Making Onuf argued
also use

it

how others

political science.

itself.

Language

is

Onuf states “Fundamental

used as a tool

to

John G. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social

Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, 4

9

In

language to understand the world and

on the world

understand the world.

social

9

term constructivist in

that people use

on

exercise further by exploring “actual

social forces.”

rise to the

to bring their influence to bear

to influence

9

become

their influence

(Autumn

1998), 861.

constructivism

he

human

is

the proposition that

human

beings are social beings, and

we would

not

but for our social relations. In other words,
social relations make or construct

people ... Conversely,

most important way

we make

that

the world what

we go

it is...

[and] talking

about making the world what

World of Our Making Onuf was building on

In

such as Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie,

who

is

undoubtedly the

10
it

is.”

the recent

work of other

scholars

in 1986, stressed the necessity

of

[ojpening up the positivist epistemology to more
interpretive strains.” 11 The work of

Alexander Wendt, who brought attention

John Ruggie who,

in 1989, criticized

to the agent-structure question in
1987,

IR for

its

and

inability to account for historical

transformations were also important precursors to constructivism
in International
Relations.

12

Similarly, in 1988, Robert

research program in IR.

mid

to late

13

These, and

Keohane argued

many

other,

works

for the creation of a “reflective”

in International Relations in the

1980s formed the basis of what would soon become widely understood as

constructivist thought.

10

This quote

is

from

Onuf s

Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism:

later

summary of the argument he made

in

World of Our Making.

A

User’s Manual,” in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul
Kowert, eds. International Relations in a Constructed World (Armonk, NY:
Sharpe, 1998), 59.

ME

11

Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, “International Organization:
Art of the State,” International Organization 40, 4 (Autumn 1986): 753-755.

12

Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem

A

State

in International Relations

of the Art and an

Theory,”

International Organization 41,3, (September 1987): 335-370; and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms,

Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

13

Robert Keohane’s presidential address

and State Power

(Boulder:

Westvew

to the

Press, 1989).

10

ISA; Robert Keohane, International Institutions

However, Wendt

s

1992

article

“Anarchy

is

What

States

Make of It: The

Social

Construction of Power Politics” 14 has become
the seminal work in constructivism.
Wendt
uses the concept of anarchy to

show

that

many

things that are taken as given are
actually

created by our ideas, perceptions, norms,
culture and interactions.

Wendt argues

“that

people act toward objects, including other actors,
on the basis of the meanings that
objects have for them.” 15

university

collective

is,

For example, he explains that “if a society
‘forgets’ what a

the powers and practices of professor and
student cease to exist...

meanings

that constitute the structures

asserts that just as people

have identities

which organize our

actions.”

(like daughter, wife, nurse) so

do

16

It is

He

states (like

superpower, leader of the western alliance, peacekeeper).
Identities are defined as
“relatively stable, role-specific understandings and
expectations about self.” 17
relate to those

people (or states) and

how those

people or states act

is

How others

often based on

those identities. “Identities are the basis of interests.” 18 Interests
will differ based on

“who you

are.”

It is

in the interests

of a professor

so that they can obtain tenure. In contrast,

it

is in

to

conduct research, publish and teach

the interests of a student to learn and

achieve good grades so they can graduate. Similarly,

14

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy

politics,” International

15

16

Ibid, 397.

Ibid,

18

is in

the interests of a state

is what states make of it: the social construction of power
Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

Ibid, 396.

17

it

398.

Ibid, 398.

11

who

identifies itself as a

amongst

fair elections

the

"champion of democracy”

champion

of

its

promote the development of free and

neighbors. Another democratic country
that did not see itself as

democracy” would be

elections in certain

to

less insistent that its

ways and consequently have a

neighbors conduct their

different relationship with those

neighbors.

Contrary to neorealism,

Wendt

argues that the structure of the system
(anarchy)

does not produce the identity and interests of the
actors, but, instead that the
themselves

which

(i.e.

their interests

and

have created the structure of the system

identities)

in turn influences those very interests

we know

it

is

states

and

He

identities.

explains that anarchy as

a creation of the social context. States act like
they are in an self-help

environment - they believe
in activities (building

up

that other states are threatening

their

own armaments

etc.) that

and as a consequence engage

appear threatening to others.

Other states in turn do the same in response, which creates a security
dilemma- and
thereby creates anarchy.

It

becomes a

self-fulfilling

systems evolve trom cycles ot interaction

in

prophecy. “Self-help security

which each party

acts in

teels are threatening to the self, creating expectations that the other

In other words,

we make

our

own

reality

- in

this case

is

ways

that the other

not to be trusted .”

19

an anarchic self-help international

system.

Since

Wendt and Onuf helped

of other IR scholars have

to clarify the constructivist

tried to further test or

implement

constructivist writings have ably demonstrated that

19

Ibid,

406.
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methodology a number

this approach.

norms have

By now,

constitutive effects. For

example, Martha Finnemore
influence of cultural

in

norms on

Finnemore reveals

how certain

organizations. She

shows

National Interests in International
Society examines the
the

development of institutions

international

that states

norms

in

developing countries.

are spread via international

have adopted or changed

their policies

because of the

successful diffusion of an international norm.
For example, Finnemore demonstrates
that

a

number of states adopted

similar science bureaucracies at the

international

norm promoted by

Organization

(UNESCO). 20

security.

the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural

Similarly, Peter Katzenstien’s edited

The Culture of National Security addresses the
,

of state

interests.

same time because of an

role of

volume on national

norms

The chapter by Thomas Risse-Kappen demonstrates

in the construction

that

norms

influenced the formation and persistence of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO).

In another interesting chapter in that volume,
Richard Price and

Nina

Tannenwald examine

the impact of norms about the use of biological,
nuclear, and

chemical weapons on

state actions.

They demonstrate

that

norms of “civilization” and

self-identification as a “civilized” country prevent the spread

weapons.

21

The

late

1980s and 1990s also saw an increase

ideas in international political

20

and use of these types of

economy and

Martha Finnemore, National

in studies that addressed the role

foreign policy. These studies

of

drew on both

Interests in International Society (Ithaca, Cornell University Press

1996).

21

Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO”
The Culture of National Security Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),
and Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons
in

Tabbos”

in the

same volume.

13

the international relations and
comparative politics fields. 22 Judith
Goldstein’s two
articles

ideas

published in International Organization in
1988 and 1989 explored the effect
of

on trade

policy.

and Foreign Policy

23

A few years later Goldstein and Keohane’s edited volume.

identified three types of beliefs
(world-views, normative beliefs and

causal beliefs) and explained the three

maps, focal points and through

ways they can influence

many

other scholars

ideas on policy, acknowledge a debt to Peter
Haas’

Special Issue of International Organization

channels through which

new

to country.”"

4

foreign policy (as road

institutionalization).

Goldstein and Keohane, as well as

from country

Ideas

(

who

study the influence of

work on epistemic communities. The

10 published
')

in

Winter 1992 explored “the

ideas circulate from societies to governments as
well as

These epistemic communities are

"a

network of professionals

with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain
and an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" 25
The members of

~ For example, see Paul Egon Rohrlich,
“Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive
Analysis of Economic Policy Making,” International Organization (Winter
1987); Peter Hall, ed„ The
Political

P ower of Economic Ideas:

1989); and Ernst Haas,

Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1990).

When Knowledge

"’Judith Goldstein, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy," International Organization
43, 1
(Winter 1989); Judith Goldstein, “Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy,” International Organization
42, 1 (Winter 1988); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical
,

Framework,"

in

Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1993). Other works on ideas include: John Kurt Jacobson,

"Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor
Economic Policy," World Politics 47, 2 (January 1995): 283-310; Peter Hall, The Political Power of
Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Albert Yee,
"The Causal Effects of Ideas on Politics," International Organization 50, 1, (Winter 1996); and Peter Haas,
in

,

ed.,

"Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination." Special Issue of International

Organization 46,

24

1

(Winter 1992).

Peter Haas, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination,”

International Organization 46,

1

(Winter 1992), 27.

25

Ibid, 3.
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an epistemic community share a
notions of validity, and have a

set

of normative and principled

beliefs, causal beliefs,

common policy enterprise. The work on epistemic

communities highlights an important pathway
between ideas and norms and
Other

articles

and books primarily examine the

formulation of state interests. The end of the
Cold

War

role

of state

policy.

identity in the

has been traced to changes in

Soviet self-identification and, thus, interests.
Michael Barnett argues that the pan-Arab
identity of countries such as Iraq. Saudia
Arabia, Syria,

aspects of their foreign policies.

based on shared identity
Barnett and

to

He

and Egypt influenced many

also maintains that the U.S.-Israeli
relationship

is

26
.

many of the

contributors to the Katzenstein

volume

tie state identity

domestic characteristics. However, the majority of the
constructivist IR scholarship

focuses on the impact of international norms, rules and ideas
on the formulation of state
interests

and action.

Wendt

s

seminal

article

has been criticized for treating the state as

a unitary actor and ignoring the role of domestic level factors.

and

identities

interests

He emphasizes

of states are created via the interaction among

that

states, ignoring the

role of domestic variables such as politics and national history 28
.

26

Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliances

Security, Peter

~7

The

J.

Katzenstein, ed.

in the

(New York: Columbia

Middle East”

in

The Culture of National

University Press, 1996).

between domestic norms and foreign policies have been studied by scholars such
had a significant influence on foreign policy behavior.
However, most of the literature remains focused on international norms.
as Kier

who

28

interplay

asserts that military culture in France

For criticisms of Wendt’s approach see Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, “Culturing International
A Call for Extension,” in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Yosef Lapid

Relations Theory:

and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 85-104.

15

Most of this
some

literature also ignores

why some

international

norms take hold

countries and not in others. Jeffery T.
Checkel, A. Florini, and

have criticized constructivist scholarship on

this point

29
.

Checkel

in

Andrew Moravcski

states

“Lacking a theory

of domestic agency, constructivism thus
overpredicts international normative
influence

and cannot explain cross-national variation

norms .”

in the constitutive

impact of systemic

30

Thus, the

rise

of constructivism

in International Relations has filled
a

none of the leading theories or approaches attempted

renewed energy

to the study

of ideas,

to

fill.

identities, values, culture,

Politics has long studied domestic factors.

the contributions

made by Comparative

As

and norms to the

The next subsection

program.

Politics

matter to the conduct of international politics- then the origins of norms

29

will review

Paul Kowert and Jeffery Logo assert in Culture
ofNational Security

subject for further study .”

31

The

field.

level variables. In contrast,

Politics scholars to this research

Comparative

that

Constructivism brought a

However, most of constructivist scholarship ignores domestic
Comparative

gap

origins of ideational factors are

more

is

if

“norms

a natural

likely to

be studied

See Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Organization 51, 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-53; Jeffery T. Checkel, “Norms,

Politics,” International
Institutions,

and National Identity

83-1 14; A. Florini,

in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999):
“The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (September

1996): 363-390.

30

3

Jeffery T. Checkel,

'Paul

Kowert and

“Norms,” 83-1

Jeffery Logo,

14.

“Norms,

Identity

Security.

16

and Their Limits,”

in

The Culture ofNational

by comparative

politics scholars. Indeed at times,
this field has explored both the
norms,

values or identities ot particular cultures,
societies or states and the origins
of those

norms

in the particular history

not consciously constructivist.

“[w]hen
scholars

we

in question.

As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink

at

times

make compelling arguments about

knowledge relevant

political culture. Political culture

well-accepted definition
as parties,

Gabriel

is

explain

find instead

more

eclectic

discourses, language, ideas,

in

Comparative

Politics has focused

has been defined in a variety of ways but a
relatively

“the general ‘pattern of orientations’ to political
objects such

government and the

Almond

we

is

to specific thematic areas .” 32

The most well known subset of this research
on

However, most of this research

look for constructivists in comparative politics,

who

culture, or

of the entity

constitution, expressed in beliefs,

symbols and values .” 33

traces the history of the study of political culture to thinkers
such as

Max

Weber, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Walter Lippman, and Harold
Lasswell, among
others

34
.

Most
and

political

32

political culture research

is

concerned with the relationship among culture

and economic development. The seminal work

in this field

was The Civic

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program
Relations and Comparative Politics,” Animal Reviews Political Science 4 (2001): 391-416.

in International

33

34

Andrew Hey wood. Key Concepts

in Politics

(New York:

Gabriel A. Almond, “The Study of Political Culture,”

Crothers and Charles Lockhart, eds.

(New York:

St.

in

Palgrave, 2000), 216.

Culture and Politics:

Martin’s Press, 2000), 5-20.

17

A Reader, Lane

C allure, written by Gabriel Almond and
Sidney Verba

in

1

963.

35

After analyzing the

politics office countries, they argue
that a nation’s political culture
influences the social

and

political

behavior

in that nation

by establishing the norms

Almond and Verba demonstrated

society.

that are followed in a

that the cultural characteristics
of Anglo-Saxon

democracies differed from those of Italy and Germany.
They found greater levels of trust

and subjective

political

competence

in the

United States and Britain and linked those

factors to democracy.

After the release of the Civic Culture other
scholars adopted similar models to

explain the effect of culture on political behavior.
Aaron Wildavsky
to our understanding of this relationship

made

a contribution

by developing a typology of cultures. Wildavsky

borrowed from the work of anthropologist, Mary Douglas,
types of cultures (egalitarian, hierarchical, individualistic,

to posit that there are five

fatalistic,

and hermit).

36

Lucian

Pye‘s examination of culture and politics in Asia demonstrated
that cultural differences

between the

volume

societies resulted in distinct political patterns. 37 Larry

Political Culture

35

Gabriel A.

and Democracy

in

Diamond’s edited

Developing Counties presented extensive

Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown,
1963); and
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Princeton: Princeton University Press

1979).

36

Aaron Wildavsky, “Change in Political Culture,” Politics 20 (1985): 95-102; Aaron Wildavsky,
“Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,”
American Political Science Review 81, (1987): 3-21; Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron
,

Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

37

.

Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge,

Harvard University Press, 1985).
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MA:

cross-national evidence linking culture
and
controversial.

Underdevelopment

that the culture in

is

democracy

38
.

Lawrence Harrision’s

a State of Mind- The Latin American
Case argued

most Latin American countries hampered
development

Working from an understanding of Southern
European and
culture

and

history,

Howard

significant explanatory role.

Southern Europe
society

it

is

J.

Wiarda has long maintained

Wiarda

necessary to

of the countries

in the

key to understanding Latin America
political culture

and tradition

40
.

Similarly,

38

on the

political

In

America or

The Soul of Latin America he argues

lies in its distinct political culture.

Wiarda and Margaret Macheish Mott

‘s

that the

Latin American

political theory

Catholic Roots and

as national identity and Catholic

development of Spain and Portugal

Larry Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy

Lynne Rienner

have a

understand the historical cultural background
and

Democratic Flowers examine such ideational features
tradition

that cultural factors

has evolved from a corporatist. Catholic, conservative

41
.

American

asserts that to properly understand
Latin

first

region

Latin

39
.

in

42
.

Developing Countries, (Boulder:

Publishers, 1993).

39

Lawrence E. Harrision, Underdevelopment is a State of Mind- The Latin American Case
(Cambridge, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Lanham MD: University Press of
America, 1985).

40

Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience (Amherst;
University of Massachusetts Press, 1977); Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and National Development in
Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981); and Howard J. Wiarda, Politics and Social Change in
Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

41

42

Howard

J.

Wiarda, The Soul of Latin America

Howard

J.

Wiarda and Margaret MacLeish Mott, Catholic Roots and Democratic Flowers:
and Portugal (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001).

Political Systems in Spain

19

(New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2001).

Furthermore, Wiarda argues that Western
scholars often make the mistake
of

assuming

that other societies

assumptions.

He

have Anglo-American worldviews and

has also pointed out that the United
States’ foreign policy suffers
from

ethnocentrism, especially in

its

dealing with developing regions, and
more recently,

Wiarda and others examined the impact of indigenous
political

development

Lipset,

who compares Canadian and American values and

and law abiding than

cultural differences to the

among

their northern neighbors

American Revolution

their

other things, that Americans

and

ties the origins

of these

44
.

In another important study, Robert

the results ot a comparative examination of
different regions in Italy in

which he concluded
en g a E emen b

economic and

43

related behaviors, is another example. Lipset
argues,

Putnam published

traditions in social,

.

Seymour Martin

are less elitist

cultural

that

good government depended on a

Though often

criticized, scholars

political culture

of civic

of political culture have provided an

important basis tor understanding the roots and influence of these
normative factors.

Ronald Inglehart's ongoing empirical research has complemented
political cultural studies.

During the

last thirty

the

work of

years Inglehart has conducted a series of

extensive surveys in North America and Europe that traced the influence of generational

43

Howard Wiarda, Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World?
(Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985) and Howard J. Wiarda,
ed. Non-western Theories of Development: Regional Norms versus Global Trends (Fort Worth: Harcourt
Brace, 1999).

44

Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: the values and institutions of the United States and
Canada (New York Routledge, 1990), and Lipset, American exceptionalism a double-edged sword (Hew
:

York

:

W.W.
45

:

Norton, 1996).

Robert Putnam, Making democracy work: civic traditions

University Press, 1993).

20

in

modern

Italy (Princeton: Princeton

change on culture (including

political culture)

and

its

effect

on the

political system.

Inglehart describes the rise of postmateriaiist
values in prosperous societies. His
survey

data supports the view that
issues related to

more and more people

in these countries are caring
less about

economic or physical security and more about values

like free

protecting the environment. In Culture Shift he
argued that political culture

is

speech or
integral to

both economic and political development. 46

Other scholars have discussed the international
implications of cultural
differences. In 1993,

Samuel

P.

Huntington hypothesized that culture has a greater

influence on individuals than other variables including
economic or political systems.

He

argued the cultural differences among civilizations (Western,
Islamic, Confucian, Slavic-

Orthodox, Latin American, and Hindu) will produce inevitable

However,
civic culture

the study of political culture has

framework came under

fire for

conflict.

had numerous

47

critics.

For example, the

downplaying the importance of citizen

participation in democracies, ignoring the diversity of culture within nations,
and for

being deterministic (political culture as a cause of democracy, not as a result of

democracy) among

others.

48

46

Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing values and political style among western
publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Ronald Inglehart, Changing Culture (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989); Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in advanced industrial society
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Ronald Inglehart, Modernization

and Postmodernization

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

47

Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72, 3, (1993): 22-49;
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1996).

48

For example, dependency theory argued that international

explained the lack of economic development and democracy

in

Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development
of California Press, 1979).
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factors, not political culture,

developing countries. See Fernando
in Latin

America (Berkeley: University

Comparative

The

field

identities

Politics research has not

been limited to studies of political

culture.

has also addressed other ideational
variables. Comparative politics
research on

comes

the closest to the type of constructivism

employed by

International

Relations theorists. In Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin

Nationalism Benedict Anderson describes the
,

the rise of creative

rise

and Spread of

of nationalism. Anderson argues that

ways of thinking about time and

territory, the

development of print

capitalism and vernacular languages allowed
people to imagine themselves as a

community. He maintains
In

variables;

that

almost

summary, Comparative
most notably,

However, most of these

all,

but the earliest communities, were imagined. 49

Politics has long studied a

political culture

and

its

studies have not deeply

variables and foreign policy, as

we do

number of ideational

influence on political development.

examined the relationship between these

in this study.

Comparative Foreign Policy
Just as the general Comparative Politics literature has widely -other than
a

exceptions'

0
-

few notable

ignored foreign policy, the scholars that study comparative foreign policy

do not emphasize the importance of cultural or constructivist

variables.

Comparative foreign policy as a discipline has only become recognized

40

years. In

49

many

respects,

James Rosenau was

in the last

the seminal scholar of the field.

He

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).

50

Some comparative

foreign policy.

In

politics scholars such as Howard Wiarda do address both cultural factors and
American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes he addresses the role of numerous

factors in foreign policy, including political culture.

22

argued that the field of foreign policy
that had traditionally utilized
the single case study
could benefit from the comparative
method that was

at that time,

very popular with

scholars studying domestic level politics.
However, he explained in order to conduct

meaningful comparisons,
asserted,

was

we

need to develop general theories.

to formulate a pre-theoretical

framework

that

A starting point, he

would assess

the relative

importance of the numerous variables involved in
foreign policy behavior. In
article

this

1966

he provided readers with an example of a
pre-theory that organized variables

important in explaining foreign policy behavior into
five categories and then

demonstrated

how we

could rank the variables in terms of relevance for
different types of

51

states.

In the

1970s and 1980s the

behavioral approach.

field

of comparative foreign policy emphasized the

A number of large-scale, cross national

Comparative Research on the Events of Nations
Analysis (IB A) were produced.

research projects such as the

(CREON) and

the Interstate Behavioral

CREON researchers investigated the influence of a wide

scope of variables ranging from leaders’ personality characteristics to the
international

system/ ~

In these studies, cultural

in discussions

and ideational factors were only touched upon, mainly

of personality types or national

attributes, in

which

“cultural

homogeneity”

51

James N. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to
Comparative and International Politics, R. Barry Farrell, ed. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press
1966).

52

CREON

produced many articles and books but the most comprehensive summary of the project
Maurice East, Stephen Salmore, and Charles Hermann eds. Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1978). For information about IBA see Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al., Foreign Policy
Behavior: The Interstate Behavioral Analysis Model (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1980).
is

found

in

23

was one of the many

factors discussed along side
others, such as territorial size and
level

of development. 53
In the 1980s a subtle shift

policy.

Laura Neack claims

and comparative

relations

The

began

field

to rely

began

to

occur in the study of comparative
foreign

that the blurring

politics fields

of the division between the international

had an impact on comparative foreign

more on domestic

policy.

factors studied in comparative politics. 54

More

scholars began to look at the relationship between
societal factors such as culture, and

foreign policy.

A good example was Robert Dallek’s

Policy: Cultural Politics

and Foreign Affairs

,

The American Style of Foreign

written in 1983. However, most of these

studies locused on political culture, reflecting the
blurring of the divisions between these

two

fields.

By

the mid-1990s, the field had undergone a significant
transformation, to the

extent that today’s scholarship no longer refers to itself as
Comparative Foreign Policy,

but instead as Foreign Policy Analysis.'

field include a return to the case study

literature,

5

Some of the main

method and the

features of the transformed

utilization

of wider body of

including comparative politics, international relations, political economy, and

psychology.

53

54

See East

et al.,

Why Nations Act.

Laura Neack, Jeanne Hey, and Patrick Haney, “Generational Change

Analysis,” in Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity

Jeanne Hey, and Patrick Haney, eds. (Englewood

55

See Neack,

et al,.

and Change
Cliffs,

in Its

in

Foreign Policy

Second Generation, Laura Neack,

NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995),

7.

Foreign Policy Analysis for a discussion of the transformation of the

24

field.

Though
developed

the majority of scholars of foreign
policy

in constructivist research, 56 there
has

do not

utilize the concepts

been some attempt

to integrate these

concepts into the study ot foreign policy. 57 One
of the most notable efforts was Judith
Goldstein and Robert Keohane’s edited volume
Ideas and Foreign Policy:
Institutions

and Political Change?* Goldstein and Keohane and

argued that people

The new

s beliefs

literature

Beliefs,

the other contributors

helped to explain foreign policy decisions.

on comparative foreign policy includes a number
of studies

about the role of constructivist concepts like culture,
metaphors and cognitive models and
a few others have adopted a self-consciously constructivist
approach. For example,
Patrick Haney’s 1997 article, “Soccer Fields and Submarines
in Cuba:

Problem Definition,” argues

The

that crises are, to a large extent, politically

Politics

of

and socially

constructed. In 1970, the United States discovered that the
Soviets were building a

submarine base

in Cienfuegos,

the U.S. reaction.

He

Cuba. Haney uses a constructivist framework

to explain

argues that perceptions determined that the issue would be

considered a non-crisis.

Studies like Haney’s are likely to

become more numerous

since

The bibliography of Foreign Policy Analysis does not include any constructivist scholarship.
However, the chapter by V Spike Peterson, “The Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism,” and the
chapter by Keith L. Shimko, “Foreign Policy Metaphors: ‘Falling Dominos’ and Drug ‘Wars’” utilize
constructivist concepts and ideas (although the Peterson chapter does not address foreign policy).

57

Exceptions include: Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York:
M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and American Values (Itasca, 1L: Peacock
Publishers, 1985) and Wiarda’s American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes.
Praeger, 1965); James

58

Political

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, Ideas

Change

59

and Foreign

Patrick Haney, “Soccer Fields and Submarines in Cuba:

NWC Review

(

Policy: Beliefs, Institutions

and

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

The

Politics

of Problem Definition.”

http://www.navv.mil/press/Review/1997/autumn/art5-a97.htm ) July

25

7,

2001.

divisions

among

the subfields

seem

to be blurring, reflecting the
shared

emphasis on

these variables.

In

summary, though

this is

identity and other ideational

International Relations

addressed

The

cultural variables

and Foreign Policy. In

many of these

constructivist

and

changing, the role of domestic level
ideas, perceptions,

factors, yet

many

have been largely neglected by
both

contrast,

Comparative

Politics has

comparativists do not study foreign policy.

IR approach comes the closest

to elucidating the relationship

between

these vanables and foreign policy, but
often neglects the constitutive effects
of domestic
ideational factors

on foreign policy and international

relations.

Thus, this current study endeavors to combine
International Relations.

Comparative Foreign Policy and Comparative
the

American and Canadian approaches

to

Politics to account for the dissimilarity
in

Cuba.

I

argue that domestic level ideational

variables are mainly responsible for the widely divergent
Canadian and American

approaches to Cuba.

Definitions

The key

variables that are used to identify ideational influence are defined
below:

Identity has been defined as “the state of being similar to

some

actors and different

from

others in a particular circumstance. Identity involves the creation of boundaries
that
separate the self and other /'

and international actors

60

Chafetz

60

Identity can be based

(like the rest

on

territory, ethnicity, culture or ideas

of us) can have multiple and sometimes conflicting

et al., viii.

26

identities. Identity creates

norms

that

tell

who we

us

are and

what we should do

in

a

particular situation.

Ideas -are defined as mental constructs, views
or beliefs political actors have about
some
aspect of the world around them.’ ,6, Shared
ideas (or culture) influence identity.

Culture “refers

to a set

of ideas or beliefs that are institutionalized,
persist over time and

are associated with a particular

community. Cultures,

in other words, adhere to specific

groups by definition and differentiate them from other
groups in a system .” 62

Constructively speaking, culture
independently, culture

is

is

socially shared ideas.

Though

it

can exist

one of the elements of identity.

Perceptions are understandings of people, things, or situations.
Perceptions are

immediately formed but often persist over time. Perceptions both
construct
are contructed

Norms

by

identities.

identities

Perceptions can create and reinforce norms.

are often defined as standards of behavior. “In a descriptive sense,
a

to a behavioral regularity, that

is,

the

way an

actor usually behaves, and

it

norm

way

in

which an actor ought

to

behave .”

refers

often refers to a

pattern of behavior developed over an extended period. In a prescriptive sense, a
refers to the

and

norm

63

61

Ibid.

62

1 am borrowing Sheri Berman’s definition. See Sheri Berman, “Ideas and Culture in Political
Analysis. ” Paper presented at the Ideas, Culture and Political Analysis Workshop, Princeton University,

May

15-16. (https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/ssr01/ssr01ae.html 1998).

b}

Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms

Political Science

Review 91, 2 (June 1997): 339-60.
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in Crisis

Bargaining," American

Interests are “those beliefs that actors
actually have about

needs, “ and

'‘are

how

to

meet

their identity

64
the proximate motivation for
behavior .”

A National
Though most

Level Theory

constructivist theorizing addresses the
systemic level, this study

employs constructivist concepts

to explain foreign policy behavior.
This study,

though

recognizing the importance of force and self-interest
in foreign policy formation,

emphasize the role of socially shared ideas and perceptions.
Constructivists focus,

to

varying degrees, on ideas, identities, cultures and norms.

Constructivism can help explain

how

states

respond differently

to the

same

international situation or issue. This study will demonstrate
that the different responses
arise

from the different

cultures, ideas, perceptions,

and

identities

of the

states in

question. These differences cause states to view, understand, and
interpret situations
differently.

Wendt

explains: “actors need to define the situation before they can
choose a

He

course of action.”

considerations: Their

asserts that: “these definitions will be based

own

are in such situations;

identities

no

and

identities

and

interests,

and what they think others

interests.”

which

will do,

on

at least

reflect beliefs about

which

two

who

reflect beliefs

Thus, “when these various beliefs are not shared,

they

about their

when

there

is

cultural definition of the situation, then actors are likely to be surprised by each

other’s behavior

64

This

is

.” 65
.

.

Alexander Wendt’s definition of subjective

Politics (Cambridge:

65

.

Cambridge University

Wendt, Social Theory,

1

Press, 1999), 232.

86.
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interests in Social

Theory of International

Much of constructivist

theorizing ignores domestic contexts.
However,

scholars allude to national level variables.
In passing,

competing knowledge. He explains
parts of this

knowledge

are shared

'‘states

- not

know

all,

Wendt allows

that states

many
can have

a lot about each other, and
important

to be sure, but important parts
nonetheless.

States and scholars alike treat these shared
beliefs as the background,
taken-for-granted

assumptions that any competent player or student
of contemporary world
understand: what a “state"

knowledge
category-

is

is,

what “sovereignty” implies ....” 66 But what
happens when

not shared at the system level? This study
looks at Wendt’s “not all”

when knowledge

isn't

shared between states,

when

competing, taken-for-granted assumptions. Wendt
refers to

He

must

politics

states

this

have their own,

knowledge as “private.”

recognizes that, "[pjrivate knowledge consists of
beliefs that individual actors hold

that others

do

not. In the case

of states

domestic or ideological considerations.

this

It

kind of knowledge will often stem from

can be a key determinant of how

states

frame

international situations and define their national interests .” 67
This study departs from the

mainstream constructivism of scholars

like

knowledge. Competing cultures, ideas and

Wendt by focusing on
identities are a

this “private’

major source of tension

in the

international system and thus are important for a complete understanding
of international
relations.

This study

relations.

The

is

interested in comparative politics, foreign policy and international

state is the

main

actor in the international system but to fully understand

66

Ibid, 158.

67

Ibid, 141.
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the

“why” of state

level factors.

It is

action

it

is

necessary to open the black box and
delve into domestic

not just international culture that
constructs a state’s identity and

corresponding behavior but also domestic
level culture, identity and ideas.

about

itself

and

its

environment influence the

state’s actions

and

A state’s ideas

in turn those actions

can

reinforce the state’s identity, culture and
ideas; thus creating reality as they
understand

The
is

constructivist adage that

“we want what we want because of how we

just as true for national foreign policy
formation as

Foreign policy

is

based on norms and interests that

(identities are constructed

The following schematic

it

is

for

think about

it.

68
it”

system level processes.

are, in turn constituted

by

identities

by a combination of ideas, culture and values)
and perceptions.

illustrates the

connections

Figure
Identity (Includes values/ideas/culture)

1

:

among

the variables:

Pathways

—

^.Norms/Interests

^.Actions/Policies

Perceptions

For simplicity,

this

schematic does not reveal

variables.

Each variable,

However,

the solid lines represent the

all

the causal pathways

among

the

to varying degrees, is able to influence the other variables.

main

lines

of causality. The following eight

chapters will demonstrate that the United States and Canada have been continually

puzzled by the other’s approach to Castro’s Cuba because of the identity differences and
the lack of ideational and cultural consensus.

68

Ibid, 119.
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Methodolopy
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink
discuss the methodology used
by
constructivists.

They

assert constructivists:

judge an interpretation of evidence by
comparing it with alternative explanations
They search for evidence that would confirm
alternatives and disconfirm the
explanation being assessed. They ask if an
explanation is supported by multiple
streams of data. For example, they examine
whether speech acts are consistent
with other kinds of behavior in a case under
investigation; whether qualitative
in mgs are supported by or at least
consistent with relevant statistical
data; and
whether actors explain and justify action in similar

ways

in private versus in public 69
).

Finnemore and Sikkink

list

in different settings (e
h v

g

the variety of methods used by
constructivists, including:

“discourse analysis, process tracing, genealogy, structured
focused comparisons,
70
interviews, participant observation, and content
analysis .”

This study will
tracing, interviews,

are supported

utilize

many of these methods

and content analysis and

including comparisons, process

will demonstrate that the conclusions

by multiple data streams. One of the main methods used

process tracing. According to

method of process

tracing

Andrew Bennett and Alexander George

is to

drawn

in this study is

the “general

generate and analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or

processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that
link putative

causes to observed effects .”

69

71

This involves both narrowing the

list

of alternative

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program
Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Reviews Political Science 4 (2001): 391-416.

in International

70

71

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock, ”391-416.

Andrew Bennett and Alexander

L. George, “Process Tracing in

MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, October
(

Case Study Research,”

17-19, 1997

http://web.mit.edu/17.802/wvw/Bennett/Process%20Tracina%20CS%20Research.htm ), August
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7,

2001.

explanations and gathering evidence that
supports your hypothesis. Bennett
and George

acknowledge
similar

that “it will

be

difficult to resolve fully the

outcomes occurring through

problem of equifinality, or of

different causal processes,

potential rival explanations but one,
especially

when human

and

to eliminate all

agents are involved

who may

be doing their best to conceal causal
processes. But process tracing forces
the investigator
to take equifinality into

causal

mechanisms

to

culture, perceptions,

account ...*’

outcomes,

norms and

72
I

use the following three research tools
to link

in this

case to link ideational factors (ideas,
values,

identities) to

each country’s approach and policy toward

Cuba.
Interviews have been conducted with contemporary
and past Canadian and

American policymakers, including ambassadors, and other
high
capitals as well as in

level officials in both

Cuba. Similar questions were asked of all people interviewed.

My

questions were designed to reveal the interviewee’s basic
perceptions of their country’s
relationship with Cuba. All those interviewed

questions about factors that they
island.

They were

also asked

felt

more

were

first

asked broad open-ended

explained their country’s relationship with the

specific questions that addressed alternative

explanations (for example the role of the Cuban- American lobby in the U.S. and
the role

of economic factors

in the

Canadian policy). They were also asked

their country s culture, history

and international standing

(ie

if they

thought that

a superpower or middle

power) had any influence. In addition, more specific questions about the relationship

were posed

that revealed the importance

of certain perceptions, ideas and

72

Ibid.
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identities.

For

example,

I

officials in

was

Cuba

Second,

Havana during

in

I

the Elian crisis

and asked Canadian and American

for their opinions of the situation.

have researched archives, primary
documents and secondary

on both Canadian and American policy toward
Cuba. For example,
and speeches for evidence of the
relations with

Cuba.

media (newspapers)
to both countries.

1

I

beliefs

and ideas

that

I

examined

literature

legislation

dominate the discourse about

have also examined public opinion
polls and the content of major

to determine the general public
opinion

of Cuba and

its

relationship

demonstrate that norms, identities, and
perceptions correlate with

domestic policy statements and debates as well
as public opinion.

Answers obtained

during confidential interviews were then compared
with public statements and documents
(both declassified and public) to further determine
the accuracy of the information.
Lastly,

I

consider alternative explanations of both policies
to determine their

relevance and to minimize the possibility that the actors are
only responding as though

they were influenced by the constructivist variables under
consideration but in reality
their actions

and rhetoric were

in

response to other variables.

Summary
This study uses the constructivist framework but studies a topic more frequently

addressed in the comparative foreign policies scholarship, as

between domestic factors and foreign policy.
have considerable constitutive

effects

It

and can,

norms.
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shows

it

examines the interplay

that these domestic factors can

at times,

counter strong international

It

will

demonstrate the connection between
ideational variables and foreign
policy

by examining the Cuba policies of
the United States and Canada.
The

traditional

explanations do not offer complete
accounts of the reasons/or each
policy nor can they
explain the difference in the two
approaches.

examined

offer

some

I

will

show

that

Realism and other theories

valuable insights but that they have
difficulty explaining crucial

aspects of the policies. This study offers
an alternative view of both policies,
one that
reveals the importance of culture, norms,
values, ideas, perceptions, and
identities. Not

only can these variables provide explanations
for each approach but they can
also explain

why Canadian and American

policies continue to diverge,

cold war.
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even well

after the

end of the

CHAPTER 2

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CUBA
Even though Napoleon Bonaparte
(1769-1821) was
“History

is

largely correct

when he

the version of past events that
people have decided to agree upon,”

understand the present without

first

said:

we cannot

attempting to understand history. This
chapter

provides the historical context for the rest
of the study by briefly outlining the
history of

Cuba, from the time of the European explorers

to the

War

Post Cold

era.

The Colonial Period
Christopher Columbus was the

Columbus landed on

first

European

to explore

He had found an

island that

Europeans. Cuba’s location

at the

made

call

it

of 1492

fall

the largest island in the Caribbean; totaling
44,218 square miles

(114, 525 square km), 760 miles long and 120 miles wide at

of England.

Cuba. In the

an excellent port ot

Conquistadores such as

Heman

would prove

to

its

widest,

it is

about the size

be very attractive to the

entrance to the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico

on the journeys between Latin America and Spain.
Cortes visited Cuba in the early 1500s on their

way

to

and from the continent.

Given the favorable climate and landscape,
Europeans began

to look

the perfect climate-

the

was not long before other

toward Cuba as more than a way-station. Cuba seemed

warm, but not too

summer and 22°C /72°F

winds and ocean

it

hot,

in the winter

to

have

with an average temperature of 27°C /81°F in

months, blessed by cooling northeast trade

currents. Furthermore, the island has adequate rainfall
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and relatively

flat

plains suitable for agricultural
production.

established the

In 151 1,

another Spaniard, Diego Velazquez,

European permanent settlement on the
eastern end of the

first

Governor of Cuba

1

until

1

As

524, Velazquez expanded the Spanish hold
over the island by

fighting the indigenous peoples (the
Tainaos,

Ciboneys and Guanahatabeyes were
almost

completely wiped out soon after the arrival
of the Europeans) and
the

island.

settling Spaniards into

newly created towns. 2
Havana, one of the settlements established by
Diego Velazquez, became an

important port. Havana was established around
a naturally deep harbor and was
considered the ideal meeting point for Spanish
ships returning to Spain. After collecting

cargo from various Latin American colonies the
ships would meet and fonn a

Havana, returning
torts

was

Spain together. The harbor was well protected
by the Spanish

to

and by the heavy chain
installed

darkness.

that

was placed

built

across the entrance to the harbor. The chain

each evening to prevent enemies from attacking the ships
under the cover of

The

well-fortified city

being destroyed by

The

flotilla in

fire

rich soil

twice in

soon became center of European
its first fifty

life in

Cuba, despite

years.

and the promise of mineral wealth (which never

really materialized)

soon led to the influx of another group; Europeans brought African slaves
mid- 1520s. In

this early period, slaves

worked

in the gold

to

Cuba

in the

mines, in early industries or

1

The three mountain ranges- the Sierra Maestra,
Organos comprise approximately 25% of the land area.

2

Much of this

The

forts built to protect

San Salvador de

la

Mountains and the Sierra de

los

information was drawn from Jaime Suchlicki, Historical Dictionary of Cuba

(Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press,

J

the Tridad

Inc., 1988).

Havana were

the Castillo de los Tres

Punta.
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Reyes

del

Morro and

Castillo de

as servants in

Havana households.

colonies, 4many

working

in

In contrast to systems of slavery
in other

of the slaves brought

to

Cuba were

New World

eventually freed, especially
those

Havana. During the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries the significant

number of freed slaves distinguished Cuba
from other

colonial holdings in the region
at

this time.

Cuba remained

in

Spanish hands for most of the following
four centuries. At

various points during the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries,
Spanish
control over

Cuba was challenged by French and Dutch

representatives of the English throne.
again, under Spanish control

enormous influence over

Cuban market
island.

Cuba

fell to

by 1763.' However,

pirates as well as

by

the English in 1762 but was, once
in that short period, the British

the island. British merchants flocked to
Havana, opening

to foreigners.

They

also dramatically increased the

up the

number of slaves on

the

6

The Catholic Church played an important

role in early

Cuban

life. Initially

devoted to converting the indigenous populations, the church soon
insinuated
all

had an

aspects of the

4

British in

Cuban

society and

economy, even owning and operating

itself into

their

own

This tradition did not survive into the eighteenth century. The slaves bought to the island
by the
rise of the sugar industry in the 800s contributed to a large increase in
the number

1762 and the

1

of slaves.

5

See Allan J. Kuethe, Cuba, 1753-1815: Crown, Military and Society (Knoxville, TN: The
University of Tennessee Press, 1986) for additional information on this period in Cuban history.

6

The Spanish controlled Cuban government had limited the number of slaves being brought to
of a slave revolt. See Hugh Thomas, “Cuba, c. 1750-1860,” in Cuba a short
Leslie Bethell, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1-20.

island because of the fear

history

:
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the

sugar mills. Even so, the church in
Cuba never achieved the control

American countries during

this

same

it

did in other Latin

period.

During the eighteenth century tobacco
was Cuba’s primary export crop.
However,
it

was soon discovered

that the island

was

perfect for

growing sugar, especially

Haitian revolt (1795-1805) ruled out
sugar production there.
nineteenth century the island

economy had become

By

after the

the beginning of the

structured around the production
and

export of this commodity, foreshadowing
Cuba’s life-long reliance on foreign
markets

and

the

havoc that

this type

of dependency would wreak on the economy.
Even

early eighteen hundreds, Cuba’s

economy

in the

suffered from the unreliable nature of
a

mono-

crop economy reliant on foreign markets. In
1807, the United States, the largest market
for

Cuban

Spain

s

sugar.

sugar, had refused to trade with any of the
belligerents of the Napoleonic wars.

involvement in the wars effectively eliminated the
American demand

for

Cuban

Consequently, only one-third of the sugar produced on
the island was sold that

year.

The Napoleonic wars

much

also strained Spain’s control over the colonies.
Spain

was

too busy fighting European enemies and the Spanish fleet too
crippled, to maintain

Spain’s heretofore secure reign over the island. The people of Cuba,
aware of the
successful

American and French revolutions and of revolts

colonies, began to think about launching their

7

8

Thomas, “Cuba,

c.

1750-1860.”

Thomas, “Cuba,

c.

1750-1860.”
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own

in other Latin

American

attempt for independence. Thus,

Cuba's

first

of many unsuccessful bids

revolt in 1809.

for

independence from colonial control
erupted in

9

After the Napoleonic wars the Spanish
re-established firm control over
their

Cuban
the

colony.

Americans

Moving
to

forty thousand troops into

Cuba and

refusing repeated offers by

purchase the island, Spain was determined
not

colonial holding in the Americas. 10

By 1815 Cuba’s

to lose

another valuable

population had reached almost

600,000." Cuba was becoming a very profitable
colony, exporting sugar as well as
coffee,

rum and tobacco. The many Cuban towns and

cities

were thriving

as the

surrounding lands were consumed by agricultural
production. Spain was determined to

hang onto the colony

at all costs.

Writings of this period in Cuban history describe
a rich and beautiful country. For

example, one visitor

of the

city... the

to

Cuba

in the mid-nineteenth century wrote:
“Passing the suburbs

road breaks out into the beautiful open country,
threading

its

narrow way

through rich plantations and thriving farms, whose vegetable
treasures of every
description can scarcely be paralleled on the face of the earth.” 12
In addition, a
substantial infrastructure

9

was evolving

to support the flourishing agricultural production.

Jorge Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1978).

10

Thomas, “Cuba,

c.

1750-1860.”

" Kuethe, 175.

12

(New

Benjamin M. Morman, Rambles by Land and Water, or Notes of Travel in Cuba and Mexico
Quoted in Louis A. Perez Jr. Winds of Change (Chapel Hill: The University of
845), 50-5

York,

1

1

.

North Carolina Press, 2001), 40.
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For example, the

first railroad in the

Caribbean and Latin America was

Cuba

built in

in

1837 to transport sugar cane. 13
Despite economic success, the idea of
Cuban independence continued to
percolate

under the surface of Cuban economic
and

political life.

century this idea was once again gaining
strength.
lack of control over their

own government and

By

the middle of the nineteenth

The high

taxes imposed by Spain, the

bureaucracy, increasing discrimination
by

the Spaniards in Cuba, and the failure
of Spain and other European powers
to conquer

other independence

The push

for

movements

in the region, contributed to

independence came to a boiling point

in

support for independence.

1867 when the proposals of the

Junta de Informat ion an elected body of Cuban,
Puerto Rican and Philippine
,

representatives created to discuss reforms in the
colonies, were ignored by the Spanish

government.

14

This insult added to the resentment caused by
the recent economic decline

and the injustices of the Spanish government, and created
a renewed wave of interest

in

independence.
Consequently,

in

1

868 a group led by a sugar planter, Carlos Manuel de

Cespedes, freed their slaves and formed a rebel army. They issued the
‘Grito de Yara’
that declared

Cuban independence and

the rebels eventually lost this war, the

Ten Years War (1868-1878). Though

started the

Cuban sense of nationality

that

was

solidified

during the ten-year struggle, inspired future attempts to achieve independence.

13

Thomas, “Cuba,

c.

1750-1860,”

Luis E. Aguilar, “Cuba,

Cambridge University

c.

1

15.

860- 1 930,”

in

Cuba a

Press, 1993), 21-56.
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:

short history Leslie Bethell, ed.

(New York:

The war and

the failure of the rebel forces
led to the creation of the
Autonomist

party. This political party

was dedicated

to the goal

of Cuban autonomy, but not

necessarily independence, and to achieving
that end by peaceful

Autonomist party enjoyed considerable support

many

to gain

Spain in

1

life to

870

Marti

is

revered in

Cuba

for being critical of the Spanish

serious

Cuban

exile groups

that

was formed

As

a

1

892.

young man he was deported

government. After living
to

in

as the father of the nation. Marti

the cause of Cuban independence.

Mexico, Guatemala and Venezuela, he moved
various

were not able

concessions from the Spanish government,
their voice was eventually

this day, Jose

devoted his

The

only.

for awhile, but since they

drowned out by Jose Marti’ s Cuban Revolutionary
party

To

means

in

Europe.

New York, where he organized the

and planned for a war to free his homeland.

The economy once again helped spark

rebellion.

blow

many of them

to the landed aristocracy, forcing
15

mills, often to rich

Americans.

influence over the

Cuban economy, over

Though

The Ten Years War
sell their

the United States already

the next

involvement in the Cuban economy continued

to

few decades,
grow.

16

the

struck a

land and sugar

had considerable

American

Consequently, in 1895, when

the United States imposed the Wilson Tariff on sugar, dramatically
reducing the

amount

of Cuban sugar being purchased by Americans, the Cuban economy took a serious
downturn. The economic

crisis initiated

movement

needed.

15

the impetus

Aguilar, “Cuba,

it

c.

to

by the Wilson Tariff gave Jose Marti’s

1860-1930.”
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Jose Marti planned a

fast

and powerful rebellion that would
oeeur simultaneously

throughout the country. However, before he
could launch his rebellion the United
States

government discovered

become aware of his

his plans,

plot,

minus the confiscated war

down on

and confiscated his arms and

ships. Since

Marti was forced to follow through with
the planned rebellion,
materials, before the Spanish authorities
had time to

the rebels in Cuba. Thus,

on February 24, 1895, Marti’ s bands rose

opposition in five regions of the country. Spain
did not have a problem

overpowering the insurgents

in the

in the eastern regions

Spanish forces.

17

killed in battle.

Gomez and

1

The

clamp

in

initially

western areas of Matanzas and Havana. The
rebels

had better luck

In April ot

Spain had

of the country where they took on much
smaller

895 the Spanish struck a blow to the revolutionaries
when Marti was
leadership of the rebellion

Captain Antonio Maceo. They

constitution. Salvador Cisneros Betancourt

to rage, killing thousands, including

set

was assumed by General Jose Miguel
up a government council and drafted a

was named

president. Yet, the

war continued

Maceo, and destroying property. Cubans who were

not personally fighting on either side were corralled into compounds,
often without

enough food. Herding people
the economy.

It

into these concentration

camps

also completely destroyed

wasn't long before news of the brutality of the war and

its

economic

consequences reached an international audience, including Americans, who were
emotionally and financially invested

in

Cuba.

18

17

Ibid.

18

329 - 355

Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The

Pursuit of Freedom

.

42

(New York: Harper and Row

Publishers, 1971),

LLS- Involvement:

Thus, in

1

1

898 and the Aftermath

898 the Americans, under the pretext

that the U.S. battleship

Maine was

destroyed in the Havana harbor inserted
themselves into the conflict. Under
the
leadership of President McKinley, the
Americans fought against the Spanish but

distanced themselves from the

Cuban

rebels

and ignored the rebel government. 19
After

defeating the Spanish, American forces
occupied the island and a peace treaty
that ended

Spanish control over Cuba was signed without
Cuban participation. The American
occupation lasted from 1899 until 1902. In 1901,
the U.S. Congress added the

Amendment

to the

Cuban

Constitution which gave

Cuba

the status of an

Platt

American

protectorate, allowing the United States to intervene
in the internal affairs of the island.

Cuba had

substituted one “colonial” master for another.

The sheer magnitude of US involvement and Cuba’s

history of frustrated

nationalism laid the groundwork for the tension in Cuban-American
relations that would

dominate the

bilateral relationship for

of the Cubans

to

much of the

next century and beyond. The failure

achieve independence in 1815, in the 1860s, and again in 1895

contributed to an unfulfilled sense of nationalism. Thus,

when

the

Cubans were

finally rid

of the Spanish they were loathed to accept domination by another power. 20
Despite the
influence

utilities

was

felt

Cuban

20

Aguilar, “Cuba,

See

economic and

political

independence, American

throughout Cuba. The tobacco industry, the railways and public

soon became,

19

desire for

Ramon

like the sugar industry,

c.

dominated by American

capital.

The

1860-1930.”

Ruiz, Cuba: The

Making of a Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton,

43

1968).

Reciprocity Treaty of 1903 solidified the
rapidly growing economic
countries.

Cuba.

By 1909

the United States controlled
almost half of

all

ties

between the two

foreign investment in

21

After the war, the political situation in

Cuba

deteriorated as corruption, patronage

and electoral fraud removed any legitimacy
of the new government, increasing
cynicism
and prompting another rebellion
States to step in to put

solution

was

down

to replace

the rebellion.

Cuba

until 1921,

Cuba with

when they

President, Estrada Palma, asked the
United

However,

Palma with a United

control of the island until 1909
the election of Jose

The

in 1906.

to

Palma’s surprise, Washington’s

States governor.

installed a

new

The U.S. remained

electoral system

in

and oversaw

Miguel Gomez as president. In 1913 Mario Garcia
Menocal, who

replaced Gomez. Menocal was followed by
Alfredo Zayas,

the assistance of an

American

special envoy, General

who

Enoch Crowder,

led

ruled

until

1925.

The Liberal Party

candidate, Gerardo

Machado was

elected in 1924 on a platform

of “water, roads and schools.” 22 He followed through on many of his
campaign promises
during his

first

term. For example,

Highway from Havana

to Santiago

Machado completed

the construction of the Central

de Cuba and expanded the University of Havana.

However, arguing

that

the Constitutional

Assembly extend

he needed more time to meet his economic goals, Machado had
presidential terms to six years and offer

him

the

chance to run for re-election, unopposed.

21

Juan M. del Aguila, “Development, Revolution, and Decay in Cuba,” in Latin American Politics
and Development Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds. 4 th ed. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press
1996), 370-407.

22

Suchlicki, Historical Dictionary , 168.
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This turn toward dictatorship, Machado’s
growing use of repression, and the
Great Depression, which had a devastating
effect on the Cuban economy,
sparked
resistance to

Machado’s

rule.

21

Resistance to the regime became
widespread and violent

as opposition groups turned to terrorist
tactics to fight the regime,
prompting
repression from the state. University students,

and professionals

all

uprising

in

class, intellectuals

joined opposition leaders, Mario Garcia
Menocal, Cuba’s third

president, and Colonel Carlos Mendieta.

Machado regime

members of the middle

firrther

1

The

resistance lead to an uprising against
the

93 1 which was quickly subdued by Machado’s
forces. Though
,

was contained, opposition

to the regime continued.

and opposition violence did not abate. The United

this

The cycle of state repression

States, attempting to avoid another

revolution in Cuba, stepped in again in 1933.

Batista’s

In 1933,

Cuba:

1

933-1959

Washington sent Bejamin Sumner Welles

to

Havana to mediate between

the

regime and the opposition. Welles soon became convinced of the
need to remove

Machado from power. The American
assume power.

month

in

23

24

However, Cespedes lacked the support of the

troops.

25

After less than a

power, Cespedes was overthrown by the army sergeants, led by Fulgencio

The Great Depression compounded

brought on by a decline

24

contingent assisted Carlos Manuel de Cespedes to

in

the

economic

crisis

of 1920-21. The

earlier crisis

F.

was

sugar prices.

See Dur and Gilcrease for an in-depth

article

on the role of the United States

in the fall

of

Machado.

25

became

The troops were initially angry about the poor pay and housing
movement that opposed the Cespedes regime.

the leaders of a

45

offered to the enlisted, but soon

Batista Zaldivar.

Ramon Grau San

power was held by one of his
government abrogated the
the

Martin was appointed President but

ministers,

Platt

Antonio Guiteras. The new revolutionary

Amendment and reduced

Cuban economy. Given these changes,

within the

much of the

the influence of Americans
in

the United States, and a

Cuban population including business

leaders,

number of groups

grew to oppose

the

new

government.

With American support, Batista stepped

He

in to

again alter the political landscape.

forced the revolutionary government to
resign. The abrupt end of the
1933 revolution

with

nationalist goals

its

had serious consequences for Cuba’s

future.

The

frustrated

nationalism of the pervious century was reawakened.
Furthermore, the events of 1933
solidified the influence of Batista

Suchlicki argues 1933

and the army over Cuban

was “a turning point

in

politics.

immediately unsuccessful, the

strike

months. But the strike did not take

However, opposition

in a general strike in 1935.

weakened Mendieta and

down

such, Jaime

Cuba’s history.” 26

Batista appointed Carlos Mendieta president in
1934.

Mendieta regime was strong and was voiced

As

to the

Though

led to his resignation within

the real source of power behind the regime-

Batista and the army. Batista appointed a series of presidents throughout
the rest of the

decade but power remained

in his hands.

This period in Cuban history was characterized

by corruption and some repression but also by economic growth and reduced
In

1940 a new constitution was adopted,

under the American occupation

unrest.

finally replacing the constitution created

that contained the Platt

Amendment. The new

constitution provided for universal suffrage, free elections, prohibited discrimination, and

26

Jamie Suchlicki, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro 2" d

109.

46

ed.

(Washington DC: Brassey’s, 1986),

mandated public education, as well

many

as

other similar provisions. However,
most of

these provisions were not applied.

The election ofl940 was one exception.
That year
in

what was reported

to be an unusually fair election. 27

Batista

was elected

president

Now a civilian authority along

with his role as army chief, Batista transferred
power back to the office of the president,
reducing the size and power of the Cuban
28
military.
Batista also brought back the
political

Batista

patronage machine. Corruption, bribery, and
political violence characterized
the

government and the regimes of the next two presidents,
Ramon Grau (1944-1948)

and Carlos Prio (1948-1952), both of the Autentico
Party. Though the Autenticos
attempted to respect democratic processes, they
were unable to secure democracy and

soon

their

own

party

became dominated by

The Cuban economy prospered

mismanagement — and

Cuban development. When
were unable

to

the

29

in this period. Yet, the prosperity

obscure the deeper problems of the Cuban
corruption and

corruption.

economy-

reliance

only served to

on a single export,

did not have a long-term positive influence on

economy began

to fail in the late 1940s, the Autenticos

meet the challenge, creating an ever-growing sense of disillusionment

with their political and economic management of the country.
Consequently, when Batista wanted, once again, to reinsert himself back into

power,

it

‘7

was

relatively simple for

Luis A. Perez,

Cambridge University

Jr.,

“Cuba

c.

him

to

do

1930-1959,”

so. In

in

Press, 1993), 57- 94.

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid.

47

1952 he engineered a quick military

Cuba: a short history Leslie

Bethell, ed.

(New York:

coup

him and

that put

the

army

in

power and ended

constitutional government. But Batista
political crises.

Wealth was not evenly

was unable

this

most recent experiment with

to cure

distributed, the

export of a single crop, foreigners (mainly
Americans)

Cuba’s economic

economy was
owned a

still

and

ills

reliant

on the

large percentage of

industry and Cubans, comparing their
economic progress to the United States,
were
frustrated. Politically, Batista ruled

Yet, neither of the Autentico nor

by

repression.

Ortodoxo

He became

political parties

increasingly dictatorial.

was strong enough

to

organize an effective resistance.

A number of smaller groups formed in opposition to the Batista
them was Fidel Castro’s Twenty-Sixth of July movement.
When

Moncada army
arrest as

garrison in July of 1953, he

one year

many groups

and

to advocate for social

in prison, Castro

began

captured. However, Castro used his

to

demand

and economic reform. Upon

to organize another uprising.

During

was gaining

Maestra mountains, others were resisting the regime in the

these groups

came

30

this period

had

lost

In 1958

support of key elements of society as well

of a large percentage of his armed

ally.

cities.

together to oppose Batista, and Fidel Castro emerged as their leader.

States, seeing that Batista

as the backing

former

his release,

strength and staging attacks on the government’s rural
guards

in the Sierra

their

a return to

staged small rebellions or demonstrations against Batista.
Thus, while

Castro’s group

The United

Among

his forces attacked the

an opportunity to present his case against the government,

constitutional rule,

after

was

regime.

As 1959

entered

its first

Jorge Dominguez, Cuba: Order

forces,

withdrew

their support

from

day, Batista and his supporters fled Havana. 30

and Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard

48

University Press, 1978).

Fidel Castro's
In

January of 1959, Fidel Castro and his rebel
army assumed power and began
to

dismantle the “old” Cuba.

The

first

Cuba

President of the

On

new

February 16, Fidel Castro became Prime
Minister of Cuba.
regime, Manuel Urrutia, was forced
out within a few

months and he was replaced by Osvaldo Dorticos
Torrado (1959-1976), whose
limited essentially to ceremonial functions,
leaving Castro to rule alone.
political parties

circle.

were disbanded. Castro quickly

Many were

put on

One of the

first

Reform Law. This

trial,

under

The main

members of Batista’s

measures passed by the new government was the
Agrarian

act prevented large-scale land

own

of land became state-owned. In 1963
fell

out to punish

was

imprisoned or executed.

any one person or corporation could

acres

set

role

state control.

ownership by limiting the

to 1,000 acres.

this limit

Under

was reduced

maximum

this law, millions

to 165 acres

and

of acres

many more

31

Castro also reorganized the education and health systems on the
island. The

number of schools was dramatically
to levels characteristic

increased, enrollment doubled and literacy rates rose

of developed regions. State money poured into the health system

as an elementary level of health care

was provided

to all citizens.

The number of health

care workers, hospitals and clinics rose to meet the increased demand. Life expectancy

and

infant mortality figures improved.

31

32

32

In addition, the

Jaime Suchlicki, Historical Dictionary,

According

to

was reduced

to

government took over the banks,

7.

World Bank

figures Cuban life expectancy had reached 76 years and infant
7/1000 by 1998. See: The World Bank Group, “Life Expectancy,”
(http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/enulish/modules/social/life/mapla.htmn December 2, 2002.

mortality

49

transportation companies, and
communication systems

bureaucracy ballooned to manage

it all.

Many

on the

island.

The

size

of the

Cubans, especially the poor, were
happy

about these changes but the wealthier
Cubans, realizing that they stood
to lose greatly

from Castro’s polices, began

,o leave the country.

Most of these

exiles sought,

what they

thought to be temporary refuge, in
Florida.
Castro also

made

considerable changes to Cuban foreign
policy. Relations with

the United States changed most
dramatically.

Even before

the 1961

Bay of Pigs

invasion,

U.S. -Cuban relations had deteriorated.
Castro had imposed the Agrarian
Reform
significantly reduced the

American holdings on the

island.

Law

that

Tensions were further

heightened when Castro nationalized most
foreign companies operating

in

Cuba and

re-

established diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union.

As Cuban- American
economic and

political ties to the Soviet

included the 26

had

th

Union.

A new,

of July Movement was formed. Then

fled the island

when

Central Intelligence

forces.

relations deteriorated, Castro continued
to strengthen

enlarged

in April

Communist

Party that

of 1961, the Cubans

who

Castro assumed power, invaded with the assistance
of the

Agency (CIA). The

rebel invasion

was quickly put down by Castro’s

Tension between Havana and Washington further escalated. In
December 1961,

Castro announced that he was a Marxist-Leninist and asserted that
the Cuban revolution

was

a socialist revolution.

U.S.-

Cuban

hostilities

reached a fever pitch in 1962

when

the United States

discovered that the Soviets had installed missiles, capable of carrying nuclear weapons,

Cuba. In response, on October 22, 1962, President John

F.

Kennedy

set

up a naval

blockade of Cuba. These thirteen days were the closest the United States and the Soviet

50

in

Union came

to a nuclear

the Soviets agreed to

showdown

during the Cold War. Nuclear war
was averted

when

remove the weapons, which they did
even before consulting with

Castro, and the United States pledged
not to invade Cuba. 33
State ownership over the

economy proceeded throughout

the 1960s.

By the

late

1960s, most businesses were state controlled.
Even though almost everyone was

employed, the Cuban economy did not do very
well
revolution.

lot.

The economy was

inefficient

Consequently, Castro turned to his

massive military and economic
for oil at preferential prices.

1969 Castro called

aid.

in the early years after the

and average Cubans struggled

new

ally, the Soviets,

Cuban economy and attempted

deficit,

its

persistent trade deficit with the Soviet

Castro abandoned his efforts to diversify the

to capitalize

to raise sugar production to

See Ernest R.

34

May

its

support. In

economic group.

on Cuba’s comparative advantage

Castro never met his goal to produce 10 million tons of sugar

Cuban

provided Cuba with

and decisive.” 34 In 1972 Cuba formally

the Eastern Bloc’s

was disturbed by

Union. In an effort to reduce the

their

For example, the Soviets allowed Cuba
to trade sugar

their contribution “inestimable

Yet, the Castro regime

the

improve

The economy benefited immensely from Soviet

became a member of COMECON,

manage

who

to

in 1970.

in sugar.

However, he did

highest level, producing 8.5 million tons that

and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997).

Missile Crisis (Cambridge:

Quoted

in

35

Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom, 1475.

35

William M. Leogrande and Julie M. Thomas, “Cuba’s Quest for Economic Independence,”
Journal of Latin American Studies 34 (2002): 325-363.
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year.

36

Consequently,

when world

sugar prices soared in the early
1970s Cuba was able

to take full advantage. 33
Fetching top dollar for sugar

from low fixed prices for Soviet

oil

during the

on the world market and benefiting

oil crisis,

the

Cuban economy was

prosperous in the early 1970s.

Dunng

the late 1970s, Castro allowed

some

liberalization

example, private financial transactions were
allowed
allowed to fluctuate based on merit, and
partially lifted.

in the

Soviet Union, the

recession. In 1986 Castro put the
“rectification”

Cuba

s

some

in 1982, restrictions

However, by the 1980s, due

economic woes

in

to factors

sectors,

wages were

on foreign investment were

such as declining sugar prices and

Cuban economy was

falling into another

blame on the market reforms he had allowed
and began

which overturned many of the

early liberalizations.

foreign policy also underwent a series of
changes between the 1960s and

1980s. In the 1960s Castro had aligned his regime with
the
critical of

of the economy. 38 For

USSR

but

was

times

at

Soviet policies, especially their decision to trade with
countries Castro

considered enemies.

39

Castro considered Cuba to be a truer example of a
communist

society than the Soviet Union. In

1

968 Cuban- Soviet tension escalated over a number of

issues including the reduction of Soviet petroleum deliveries
to Cuba, Castro’s criticism

Jorge Dominguez, “Cuba since 1959,”
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 95- 148.

in

Cuba

:

a short history Leslie Bethell,

ed.

(New York:

37

Ibid.

38

See Jorge Dominguez

ed.,

Cuba

Internal

and International Affairs (London: Sage

Publications,

1982) for an analysis of Cuba during the 1970s.

39

T

r

Jorge Dominguez, To

MA: Harvard

Make a World Safe for

University Press, 1989), 69.

52

Revolution:

Cuba 's Foreign

Policy (Cambridge,

of Soviet-style communism, and charges
the

Cuban

revolution.

40

that

some Soviets were attempting

However, by the mid-1970s, the Soviet-Cuban

been mended. Cuba collaborated with the

USSR

in Africa,

to

undermine

relationship had

sending Cuban troops to the

continent.

The African involvement was
and

rebellion

assist

communist groups

the culmination of Cuba’s efforts to
spread
in other countries. After being
expelled

from the

Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962, Castro
issued the “Second Declaration

of Havana”

in

which he urged the peoples of other countries

and use guerrilla warfare against

would be used over

America and

the next

Africa.

few decades

By 1974 Cuba was

African countries. In 1975
in

their oppressors.

it

supporting

Angola and by 1976 Cuban troops had

The Castro regime was

struggles.

Cuban

Though

limited,

to aid revolutionary

became known

Ethiopia.

41

to follow

that

also

Cuba’s example

Cuban resources

movements

Communist groups

Cuban

in Latin

in a

number of

troops were assisting the

become involved

also implicated in Latin

MPLA

in the conflict in

American revolutionary

advisers assisted the consolidation of the Sandinista regime in

Nicaragua, assisted the guerrilla movements in El Salvador, and provided some arms and
technical support to revolutionary Grenada. Cuba’s participation in these conflicts

complicated Cuba’s relationship with western countries and, what Castro did not
the time was, that soon,

Cuba would need

friends in the

imagine.

40

Ibid, 73.

41

Jaime Suchlicki, HistoricalDictionary, 86.
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know

West more than he could ever

at

The End of the Cold War and Cuba
The world changed dramatically

at the

end of the 1980s as the Soviet Union,

almost overnight, went from a superpower to nonexistence.
This transformation had a

profound impact on

all

aspects of

began the economic and

Cuba. Prior to 1989, before Mikhail Gorbachev

political transformations

the Soviet Union, Cuba’s

dependent on the

life in

economy,

(known

financial system

USSR and its allies. 4

''

as perestroika and glasnost) of

and military power were heavily

For example, prior to the collapse of the Eastern

Bloc 85 percent of Cuba’s trade was with the Soviet Union. 43
Consequently, as reforms
increased in the

substantially,

Castro

Warsaw

Pact countries, Cuba’s trade with those countries declined

weakening

the

was forced

Cuban economy.

to institute austerity

measures as Soviet aid and subsidies were

terminated. Emphasizing the temporary nature of these measures, he referred
to this time
as the “Special Period in

percent.

44

Time of Peace.” From 1989

Massive economic

caused an increase

ills

GDP declined by 35

and resulting shortages of most goods and services

in political dissent

and growing

In an attempt to halt the free-fall, Castro

liberalizations after 1993.

1993 Cuba’s

to

efforts

by

the regime to suppress

began another round of economic

Changes included allowing the existence of small-scale

companies, legalizing the U.S.

dollar, freezing

it.

wages, reducing the

state

private

bureaucracy,

42

See Pedro Monreal, “Development as an Unfinished Affair: Cuba After the ‘Great Adjustment’
of the 1990s,” Latin American Perspectives 124, 29, 3 (May 2002): 75-90.

43

Douglas Hamilton, “Whither Cuban Socialism? The Changing

Revolution,” Latin American Perspectives 124, 29, 3

44

Claes Brundenius, “Whither the Cuban

(May

2002):

Economy

1

Political

Economy of the Cuban

8-39.

After Recovery? The reform process,

upgrading strategies and the question of transition,” Journal of Latin American Studies 34, 2 (May 2002):
365-395.
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instituting personal

as liquor

state

tax

on independent

and tobacco. These changes helped

had a budget
5

surplus.

income

deficit

activities

to turn the

of 33.5 percent but by 1994

The economy continued

it

and taxes on luxury items such

economy

was operating with

side-affects.

Tourism, no longer sugar,

Cuba’s primary source of hard currency.
Remittances from

Union.

Ten years

income

disparities

based features.

later

due

It is

fill

the void

Cuba was

still

left

now common

society as well as the

and

by the end of transfers from the Soviet

of the dollar and the introduction of market-

for well -educated doctors

and chamber-maids working

and indirectly the demise of the Soviet Union led

directly

relatives in the U.S.

is

experiencing unemployment and increasing

to the legalization

significantly less than the waiters

a 7.4 percent

to recover, but anemically,
throughout the 1990s.

However, these changes have had

foreign investment help to

around. In 1993 the

to

and teachers

to earn

in the tourist hotels.

profound changes

in the

economy.

Other areas of Cuban society also underwent meaningful
changes during
turbulent period.

The end of Soviet

foreign policies.

The number of people

this

military aid catalyzed changes in Cuba’s military and
in the

armed

forces declined both because the

regime could no longer afford them and because Cuba was no longer participating
foreign conflicts.

48

45

Ibid.

46

47

48

Thus,

Monreal, 78.

Hamilton, 18-39.

See Aguila, “Development, Revolution, and Decay
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in

Cuba,”, 370-407.

in

Civil society has also changed in
Cuba.
status.

Even by

diminished.

By

the late 1980s the conflict

The church has regained some of its

between the Castro regime and the
church had

the early 1990s the regime had
eliminated

This process was amplified during the
preparations for the
1998. In the lead-up to the
the people of

Cuba on

He made

decades.

visit,

of Pope John Paul

II

in

Castro allowed the Church to
communicate directly with

United States to touch

and nuns to transfer

Cubans wishing

to

Cuba.

49

to

down on

Cuba have not been

the island, providing

some

go to a papal mass and allowing more

Despite these changes, the tension between
the

Catholic Church and the Castro regime remains,
as
in

visit

other concessions including giving his
permission for direct charter

additional transportation for

freedoms

policy of official atheism.

television and in the newspapers for
the first time in over three

flights originating in the

priests

its

eliminated.

many of the

restrictions

on religious

50

Conclusion

A number of themes recur throughout Cuban history.
lor

The

defeat of Cuban independence efforts in 1815, the 1860s, in
1895, and again

1933 have made the Cubans intensely protective of their sovereignty. The repeated

American interventions heighten

49

(

failed bids

independence have contributed to a strong sense of frustrated nationalism
on the

island.

in

The numerous

“Religion in

Cuba During

their resolve.

1997:

Yet, even after Fidel Castro took power,

From Radio Havana Cuba, 2 January 1998,”
December 9, 2002.

http://wvvw.hartford-hvvp.com/archives/43b/192.htmn

50

For the U.S. government’s view of the state of religious freedom in Cuba see United States
Department of State, Cuba: International Religious Freedom Report 2002 (Released by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) (http://www.sate.gOv/a/drl/rls/irf/2002/14039.htnn December 9

2002

.
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the island remained very vulnerable
to forces

American influence Castro threw Cuba

Cuba

placing

in the center

into the

of great power

world. Though, only a small country,

beyond

its

borders. In an attempt to purge

hands of the Soviets, inadvertently

politics

and attracting the attention of the

Cuba has garnered more

and more powerful countries, making Cuban
independence

attention than

that

much more

many

larger

difficult to

maintain.

Many

scholars have described and analyzed

thousands of pages about this island. In contrast,

Cuban

history.

this chapter

Some have

written

has presented a very brief

synopsis of Cuba’s long and complex history.
However, most students of Cuban history
will agree that this island s past has been
profoundly influenced

borders.

The next chapter looks

at the history

of Cuba’s relationship with two of the

countries that have influenced the course of Cuban history.
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by peoples beyond

its

CHAPTER
U.S.

3

AND CANADIAN RELATIONS WITH CUBA:
A HISTORY OF DIFFERENCES
Introduction

From

the earliest points in Canadian and

American

history, these

have had very different relationships with
Cuba. Even prior
States

was

actively involved in domestic level

Cuban

to the

politics

two countries

1898 war the United

and was heavily invested

financially in the island. In contrast, though
always having a presence of one sort or

another in Cuba. Canadian involvement was, in
comparison, minimal and understated.

This chapter begins by chronicling the long and
tumultuous relationship between the

United States and Cuba.

It

then reviews the quiet, yet often controversial,
relationship

between Canada and the island nation. This chapter
provides the background

to the

analyses of both bilateral relationships undertaken in the
rest of this study.

U.S. -Cuban Relations:

A

Short History

Extremes of closeness and animosity have characterized U.S.- Cuban

Even when Cuba was a Spanish colony,
During the American

the U.S.

War of Independence,

was developing

trade flourished

ties

colony and the U.S. broadened. Americans became involved

in

construction of the

Cuban

railroad in

1

By
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the middle

between the Spanish

many

participated in almost

830s.

ties to the island.

between Cuba and the

United States. Over the next one hundred years, commercial

Cuban economy. For example, Americans

relations.

all

sectors of the

aspects of the

of the nineteenth century the

volume of Cuba’s

trade with the United States had
surpassed trade with Spain, and
most

of the island’s main export crop, sugar,
was destined for the American market.

The United

was

States

also interested in closer political
and strategic ties with this

Spanish colony and attempted to purchase
Cuba from Spain beginning
In

1

in the early

1

800s.

1808 President Jefferson offered to buy the
island because the United States
believed

that Spain,

embroiled

the colony.

The southern

since

in the

Napoleonic wars, could not maintain adequate
control over

states

Cuba was obviously

were particularly interested

pro-slavery.

adding Cuba

in

The idea of annexation

to the

to the

union

United States grew

popular with Cuban planters in the mid- 1800s because
they thought the institution of
slavery,

and consequently,

States. This

the

movement

government

in

to obtain

their wealth,

would be protected

Cuba coincided with
Cuba under

a

campaign

if

Cuba joined

in the

the United

United States, urging

the rubric of manifest destiny.

Cuba became an

issue in the 1848 presidential election. During this
period, the United States

numerous

offers to purchase the island

from Spain.

made

2

Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the American people
and their

government were heavily invested

in

Cuba. American interest

in

Cuba had grown

throughout the century. American jingoism was directed toward the island.
Annexation

was

frequently put forth as not only a possibility but often presented as a natural

evolution of the relationship and U.S. investors saw their future in the expanding

Cuban

economy.

1

See Leland Hamilton Jenks, Our Cuban Colony: A Study

1928), 18-40, and Michael Kryzanek, U.S.

-

in Sugar (New York: Vanguard Press,
Latin American Relations, 3rd ed. (Westport, Connecticut:

Praeger Publishers, 1996), 40.

2

Jenks, 9-13.
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This interest culminated
in 1898.

The struggle

for

in the

American involvement

independence that began

without regard for the citizenship of the
owner.

By

Cuba's war with Spain

1895 destroyed property

was

also catastrophic in

Cuba

in

human

terms.

3

1898, reports of the devastation appeared daily
in American newspapers. 4
Though

annexation was debated

in the

United States, the McKinley government
stopped short of

outright annexation. That option

the

It

in

in

American declaration of war,

was

effectively

that stated that

removed by

the Teller

Amendment

Cuba would not become a

to

U.S. colony,

leading the United States to pull out of Cuba
in 1902.

However, the influence of the United States on the island
did not abate and
annexation was considered a likely possibility. In

counted on

it.

Many had

would soon become
colonies in

fact, the

based their decision to come

a state.

Carmen Diana Deere

American

to the island

explains that the

Cuba almost doubled between 1903 and

1913.

The

settlers in

Cuba

on the belief that Cuba

number of American

sixty-four

American

colonies present on the island in 1913 were for the most part
dedicated to growing

and vegetables sold

to the

United States.

fruit

5

Furthermore, Cuban economic dependence on the United States continued
to

grow. The United States-Cuban Reciprocity Treaty gave Cuban exports to the
U.S. a
trade advantage

3

4

5

Colonies

by reducing

tariffs

on goods from Cuba by 20 percent. The

treaty

Jenks, 43-45.

Jenks, 50.

Carmen Diana Deere, “Here Come

in

Cuba,

1

the Yankees! The Rise and Decline of the United States
898-1930,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 78 4 (November 1998): 729-765.
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influenced further American investment
in the sugar industry. 6 Within
ten years of the
treaty

American investment

investment

in all

in

Cuba made up almost 20

percent of the

of Latin America, and most of that
was invested

in

total

Cuban

of American
7

sugar.

The

United States also had investments in other
areas such as produce, tobacco,
cattle and
railroads,

among

others.

8

During the occupation the U.S. government
had attached the
the

Cuban

constitution,

which gave Cuba

the status of an

American

Platt

Amendment

protectorate.

to

The

United States intervened again in 1906 in order
to suppress a rebellion. Washington

remained

officially in control

political affairs

of Cuba

until

1909 but American influence over the

of the island continued unabated

after the

end of this second intervention.

For example, an American General, Enoch Crowder,
was one of the most influential
people in Cuban politics during the
electoral system put in place in

first

quarter of the century.

1909 and, as the U.S. envoy

He

established the

to the island a

decade

later,

he had considerable influence over the government of
President Alfredo Zayas (19211925).

Crowder forced Zayas

Crowder and

the United States.

The United
and

in the rise

6

7

8

to reorganize his cabinet

and appoint people acceptable

to

9

States played an integral role in the

fall

of President Machado

in

1933

of General Fulgencio E. Batista y Zaldivar. Philip Dur and Christopher

Deere, 738.

Thomas, 536.

Jenks, 162.

See Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change,
1920-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001) for an in-depth account of this
period

in

Cuba

history.
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Gilcrease maintain that the American
Ambassador,
the events

of 1933 and 1934

in

Sumner Welles, was

the architect of

Cuba. For example, they argue that
Welles engineered the

overthrow of Machado and hand picked
Cespedes as the next president. 10
After 1933, power in

Cuba belonged

to

General Batista,

support of the United States early in his political
career.
intermittently Cuba’s president, Batista and
the
until Castro’s forces

Under

removed him from power

Batista,

American

The Cold War increased

political

army

who had

Though he was only

controlled

Cuban

politics

from then

in 1959.

and economic influence

Batista’s value in

secured the

in

Cuba was enormous.

Washington since he was an ardent

anticommunist and consistently supported American foreign
policy goals. In 1958, the

American Embassy

in

Havana reported

that the Batista

government, “has a record of

excellent cooperation and solidarity with the United States
in the international field on
issues of major importance.

Communism and

opposing

United States.”

American economic

owned

in

representatives have on occasion taken the lead in

advocating policies and courses of action desired by the

11

Just as his regime

to

Cuban

all

was pro-American

interests.

During the

in politics, Batista’s

first

large tracts of real estate, including as

Cuba was

also friendly

half of the twentieth century, Americans

many

as half of the sugar plantations. 12

The

Great Depression had dramatically diminished trade between the two countries and

10

Philip

Machado

in

1933

Dur and Christopher Gilcrease, “US Diplomacy and the Downfall of a Cuban
Journal of Latin American Studies 34 (2002): 255-282.

Dictator:

11

Quoted in Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 19521986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 47

12

Harry Targ, Cuba and the USA: A

New World Order? (New

1992), 13.
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York: International Publishers,

reduced American economic

ties to

Cuba. Under Batista, the United States
sought to

regain those losses.

Though
done

the

economic connections never reached the

to strengthen the ties. Tariffs

were lowered

to

earlier levels,

permit increased trade, raising the

value of U.S. imports from under 23 million
in 1933, to 81 million
time, almost 65 percent of Cuba’s imports
tariffs

came from

on Cuban sugar and the American decision

US

sugar market

the

American market. 15

was lower than

it

at

a

was

premium

price,

three decades earlier,

taxes paid by investors.

Although

1940.

the United States. 14

to allot

Cuba

13

By

Due

that

low

to

a large percentage of the

it

amount of American investment

was

American

also

firms,

on the

in

Cuba

rise in the 1950s. Batista’s

exempting them from many of the

16

In 1959,

officially sovereign,

United States in

to

in

Cuban sugar exports became highly dependent on

Similarly, though the

regime was particularly generous

much was

this era as

it

Americans had one

Cuba was,

for

billion dollars invested in

Cuba.

17

economic purposes, just as dependent on the

was when American

forces occupied the island after the

Cuban war of independence.

13

Robert Whitney, State and Revolution

1940 (Chapel

'

Hill:

in

Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-

The University ofNorth Carolina

Press, 2001), 135.

4

Juan M. Del Aguila, “Development, Revolution, and Decay in Cuba,” in Latin American Politics
and Development, 4th ed. Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 383.

Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba 's Foreign Policy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 18989), 9.

16

17

Morley, 50.

Juan M. Del Aguila, Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994),
,
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While the American government eventually
became concerned about

Batista’s

abuse of power, they did not support the revolution
led by Fidel Castro. Consequently,
they greeted Castro’s early months in office
with apprehension. The

while strained, was not openly antagonistic.

On January

7,

initial relationship,

1959 the United States

recognized the Cuban government but had serious
reservations about Fidel Castro. 18
Philip Bonsai,

who had

replaced Earl T. Smith as the

new ambassador

instructed by the State Department to be “cool and
distant” to the

new

in

Havana, was
19

regime.

Events such as the 1959 agrarian reform and the warming
of Cuban- Soviet
relations

from 1960 onwards were viewed with increasing suspicion

After American companies in

Cuba

refused to process crude

in the

oil that the

United States.

regime had

bought from the Soviet Union, Castro responded by expropriating the
companies. The
nationalization of U.S.

owned

oil

companies worsened an already tense

situation.

The

U.S. response, to suspend Cuba’s sugar quota, was regarded by Castro as an
act of

economic war.

In retaliation, he nationalized the remaining

American

time the rhetoric between Havana and Washington had become

20

assets.

fairly confrontational as

the U.S. accused Castro of Communist leanings and he claimed the U.S.

explosion on a ship in the Havana harbor that was

18

For a discussion of these early reservations

Revolution: The United States

19

20

Quoted

in

Aguila,

Cuba

see:

full

By this

was behind an

of arms purchased by his regime. 21

Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and

and Cuba, 1952-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1987).

Morley, 74.

,

58.

21

Jorge Dominguez, “Cuba since 1959,”
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 95-148.

in
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Leslie Bethell, ed.

(New York:

In

October of 1960, the United States imposed
an economic embargo on Cuba,

restricting trade

on

products except for food and medicine.
This measure became the

all

cornerstone of American policy during this
early period. Referred to as a
“program of

economic dental,” the embargo sought
“keeping” Cuba

in their alliance,

make

demonstrate to the Cuban people that
country.

The United

effect of the

Canadian trade with Cuba
1

:

it

for the

and to

not a viable option for their

Havana embassy

in

embargo on US-Cuban

same

Union of

difficult for Castro to export
revolution

communism was

States closed their

below demonstrates the

Table

to increase the cost to the Soviet

January 1961. The table
trade

by comparing

it

to

years.

Canadian and American Merchandise Trade with Cuba
1955

1960

1970

1980

1990

United States (US $)

Cuba
Imports from Cuba
Exports to

Canada (CDN

458

million

225

million

0

0

422

million

357

million

0

0

1

.4 million

0

$)

Cuba
Imports from Cuba
Exports to

14 million

13

10 million

7 million

59

million

million

9.5 million

163.5 million

170

million

416.5

130

million

million

~
vii
uuu i
o
iviv^rvcima, u unciClu-^ UOu
Relations (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997); and The
Canadian-American Committee of the
Private Planning Association of Canada and the National Planning Association,
USA. “Canada’s
*

,

Trade

with Cuba and Canadian-American Relations.” (February

6, 1961).

Between 1959 and 1962, approximately 250,000 Cubans who were outraged by
Castro’s reforms,

left

escalating between

the island to live in the United States.

Washington and Havana these

exiles

23

While tensions were

had begun a campaign against

22

John Scanlan and Gilburt Loescher, “U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80: Impact on Refugee Flow
from Cuba,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467 (May 983): 24.
1

23

David Masci, “Castro’s Next Move,”

CQ Researcher (December

65

12, 1997): 1093.

1

the Castro regime,

which included bombing

targets in

Cuba from planes launched from

Florida. Castro’s accusation that the
United States supported the exiles

the tension increased between

was

accurate.

As

Washington and Havana, the CIA, under
President

Eisenhower, had begun to aid the exiles by
providing arms, supplies, and
U.S. assistance the leaders of the different

Cuban groups formed

the

training.

24

With

Cuban

Revolutionary Council. Since Washington wanted
Castro overthrown but did not want

Amencan troops

involved, they assisted the exiles to plan and
execute the invasion that

would take place

in April

of 1961.

Bay of Pigs but were quickly

On

April 17, the exile army landed at a beach
on the

defeated by the

Cuban army

Despite the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the

led

by Castro.

CIA

continued

its

efforts to

oust Castro from power. However, they never again
attempted an invasion, replacing
military force with covert measures including attempting
to assassinate Fidel Castro on

multiple occasions.

The Alliance

program directed

Latin America) was another major tool in the

administration's

at

Cuba

for Progress (an extensive

policy. This

program sought

America with massive infusions of aid
In 1962,

when

the

economic and military aid

Kennedy

to limit the influence of

Cuba

in Latin

to countries in the region.

Americans discovered

that the Soviets

had

installed

medium-

range missiles in Cuba, the island became the center of an intense superpower
confrontation. President John F.

Kennedy and Soviet

leader, Nikita

Khrushchev,

after a

tense 13 days, resolved the crisis without any consultation with Castro. President

Kennedy

~4

said that the U.S.

would

Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The

refrain

from invading Cuba, end the naval blockade,

Pursuit of Freedom

1301.

66

(New York: Harper and Row,

Publishers, 1971),

and remove the American Jupiter
missiles from Turkey 25 and Khrushchev
agreed

remove

the missiles from Cuba. Nevertheless,
the United States tightened the
embargo,

preventing Americans from visiting Cuba
and forbidding

all

trade with the island.

However, the embargo did not prevent Cubans
from coming

The 966 Cuban Adjustment Act made
1

residents.

The U.S. government

from the CIA, was given

men

to

fighting Castro.

program

26

program

In the mid-1970s,

Cubans

Cuban

to

become

United States.

legal U.S.

exiles economically.

Cuban businesses and

Cuban immigrants were

that included food

Flights

easier for

also aided the

to assist

Money,

to provide for families

also the beneficiaries

often

of the

of a special

refttgee

and financial assistance. 27 Over the next
decade, hundreds of

thousands of Cubans made their

Freedom

it

to the

way

to the

United States. They came by boat and via the

that lasted until 1973.

it

appeared as though change

in

U.S.-Cuban relations was

imminent. The Ford administration began secret talks with the
Castro government.
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs, William
Rogers, and the
Assistant to the Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleberger, met with

Cuban

numerous occasions

in

in

an attempt to normalize relations. However,

officials

on

1975 the talks

28
broke off over Cuba’s military and financial support of the Neto government of
Angola.

25

*6

The agreement

Maria de

los

to

remove missiles from Turkey was not made public

Angeles Torres, In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile

(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan

27

28

at the time.

Politics in the United States

Press, 2001), 75.

Ibid. 63.

Confidential interview with senior government official, Washington

67

DC, 2000.

President

Jimmy

Carter (1976-1980)

was

particularly interested in rapprochement

and made numerous moves toward warming the
relationship. His administration halted
reconnaissance flights over Cuba, negotiated fishing
and maritime agreements with the
regime, and once again, permitted Americans to travel
29
to the island.
In 1977, Cuba and
the United States opened interest sections in each
other’s countries. However,

it

was not

long before the relationship began to cool off because
of the regime’s continued

involvement in African conflicts. 30

Any movement toward

normalization was put on

hold.

The 1980 mass migration of over one hundred thousand Cubans
States, referred to as the Mariel exodus, increased the tension

The exodus was

Washington.
difficulties

relatives living in Florida.

Americans had
States

and

gifts

United

between Havana and

the result of disillusionment with the

of life on the island, especially when compared

to the

economic

to the lives

of their friends and

During the prior year, almost one hundred thousand Cuban

visited the island, bringing with

them

stories

of a good

life in the

United

of consumer goods unavailable to average Cubans.

The exodus was sparked by an

incident at the Peruvian

embassy

in

Havana. Peru

granted asylum to a group of Cubans who, in their attempt to enter the embassy, had shot

39

W. Raymond Duncan, “Cuba-U.S. Relations and Political Contradictions in Cuba,” in Conflict
and Change in Cuba, Enrique A. Baloyra and James A. Morris, eds. (Albuquerque, NM: University of New
Mexico Press, 1993), 215-241.
30

Carter

A

senior

was very

involvement

in

US

government

official with the Carter administration told the author that President

interested in normalization.

He

stated that the administration’s subsequent focus

Africa was the result of pressure from those within the government

warming of relations between
Washington DC, 2000.

the

US

See chapter eight in Wayne Smith, The Closest of Enemies (New York:
987) for an interesting and informative discussion of the Mariel exodus.
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on Cuban

did not want to see

and Cuba. Confidential interview conducted by the author

31

1

who

in

WW Norton and Co.,

a

Cuban

guard.

The Castro government

retaliated

by removing the guards around the

Peruvian embassy, essentially allowing
Cubans to leave the country via Peru’s
embassy.

Thousands of Cubans made
authorities.

the

The numbers

their

way

to the

embassy, overwhelming the Peruvian

also surprised the regime and created
an intolerable situation for

Cuban government. The

ten thousand

Cubans

that

descended on the compound

created havoc in Havana.

The government had promised

They began an

according to

airlift but,

Wayne

the people they could leave.

Smith, the head of the U.S. Interest

Section at the time, that seemed to play into
the hands of the Americans as they
could use
the refugees as evidence of the
dissatisfaction in

human

but not have to deal with the

flood themselves.

The decision
the

Cuba

American

to

refusal to

attempting to secure a
States prosecute the

to enter the

open the port of Mariel

condemn marine

way

Cuban

to Florida.

hijackers.

to small boats

was

also in retaliation for

hijackings began in October 1979 by Cubans

The Cuban government had asked

that the United

Washington had refused and allowed the hijackers

United States as ‘normal' Cuban immigrants. More hijackings
occurred. The

United States continued

to

welcome

United States that inaction on
for the United States.

the hijackers as immigrants.

this issue

Washington had

was flooded with Cubans
government by using the

in April

might result

still

opening a port for Cubans bound

not taken action

when

the Peruvian

embassy

of 1980. Washington had further aggravated the Cuban

affair as further

evidence of the political and economic failures

ot the

Cuban regime. Thus, Havana ended

could

come

to the port

in

The Cubans warned the

the airlift and

announced

that small boats

of Mariel to transport Cubans to the United States. The resulting

69

exodus

that lasted until

September of 1980 brought 120,000 additional
Cubans

to the

United States.

The

election of Ronald

Reagan

in

1980 brought even more tension

relationship. Washington’s approach toward

Cuba under the Reagan, and subsequent

Bush, administration remained antagonistic. In an
effort

Cuban populace,

the

Voice of America,
In

it

to the bilateral

to

communicate

Reagan administration approved Radio Marti

directly with the

in 1985.

Based on

broadcast anti-Castro, pro-American radio
programming into Cuba.

1990 the Bush administration followed with

TV

Marti.

32

The next major milestone in U.S.-Cuban relations came

of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). This

act, also

known

in

1992 with the passage

as the Torricelli Bill,

contained both positive and negative inducements for change in
Cuba.

embargo by attempting

to prevent subsidiaries

It

tightened the

of American companies located

countries from doing business with Cuba; prevented ships that had
stopped in
past 180 days from entering U.S. ports; and
aid to

Cuba

States;

to receive

American aid or

and increased the disincentives

made

it

difficult for

Americans

Cuba

in the

any country providing

to qualify for free trade deals

for

in other

with the United

to illegally visit the island.

33
It

also

contained provisions to increase “people-to-people” contact between Americans and

Cubans and

to strengthen

Cuban

civil society.

Known

as Track

II,

this part

of the

Torricelli Bill authorized the resumption of telephone and direct mails services with the

32

Since

its

inception, the

Cuban government has

successfully jammed the transmission of the

TV

signal.

33

See

Max

Azicri,

Cuba Today and Tomorrow

187.

70

(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000),

island,

allowed private

additional support for

entities to deliver

TV

medicine and food to Cuba, as well as
ensured

and Radio Marti.

During his election campaign, William Clinton had
pledged support

and for the

first

couple of years of his administration he did not
attempt to

framework established under the

act.

Soon

after he

assumed

took center stage in the relationship. In the spring and

Cubans, determined
in

to

inability to guarantee the safety

of ships

in the

set

immigration issues

1994, numerous

As he

ports. Castro, frustrated

Bay of Havana and by

of the United States to discourage these departures,

and

summer of

removed

CDA.

alter the basic

immigrate to the United States due to the severe economic

Cuba, resorted to hijacking boats visiting Cuban

leaving the country.

office,

for the

by

crisis

his

the apparent refusal

restrictions

on Cubans

expected, this prompted thousands to take to boats and rafts

out for U.S. shores.

This influx of Cubans
fiasco along the lines of the

to put a lid

on the growing

now threatened

to

become

a major

American immigration

1980 Mariel exodus. The Clinton administration, attempting

crisis in Florida,

announced a major change

to a long

entrenched immigration policy. Under the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans
attempting to reach the U.S. were automatically granted asylum. After the repeal of this
act

by Clinton, the Coast Guard no longer assisted Cuban

States. Instead they

base

at

began

to intercept

them

Guantanamo. The outcome of this

between the U.S. and Cuba. Under

Cubans from

setting out for

this

at sea

crisis

rafters to reach the

and transport them

United

to the U.S. naval

was a new immigration agreement

1994 accord, the Castro regime agreed

American shores and

71

the U.S. agreed to accept a

to prevent

minimum of

20,000 Cubans each year. Another
agreement, signed

on the United States would return Cuban

Cuban Americans were

in

1995, stipulated that from then

rafters intercepted at sea.

upset with the

new immigration

policy and after a

meeting with representatives of the Cuban
American community, the Clinton
administration announced a series of changes
to the policy that would mollify
the

community. These included greater

restrictions

on

island as well as increased support for
Radio and

Despite these changes

measures contained
Torricelli s

in

Track

TV

of the

CDA.

and the White House. Nuccio, who drafted the

Marti broadcasts. 34

affairs to both the State

At

civil societies.

bill)

making

Havana

in

36

way through

Walt Vanderbush and Patrick

Political Science Quarterly

35

its

1

J.

35

Also

in 1995,

36

Cuban Liberty and Democratic

Helms-Burton

civil society.

policy that would strengthen the links between

this time, the Clinton administration

including the

4

Cuba

Department

CDA for Torricelli, was the driving force

behind the innovative provisions to strengthen Cuban

American and Cuban

to the

In 1995, Clinton chose Richard Nuccio,

former aide, as special advisor on Cuban

Clinton announced changes to

and cash remittances

appeared as though policy toward Cuba would
emphasize

it

II

travel

opposed tightening the embargo,

Solidarity ( Libertad)

Act

(also

Congress. In an interview on

Haney, “Policy Toward Cuba

in the

known

as the

CNN on April

Clinton Administration,”

14, 3 (1999): 399.

Confidential interviews with senior U.S. government officials conducted

in

Washington

DC

and

1999.

This October 1995 executive order eased some travel restrictions, authorized the exchange of

news bureaus, allowed some donations
Cuba to facilitate money transfers.

to

Cuban NGOs, and allowed Western Union

72

to

open offices

in

13,

199^ the President stated that he thought

the year

began

According
before

it

to

draw

to

Dan

did not have

to a close, the administration

Fisk, Clinton instructed the State

bill to

much of a

the

became more vocal

Department

House Speaker, Newt Gingrich. 38

against the

bill.

to attempt to kill the bill

Cuban planes

It

seemed

as though the bill

chance.

However, the events

this

Helms-Burton was unnecessary. 37 As

reached his office. Warren Christopher, the
Secretary of State, conveyed his

opposition to the

that day,

that

shot

ot February 24, 1996,

down two

changed the outlook

for the bill.

Brothers to the Rescue planes. Four

Miami-based, Cuban American group

that

had been conducting

flights

On

members of
over

Cuba

to

distribute anti-Castro flyers

were

administration announced

would support Helms-Burton. Thus, the Cuban Liberty and

it

killed in the

downing. In response, the Clinton

Democratic Solidarity {Libertad) Act was signed

into

law on March

12, 1996. This act

authorizes penalties on foreign companies that conduct business in Cuba;
allows U.S.
citizens to sue foreigners for attempting to profit

Americans prior

to

it

from property

that

was owned by

being seized by the Castro regime; and prohibits those foreigners

from entering the United

States.

The provision

to

suspended by Presidents Clinton and Bush every

sue foreigners has been consistently

six

months.

In 1998, following the visit of Pope John Paul

II

to

Cuba, President Clinton

authorized the resurrection of the licensing of direct humanitarian flights between the two
countries, re-instated remittances at 1994 levels, and

37

officials,

it

easier to sell medicine to

William Jefferson Clinton, “Interview with Wolf Blitzer and Judy Woodruff on CNN,” Weekly

Compilation of Presidential Documents 31, (April
bin/multidb.cgi ) December 28, 2002.

38

made

14,

1995) (http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-

Vanderbush and Haney, 403; and confidential interviews with senior American government

1999.
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Cuba.”

In 1999,

Washington implemented farther changes

Clinton permitted

Cuban

all

to the policy. President

U.S. residents, not just those with family in
Cuba, to send

citizens; sanctioned

more

direct flights to

Cuba from

additional

money

American

to

airports;

allowed the resumption of direct mail service between
the U.S. and Cuba; increased the
categories of groups allowed to participate in

two-way exchanges with Cubans; and

authorized food sales to nongovernment groups in Cuba. 40
In 1999, the focus of

Gonzalez, a small boy

when

who

U.S.-Cuban relations took a detour. The

lost his

his boat sank off the coast

attention and

became

the

plight of Elian

mother and the other Cubans he was traveling with

of Florida

in

November, had gained

international

symbol of U.S.-Cuban enmity. Elian Gonzalez was turned over

by U.S. Immigration (INS)

to his relatives living in

Miami, causing an

international

custody incident that would wage well into the next year. The decision of Attorney

General Janet Reno

caused a

rift

to support the

INS decision

to return the

boy

to his father in

Cuba,

between the Cuban-American community and the Clinton administration.

Reverberations from this decision continued to have consequences for the bilateral
relationship over the next

few

years.

Since 2000 there have been further developments in U.S.-Cuban relations. The
crucial role of Florida in the

2000

President; the terrorist attacks

on

presidential election; the election of a Republican

New York and Washington;

supports bioterrorism; and former President

39

Jimmy

the charges that

Cuba

Carter’s visit to the island, are

among

William Jefferson Clinton, “Statement on Cuba,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential
20, 1998) ( http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cizi-bin/multidb.cgi ) December 28, 2002.

Documents (March
,

40

“U.S. Policy: Balancing Strategic and Humanitarian Concerns,” Congressional Digest (March

1999): 73.

74

the events that have continued to shape
the relationship between these

2000. The relevance of these recent developments
will be discussed
chapters and what they

mean

for the future

two countries since

in

subsequent

of U.S.-Cuban relations will be addressed

in

the conclusion.

Canada’s Cuba Policy:

Canada

s early relationship

American countries

at the time.

A Brief History

with Cuba mirrored

its

relationships with

most Latin

Since the British officially controlled Canadian foreign

policy until 1931, Canada could not direct

hemisphere. Consequently, Canada’s

its

political affairs

with the states in the

interactions with the countries of Latin

initial

America were dominated by economic exchanges.
In

comparison

to the

U.S.-Cuban relationship, Canada’s relationship with Cuba

has enjoyed a rather quiet history. That
history with Cuba.

war and

in the

1

New France

by the Spanish.

41

(present

in

day Quebec). Canadians fought

1601

in the

895-1898 war of independence. 41 One Canadian, William

Ryan, was appointed brigadier general
materials between

not to say that Canadians do not have a long

Samuel de Champlain spent a few months exploring Cuba

before he went on to found
ten years

is

New York and

in the ten years war.

Cuba, and

after

He

transported

men and war

being captured in 1873, was executed

42

John Kirk and Peter McKenna, Canada-Cuban Relations: The Other

Good Neighbor Policy

(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 10.

42

Ibid., 10.

For more information see William Ryan’s biography

at

(http://www.famousamericans.net/williamalbertcharlesryan/) (December 31, 2002) or information about his
last

expedition as a general on the "Virginius," which was captured by the Spanish man-of-war "Tornado"

on October, 31, 1873.
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Though
Canadians

the

in the

number

Cuban economy paled

American connection
Castro

Scandinavian, were

grow

to the island,

in

Cuba and

the level of involvement of

comparison to the intensity and scope of the

Canadians did have an

revolution. Canadians, along with Americans,

s

century.

of Canadians in

43

among

For example,

the

in the

many

farmers

who

interest in

Cuba

prior to

Germans, English and

settled in

Cuba

in the early nineteenth

1920s a large group of Canadian farmers moved to Cuba
to

tropical fruit. Their colony lasted until a hurricane hit
the island in 1926. Canadians

had also invested

in

Cuban

sugar. For example, in 1915

one of the three new

centrales,

the large social and economic hubs surrounding sugar production
and distribution formed

by the union of large plantations, was Canadian. 44 Canadian
also active in

Scotia had

Cuba

Cuba

prior to the revolution.

many branches

in 1950.

in

financial institutions

were

Both the Royal Bank and the Bank of Nova

Cuba. The Royal Bank was the largest commercial bank

in

Also by the 1950s, Canadian insurance companies held a majority of

Cuban insurance

45

policies.

Trade considerations dominated the relationship

and sugar were traded

for

in its early period.

Cuban rum

Canadian lumber and other natural resources. After

Confederation trade between the countries continued. Overall, trade increased steadily in
the

first

goods

quarter of the twentieth century. In 1902

to

43

44

45

Cuba and imported US$396,000

in

Canada exported US$265,000 worth of

Cuban goods from

the island.

By 1910

Deere, 729-765.

Thomas, 275 and 537.

John Kirk, Back

Canadian Foundation

in Business:

for the

Canada

Americas, 1995),

-

Cuba

7.

76

Relations after

50 years (Ottawa: FOCAL,

these

figures

were US$1,871,000 and US$1,259,000 and
by 1925 they had reached

US$8,619,000 and US$6,455,000

respectively.

46

The depression years and Canadian

sugar protectionism in the 1930s resulted in a
decline in trade. However, the disruption

European exports caused by the Second World War
once again increased
between the two countries.

By

1950, the value of Canada’s exports to

in

bilateral trade

Cuba had reached

Cnd$17.5 million. 47

Canada established diplomatic
ambassadors

in 1950.

of Fulgencio Batista

in

When

relations with

Fidel Castro’s rebel

Cuba

in

1945 and exchanged

movement overthrew the government

1959, the Canadian government was clearly surprised.
Reports

from the Canadian embassy prior

to the revolution describe Castro as

somewhat mad,

his

group as relatively weak and the government as “virtually impregnable.” 48
Despite these
inaccurate assessments and Ottawa’s apparent willingness to discount
Castro, officially
the Canadian government recognized his revolution as legitimate and
consequently

maintained normal relations with the

Canadian economic

Cuban

interests

new

regime.

were treated very favorably by the Castro regime.

officials cited the “excellent political, social

Canada and

the

Cuban revolutionary government,”

and economic relations between
as a reason for exempting

many

46

Harold Boyer, “Canada and Cuba: A Study in International Relations,” Ph.D. Dissertation,
(Simon Fraser University, 1972), and James Rochlin, Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of
Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994).

47

48

Rochlin, 238.

G.A. Browne, “Current Events

Archives, Ottawa

RG

25, vol.2750,

file

in

Cuba, November

513-40,

2.

77

1-

December

8,

1956” Canada, National

Canadian companies and individuals from
the expropriations

McKenna

believe the preferential treatment

government needed

Cuban machinery.

was “

to retain a link with the

in

49

John Kirk and Peter

.

essence because the revolutionary

West and obtain badly needed spare

parts for

Thus, while American companies were
being nationalized and U.S.

property was being expropriated, Canadian
assets in

Cuba were

often protected or

mutually satisfying agreements were reached
between the regime and Canadians. For

example,

Reform

many Canadian

property holders were not held to the limits of
the Agrarian

legislation. In addition,

when

all

both of them Canadian, were exempted

foreign banks were nationalized only

51
.

One wealthy Cuban,

preferential treatment accorded to Canadians, asked
the

home

to prevent

it

from being confiscated by the regime

Despite this preferential treatment, Canadian

warm

during this period. The Canadian government

loyalties

to treat

were with the Americans and other

Cuba

49

50

51

two banks,

recognizing the apparent

Canadian embassy

to lease his

52
.

- Cuban

made

it

relations

were not overly

clear to the

Cubans

that their

NATO allies 53 Ottawa’s official policy was
.

as a sovereign state.

Quoted

in

Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations, 46.

Ibid., 46.

Since there were no longer any American banks operating

in Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs
Bank of Canada helped to solve the problem of the ,200 Cuban exiles caught by
Castro’s army during the Bay of Pigs invasion. They facilitated the exchange of the prisoners for food and

invasion, the Royal

1

medicine.

52

Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuban Relations, 45.

Ibid., 52.
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Tension between Canada and the United
States over Cuba grew as the

between Washington and Havana increased.
Ottawa was

critical

hostility

of the Bay of Pigs

invasion and did not believe Washington’s claim
to be completely uninvolved
in the
affair.

Cuban

The

strain in

Canadian- American relations about Cuba came
to a head during the

missile crisis.

missiles in Cuba,

When the

United States discovered that the Soviets
were installing

Kennedy ordered Livingston Merchant,

the

American ambassador

Canada, to obtain assurances from Prime Minister
Diefenbaker (1957-1963)

would follow
forces

the

that

to

Canada

NORAD agreement. Merchant wanted to be guaranteed that Canadian

would automatically

reflect the level

of readiness assumed by the American forces.

Diefenbaker and his cabinet refused to place the Canadian
forces on the same
level

of alert. The External Affairs Minister claimed

that if

Canada agreed

to this U.S.

request then Canadians would “be their vassals forever.” 54
Furthermore, Prime Minister

Diefenbaker implied that the American version of events was possibly
unreliable and

recommended
At

that the

this time,

United Nations investigate to determine the actual

Canada and Mexico were

the only countries in the Americas that did

not acquiesce to U.S. demands to sever relations with

hemispheric vote

at

(1963-1968), was

Punta del Este

much more

in 1962.

facts.

Cuba

in

accord with the

Canada’s next Prime Minister, Lester Pearson

willing to follow the

American lead on other matters but

refused to significantly alter Canada’s policy toward Cuba. Pearson was careful not to
alter

Canada’s

54

official relationship

with Cuba but he also did not encourage a closer

Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border

(Toronto: McClelland

& Stewart Inc.,

1990).
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relationship with Havana. Pearson’s
relationship with

‘coldly correct.’

warming

characterized as

55

In contrast.

in

Cuba has been

Prime Minister Trudeau (1968-1979; 1980-1984)
was very

relations

between Havana and Ottawa. He was the

to officially visit Castro in

Cuba.

56

first

interested

leader of a U.S. ally

Castro and Trudeau developed a close
relationship

that could be considered a friendship. After
Trudeau’s death in 2000, Fidel Castro said,
“I

remember him
that

that

I

as

one of the most decent men and one of the most outstanding
statesmen

have met and

towards a

I

have met a

member

lot

of people.

of the family.

I

And

the regard

didn’t just like him,

Prime Minister Trudeau was instrumental

in

strongly believed that the transition to democracy in
furthered through trade.

countries,

in office.

In

He developed

which included

As

right

wing

I

I

felt

towards him was like

was very fond of him.” 57

expanding trade with the

island.

Cuba and elsewhere could be

trading connections with

dictatorships as well as

many

Latin American

Cuba during

a result, Canadian -Latin American trade expanded

his early years

much during

the 1970s.

1970 Canada exported $500 million worth of goods to Latin America. By 1980

figure had risen to $3,493 million.

55

58

Cuba was

He

definitely part of this trend.

this

Canadian

Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuban Relations 66.
,

56

Janies

Guy, “The growing

(July-August, 1977):

57

(

relationship

of Canada and the Americas,” International Perspectives

6.

“Fidel Castro: Interview with Paule Robitaille,”

http://www.cbc.ca/national/magazine/castro April
')

58

6,

CBC: The Magazine

2003.

Rochlin, 238-9.

80

exports to

Cuba had

increased from $58.9 million in 1970
to $421.8 million in 1980. 59

1981 Cuba looked to Canada as

its

main non-Communist trading

Despite early attempts by Trudeau to

partner.

move Canada and Cuba

trend could not weather the storm growing
in

By

60

closer, the

Canada over Cuba’s involvement

warming
in Africa.

Trudeau came under increasing criticism from other
quarters of the Canadian government
for maintaining his friendship with Castro
while

Though Trudeau had repeatedly voiced
African conflicts, he was pressured to

Cuban

to

troops were involved in Angola.

his concern to Castro about

make

it

was

finally decided that

role in the

Canada would

underscore Ottawa’s objection to the presence of

troops in Africa.

Prime Minister Mulroney (1984-1993) oversaw a

shift in

toward Latin America. At the urging of the Secretary of State
Clark,

Cuba’s

a change in official policy to register

Canada’s disapproval. After months of debate,
suspend their aid program in Cuba

Cuban

Canada

finally joined the Organization

level visits to the region

of American

Canadian foreign policy

for External Affairs, Joe

States, initiated

and provided considerable funding

to the

more high-

Canada-Latin America

Forum (FOCAL). 61
However, Mulroney was widely recognized as being the most pro-American
Canadian Prime Minister. Mulroney’s oft-quoted

line that:

“Good

relations, super

relations with the United States of America will be the cornerstone of our foreign policy”

59

60

Rochlin,, 238-9.

Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuban Relations 106.
,

61

Ibid., 130.

81

characterized his leadership. 62 Consequently,
attention paid to the region

Cuba

did not benefit from the increased

by Ottawa. Mulroney’s approach toward
Cuba was somewhat

reminiscent of Lester Pearson’s policy toward
the island.
trade ties with

Cuba while very

foremost an American

ally. In

carefhlly sending the

maintained diplomatic and

message

to

Havana

that

Canada was

1989, a Canadian diplomat, Richard Gorham,
described

Canada’s relationship with Cuba
correct, cordial

He

as:

and as close as can be expected for two such countries
with
and systems and security concerns... We are an
ally of the

different outlooks

United States against possible threats from the Soviet
Union
unaligned.

63

- we

are not

Thus, under Mulroney, Canadian-Cuban relations remained
distant. However, after Jean
Chretien’s Liberal Party trounced the Conservative Party in the
1993 election, Ottawa’s
policy toward

mandate

Cuba was one of the many

policies the

new government

believed

it

had a

to change.

The Canadian-Cuban

relationship

warmed during

the first

few years of Prime

Minister Jean Chretien’s (1993-) Liberal government. Official development assistance
to
the island

was

reinstated in 1994.

According

since 1994 the Canadian International

$65 million

6
~

to

Cuba

Quoted

in

in multilateral

to a

2002 Canadian government

Development Agency (CIDA) had granted almost

and

bilateral initiatives.

David T. Jones, “Canada and the

US

in

CIDA

supports a large

the Chretien Years:

Edging Toward

Confrontation,” Policy Options (November 2000): 34. (http://www.irpp.oru) January
.

63

Context...

report,

3,

2003.

Quoted in George W. Schuyler, “Perspectives on Canada and Latin American: Changing
Changing Policy,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 33, 1 (Spring 1991):

82

41.

number of civil society-based
universities

ties

including connections between
Canadian and

Cuban

and community organizations. 64

Also, for the

first

time in decades, high-level Canadian
officials visited Cuba. The

Speaker of the House of Commons, Gilbert Parent,
personally took medical aid
in

1

995. Lloyd Axworthy, Prime Minister Chretien’s

made a highly publicized

trip to the island in early

first

1997.

to

Cuba

Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Then

in

1998 the Prime Minister

himself met with Castro in Havana.

Trade between Canada and Cuba increased

power

in 1993.

after the Liberal

Trade between the two countries rose

Table

2:

to

Cnd $753

government came

million in 2001, a

Trade with Cuba. 1993-2002

Canadian Total Exports U.S. Total Exports Canadian Total Imports
Year

($

CND)

($

CND)

($

CND)

U.S Total
Imports
($

CND)

1993

146,210,248

3,206,518

171,501,193

0

1994

124,871,430

6,294,833

194,417,592

0

1995

279,375,855

8,023,822

320,914,410

0

1996

291,990,504

7,456,934

401,164,558

0

1997

364,054,484

13,142,477

353,126,763

0

1998

481,192,778

5,129,562

333,464,942

0

1999

396,911,298

6,648,792

305,201,552

964,770

2000

333,128,405

10,227,958

408,515,143

479,864

2001

394,325,217

10,619,949

361,275,529

8,617

2002

276,431,269

226,759,653

325,050,525

489,952

Source: Industry Canada, Trade Data Online (http://strategis.ic.gc.ca )

64

Program

in

to

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canadian Cooperation
Cuba,” ( http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cuba/dev-en.asp ) December 17, 2002.

83

Cnd $12

million increase from the year earlier,
though less than the

Cnd $817

traded in 1998. 65 Table 2 compares
Canadian and American trade with

million

Cuba from 1993

to 2002.

Canadian companies are especially active

Canadian hotel and restaurant chains are

in the travel

common on

and tourism

industry.

the island, as are Canadian food
and

beverages. Ottawa reports that Canadians are the
single largest group of tourists in
Cuba.
In 2001,

400,000 Canadian

tourists visited

Cuba.

66

Mining companies have

also heavily

invested in the country. For example, Canadian
Sherritt International, a nickel and cobalt
refining

company,

is

one of the largest foreign investors

in

Cuba and consequently, was

one of the companies targeted by the American Helms-Burton

Canada remains one of the top sources of foreign investment
for the top investors in

Cuba during

effective

way

to foster

the people and

that their policy

change

in

Cuba.

in

68

67

Overall,

See table 3 below

the 1990s.

Trade was not the only focus of Canadian policy

government maintained

legislation.

in the 1990s.

The Chretien

of “constructive engagement”

is

the most

Cuba. This policy attempts to create linkages between

government of Cuba and

their

Canadian counterparts

in order to influence

65

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Cuba: Canada-Cuba Trade and
Investment,” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/cubatrade-en.asp ) December 17, 2002.

66

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Cuba: Canada-Cuba

Relations,” ( http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/cubarelations-en.asp April
')

67

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Cuba:

Businesses,” Minister of Supply and Services, 2
17,

nd

ed. (June 1999)

U.S. Trade and Economic Council, “Foreign Investment and Cuba,”

(http://www.cubatrade.org.) January

5,

2003.

84

2003.

A

Guide

for

( http://www.infoexport.gc.ca )

2002.

68

7,

Canadian

December

Cuba

to

open

their

economy,

to

give greater respect to

human

the development of representative
government. 69 In 1997,
Joint Declaration,

which established cooperation between

number of areas including on human

Table

and to encourage

Ottawa and Havana signed a
the

two governments

and good governance

issues.

in

a

70

Foreign Direct Investment in Cuba
($ U.S.)

3:

C ountry

rights

rights,

Direct Investment in

Cuba from 990
1

to

March

1999
1.807.000.
1.806.000.
599.000.

Canada
Mexico

000

500.000.
000
400.000.

Italy

000
000
000

Australia

South Africa

Source: U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.
“Foreign Investment in Cuba”.

However,

after the

1998

visit

by Prime Minister Chretien

between Havana and Ottawa took a downturn. During

to

that visit, the

Cuba, relations

Canadian Prime

Minister personally raised the case of four dissidents that were scheduled
to be tried in

Cuba. Castro ignored the Prime Minister’s request which lead to a suspension of visits

between the countries’ highest

PanAmerican games held

in

officials.

Relations continued to deteriorate

Winnipeg. Fidel Castro accused the Canadian

at the

1999

officials

of

69

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Cuba: Canada-Cuba
Relations,” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/cubarelations-en.asDi December
17, 2002.

70

See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada’s Relations with

Cuba” (http//www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latin/cuba/81600-e.htm).

In recent years, the success

Declaration has been called into question as there appears to be

Canadian government

officials

constructive engagement

government

officials,

is

little

of the Joint

progress on these issues

respond that they did not expect rapid change

in

in

Cuba.

Cuba and maintain

that

a long-term policy. Based on confidential interviews with senior Canadian

Ottawa and Havana, 1999 and 2000.
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many

things including trying to disadvantage
Cuba's teams and allowing sports scouts
to

promote the defection of Cuban
Canadian universities defected,
and Canadian investment

athletes.

C1DA

71

In addition,

programs

in

some Cuban

Cuba began

students attending

to eneounter difficulties

in the island started to decline.

Since 2000 there have been further developments
in the Canadian-Cuban
relationship including Castro’s visit to Ottawa in
rift

2000

for Pierre Trudeau’s funeral; the

between the two countries over Cuba’s exclusion from
the Summit of the Americas

meeting

in

Quebec

in

2001; and the

visit in

November 2002 by Denis

Paradis, Secretary

of State for Latin America, Africa and La Francophonie, to
Havana. These and other
recent developments will be highlighted in the concluding
chapter of this study.

Conclusion

The previous two chapters have reviewed hundreds of years of history. Cuba,
United States and Canada have changed enormously over the

Canada and
history and

the United States have gone

from colonial outposts

Though each country’s
three were

policies.

mere

relationship with

colonial holdings,

in

it

is

Cuba

“Castro: 1999 on

its’

states.

Cuba’s

northern

stretches

back

to the period

when

possible to see foreshadows of the current

Cuba’s war with Spain, and the

Platt

to

Amendment

annex Cuba,

their

are evidence of the

PanAm Games,

of the Rebuplic of Cuba, related
1

modem

years.

itself.

For example, the repeated attempts of the United States

involvement

71

to

development has been much more rocky and uneven than

neighbors but the island has also dramatically transformed

all

few hundred

last

the

to the

Excerpts from the speech given by Dr. Fidel Castro, President
th
Pan American Games in Winnipeg, Cienfuegos, Cuba, July 26
,

999.” ( http://www.pbs.ortz/stealinghome/sportycastro99b.html ), January 3
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1 ,

2002.

American perception of Cuban sovereignty and
approach including the Helms-Burton
Castro’s

first

much of the contemporary

The Canadian exemptions from many of

expropriations demonstrate the long history
of amicable relations between

Havana and Ottawa. Likewise,
isolationist

bill.

foretell

the reasons for Canada’s decision not
to support an

approach toward the regime

in the

1960s are

still

relevant today.

Though

chapter has mainly served to provide a historical
backdrop to the rest of the study,

it

this

also

demonstrates that parts of the contemporary policies have
historical roots.

Both countries would

on the

island, but they

like to see greater respect for

human

rights

and democracy

have chosen very different means to that end. The United
States

has used their economic and military power to attempt to
force the end of Castro’s
“socialist experiment.” In contrast,

Canada has used

their ‘soft

power” resources

to

encourage a change within the Castro regime.

The Americans have economically and

politically isolated the regime, sponsored

various plots to overthrow or assassinate Castro, and tried to pressure other
countries to

impose sanctions on the regime.

In contrast,

Canada has sponsored numerous meetings

with Cuban officials to discuss the issues, actively pressed for academic and cultural
exchanges, given financial aid to the regime to support projects that they hope will lead to

improvements on the
and attempted

to

island,

sponsored readmitting Cuba to international organizations,

mediate between the United States and Cuba. Though especially

noticeable since 1959, the differences in approaches stretch back
the next chapters will reveal, the

two

policies

of the nations involved.
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go

to the heart

many

of the

years because, as

identities

and cultures

CHAPTER 4

AMERICAN IDENTITY AND VALUES AND THEIR
INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

Scholars have studied the American identity for
centuries but
the attention

However, by

it

for

has not received

deserves as an explanation for American actions on
the world stage.

definition, a state’s identity is integral to

identity “is the

it

mechanism

that provides individuals

comprehending the relationship

have certain collective

identities

its

policies toward others, since

with a sense of self and the means

ol the self to the external environment.”

through which individuals

1

All societies

in that society give their

meaning and through which they make sense of international and domestic

actions

situations. Identities

produce certain patterns of thinking and help construct behavior and

policy.

Scholars are

now recognizing

the connection

between American

identity

and

foreign policy. Samuel Huntington, writing about American foreign policy asserts
“Efforts to define national interests presuppose agreement on the nature of the country

whose
have

interests are to

know who we

to

be defined. National
are before

we

can

interest derives

know what our

from national

interests are.”

argues that American identity shaped America’s decisions regarding

2

identity.

We

John G. Ruggie

NATO security

1

Identity

Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, “Introduction: Tracing
on Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 8, 2/3 (Winter 1998/1999- Spring 1999), xi.

2

Samuel

P.

the Influence of

Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76, 5

(September/October 1997), 28.
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commitments, the features of the United Nations
and
Defense Community, among other things
influence over major

but, also as the

3

Identity is

.

American foreign policy

Americans generally see

US

support for the European

now

widely understood to have

decisions.

their country as not only the best
country in the

embodiment of democracy,

the

world

champion of freedom and human

rights

and the leader of the West. These representations
are accepted as obvious and natural

American foreign policy

American

identity

circles.

in

This chapter will describe these crucial
elements of

and demonstrate how they have influenced

US

foreign policy.

Many

of

these elements of American identity are encompassed
within the idea of American

exceptionalism.

The United
The

States as an Exceptional Nation

origins of the exceptionalist identity have been addressed by

many

scholars.

Louis Hartz argued that the American isolation from Europe and the lack
of religious and
class conflict during the founding period created an

emphasized individual

liberty, equal rights,

American

political culture that

and government by consent. Fredrick

Jackson Turner argued that the American frontier that allowed individualism

was

the basis of the

American democratic

tradition.

Others have pointed out that religion

played a crucial role in the creation of the unique American identity. The
settlers in the

United States had strong religious

Christians, believing that

3

it

was

to flourish

beliefs.

first

European

These Puritans and other

a state’s duty to enforce morality, built institutions with

John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utlitarianism and the Social

Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52,4

89

(Autumn

1998); 855-885.

religious overtones. Their conviction
that the United States

contributed to the idea that the U.S. had
a mission to spread
others. Theories about

America’s

was favored by God,
its

God-given values

historical experience, religious basis,

offer insight into the foundation of

American

political culture

and

Regardless of its origins, the belief that the
United States
is

and

to

frontier past,

identity.

is

an exceptional nation

firmly entrenched within the American
self-consciousness and has contributed to the

development of U.S. foreign policy. One of the best
articulations of exceptionalism was
voiced by John

O

Sullivan, a journalist

and the author of Mainfest Destiny. The

following, written in 1845, encapsulates the most
accepted ideas of exceptionalism:

Yes, we are the nation of progress, of individual freedom,
of universal
enfranchisement. Equality of rights is the cynosure of our
union of States, the
grand exemplar of the correlative equality of individuals;
and while truth sheds its
effulgence, we cannot retrograde, without dissolving the
one and subverting the

We must onward to the ful filment of our mission — to the entire
development of the principle of our organization ~ freedom of conscience,
freedom of person, freedom of trade and business pursuits, universality
other.

of

freedom and equality. This is our high destiny, and in nature's eternal,
inevitable
decree of cause and effect we must accomplish it. All this will be our
future
history, to establish on earth the moral dignity and salvation of
man - the
immutable truth and beneficence of God. For this blessed mission to the nations
of the world, which are shut out from the life-giving light of truth, has America
been chosen; and her high example shall smite unto death the tyranny of kings,
hierarchs, and oligarchs, and carry the glad tidings of peace and good will where
myriads now endure an existence scarcely more enviable than that of beasts of the
field.

Who,

futurity?

then, can doubt that our country

4

To John O’Sullivan and many Americans
what a nation could aspire

4

to

since, the

is

destined to be the great nation of

United States represents the best of

be and was destined to lead other,

John L. O'Sullivan on Manifest Destiny, 1839

(htt p://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/osulliva.htm )

March

90

7,

2003.

lesser, nations.

American exceptionalism
other countries due to
identity contains a

its political

state;

including: that

political rights are

and

United States

is

superior

values internationally.

unique and superior

among

democracy and

the

to

related values

most important principles

that

that the United States has achieved
unparalleled success in

these areas. Exceptionalism also contains
a missionary norm.

United States

is

system, economy, society, culture
and values. This

number of elements,

such as freedom and other

can be held by a

asserts that the

it

It

asserts that since the

has special rights and duties associated
with promoting these

The next

part

of this chapter highlights the relationship
between

the elements of exceptionalism and foreign
policy.

The United
Alexis de Tocqueville

first

coined the term exceptionalism, but the notion
that

America was unique and superior has
that arrived in present day

a

model

roots in early

John Winthrop declared

that others should follow.

these ideas during their bid for independence. In

have

it

in

American

history.

The

New England believed they were creating a new,

society. In the seventeenth century,

City on a Hill,

States as Superior

that this

first settlers

superior

new world was

The people of America turned

Common

Sense

Tom

Paine wrote:

a

to

“We

our power to begin the world over again.” These sentiments appear over and

over in documents from early American history.

Though most
sentiments are

still

revolutionaries believe that they will create a superior society, these

articulated

by American policy makers of the twentieth and twenty-
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first

centuries. Before he

was

Philippines with Americans.

president,

He

said

5

Woodrow Wilson

“They

contrasted the people of the

are children and

we

are

men

in these

deep

matters of government and justice. If we
have not learned the substance of
these things no
nation

is

ever likely to learn

it...”

President Ronald Reagan’s inaugural
address quoted

John Winthrop's famous words. Reagan said

upon a

hill.”

6

President George H.

W. Bush

that the

Sr.

United States was “shining city

declared that the Gulf War

demonstrated our special role as the world’s
preeminent moral,
military power.”

7

This

belief,

bom

in the

political,

economic, and

days of John Winthrop, remains a stable

element of the American identity in the twenty-first
century. The United States believes
that

it

is

a special nation, superior to others, and consequently,
that the U.S. has the

authority to judge other countries’ social, economic
and political systems.

Democracy, Freedom and

Americans are especially convinced
belief has been

embraced by

all

Human

Rights

that their political

system

is

superior. This

policy makers, regardless of political party. For example,

Republican President George Bush

Sr. said,

“For two centuries, America has served the

world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy.” In his 1993 Inaugural
Address, Democratic President William Clinton told Americans: “our greatest strength

is

5

Woodrow Wilson, “The Ideals of America 1902,” in The American Intellectual Tradition A
Sourcebook Volume II: 1865 to the Present (4 th ed.) David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper, eds. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 123-130.
:

6

7

President Reagan’s Inaugural Address- 1981, reprinted in the

President George

H.W. Bush’s Remarks

at the

Texas, October 31, 1991, Public Papers of the President.
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New

York Times January 21, 1981.

Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner

in

Houston,

the

power of our

embraced, and
continent

Michael

who

Cox

ideas,

we

which

rejoice.

are

still

new

Our hopes, our

are building

in

many

lands.

Across the world, we see them

hearts, our hands, are with those

democracy and freedom. Their cause

on every
9

is

America's cause.” 8

argues that Clinton’s focus on democracy
promotion was

in part,

based on:

American experience and the widely shared
belief that the United States was
not just a successful democracy but a
shining example for others to follow,
mton, in fact, was quite adamant that the
character of a nation’s foreign policy
ad to reflect its core values: and there was
nothing more important in the
American value system, he believed, than the principle
of democracy.
the

The

belief that the United States

American

identity

the best

is

example of democracy

is

firmly rooted in the

and has furthered the emphasis on democracy and
human

rights in

foreign policy.

Democracy and freedom

are considered important goals of US foreign
policy

Washington insiders and policy makers. Though also important

to

by

average Americans,

survey data indicates that support for democracy promotion does
not trump most other
goals of American foreign policy.

0

However, democracy and human

dismissed by the public as unimportant foreign policy

“Here

is

8

priorities.

A

rights are not

1995 survey asked:

an argument tor and against emphasizing democracy and human rights in our

William Jefferson Clinton's

First

Inaugural Address

-

1993 ( http://www.re-

quest.net/history/inaugurals/clinton/') April 29, 2003.

9

Quoted in Michael Cox, “Democracy Promotion Under Clinton,” in American Democracy
Promotion Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takshi Inoguchi, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), 218-239.

10

For a review of the relationship between democracy, public opinion and foreign policy see
Howard J. Wiarda’s American Foreign Policy: Actors
and Processes and also Ole R. Holsti, “Democracy Promotion as Popular Demand?” in American

chapter 4 “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” in

Democracy Promotion Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi
,

University Press, 2000), 151-180.
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,eds.

(Oxford: Oxford

foreign policy. These values are what

that this

poll found that

human

came very

or

democracy

somewhat close

86 percent of Americans said

rights in other countries”

policy goal.

stand for as a people and

we must uphold them

How close does this come to your own view?” Eight-four

in foreign policy.

answered

we

to their

percent

view." Similarly, a 2003 Gallup

that they thought

“promoting and defending

was a very important or somewhat important

That same poll also found that 75 percent of those
asked said
in other countries”

American foreign

policy.

13

was a very important

A June 2002,

survey revealed that 90 percent said

that

or

foreign

that “building

somewhat important

goal of

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR)
“promoting and defending human

rights in other

countries” should be an important goal. Forty-seven percent
of those asked said this

should be a “very important” goal. 14 Thus, even though goals such
as fighting terrorism
or preventing the spread of nuclear weapons rank higher than spreading
democracy and

defending

human

rights, these goals are still important to the

Democracy and

its

related values

Cuba’s war with Spain

11

(

in 1898,

public.

have been guiding principles of American

foreign policy for centuries. According to

in

American

Tony Smith,

since the United States intervened

“no theme has figured more prominently

Foreign Policy, The Public Agenda Foundation,

New

in

American

York, 1995.

http://poll.orspub.com/poll/lpext.dl l/ors/f/foreignpolicv/01 1462-1 995. htm?f=templates&fih

March

15

2003.

12

Gallup Poll, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, CT, February 20, 2003.

( http://poll.orspub.com/poll/lpext.dl

l/ors/f/foreignpolicv/002272-2002i.htm?f=templates&fl March 15,

2003.

14

This percentage

is

International Policy Attitudes,

up from 39 percent in 1998 and 34 percent in 1994. See: Program on
Americans and the World ( hnp://www. americans-world.org ) April 28, 2003.

rising,

94

foreign policy than the repeated presidential
calls to promote the creation of
democratic

governance abroad .” 15 Since the end of the Cold
War and what

is

perceived to be the

triumph of American democracy, the United
States has further embraced
its

identity

16
.

Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi
agree

this

that

element of

democracy

has become even more central to American foreign
policy since the end of the Cold War.

They

state,

“democracy promotion has

rather neatly filled the missionary

by the collapse of international communism .” 17 Thus,
the perception

example of democracy, the

democracy

US

is

gap

left

behind

that as a superior

has a responsibility to promote the development
of

in other countries.

American Democracy: Liberalism and Open Markets

The American understanding of democracy, not
liberal

democracy. According

liberal

democracy (even by comparison with other

to

Tony Smith

surprisingly, resembles

the “distinguishing

liberal

US

style

mark of American

democracies) has been a

state

limited by strongly organized social forces acting through freely organized political

15

in the

Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy

Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

16

For a thorough treatment of the role of democracy

in

American foreign policy see Cox,

Ikenberry and Inoguehi eds. American Democracy Promotion.

17

Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguehi

,

“Introduction,” in

Democracy Promotion, Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi
University Press, 2000), 1-17.
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American

Inoguehi, eds. (Oxford: Oxford

parties.”

in

18

Tony Smith

domestic American

continues “[I]t

life

is

inevitable that the

meaning of liberal democracy

should deeply mark the conduct of its
foreign policy.” 19

Further, the United States sees

democracy

as intimately connected with free
trade

and open markets. American foreign policy has
historically espoused a

laissez-faire

approach toward trade. Open economies are seen as
incompatible with authoritarian
political systems.

Economic and

political

development are thought

to

go together. In

1959 Seymour Martin Lipset argued that economic development
resulted

in a

more

educated populace and a larger middle class, both of which
he said were important to

democracy.

20

Though many of the assumptions made by

the modernization school have

been called into question, the relationship between economic and

political

development

remains widely accepted by the architects of American foreign policy.
American

democracy promotion,

thus, attempts to

side democratic institutions and values.

greatly

encourage open economies and free trade along

The perception

from the American model, shapes U.S. foreign

Exceptionalism in Action:

democracy does not vary

that true

policy.

A Missionary Foreign Policy

Both the importance placed on democracy and freedom, and the idea

that the

United States represents the apex of these and other values, contributes to the norm that

18

Smith, America

’s

Mission

,

17.

19

Ibid..

20

Political

Seymour Martin

Lipset,

“Some

Social Requisites of Democracy:

Economic Development and

Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 69-105.
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the United States

on an

is

international mission to assist
others to adopt similar political

and economic systems and values.
Since
States in

WWII

world

Americans have consistently supported an
active

affairs.

Though

there have

role for the United

been periods when isolationism has been

preferred, polls as far back as the early
1950s reveal a preference for an active foreign
policy.

21

In 2000, 78 percent of

affairs.

world

Recent polls indicate continued support for American
involvement

is

protect

Americans agreed with the statement

so interconnected today, the

human

rights,

US

in

world

that “[bjecause the

should participate in efforts to maintain peace,

and economic development.” 22 In 2002, the Chicago
Council on

Foreign Relations asked “Do you think

it

will be best for the future of the country if we

take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world
affairs.” Seventy-one

percent of those polled advocated that the United States take an
active part in world
23

affairs.

The

belief that the United States has a responsibility beyond

contested by

many

isolationism

was John Quincy Adams, who

leading figures.

its

borders has been

One of the most well-known advocates of
in 1823,

warned

that the

United States

should not go “abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.”

He

wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She

champion and vindicator only

21

22

is

the

continued “[s]he

is

the well-

Wiarda, American Foreign Policy, 64-65.

PIPA, “Americans on Globalization:

A

Study of US Public Attitudes,” (March 28, 2000)

( http://www.pipa.Org/OnlineReports/Globalization/4.html ) April 28, 2003.

22

Marshall M. Bouton and Benjamin

(September

1

1

,

I.

Page, “Vulnerable, vigilant, engaged,” Chicago Tribune

2002) (http://www.chicagotribune.eom/news/specials/9

020908perspective.story ) April 28, 2003.
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1

1

/showcase/chi-

.

of her own.

Though

contested by

Henry Kissinger, much of the

Adams and

other prominent Americans such
as

history of American foreign policy
has been dominated

by

an internationalist, missionary sentiment.

Americans perceive

that

1950 articulation of U.S. Cold
United States has,

it is

their duty as the superior state to
lead others.

War policy,

the then top secret,

the responsibility of world leadership.

attempt, and accept the risks inherent in

it,

It

NSC 68, declares that the

demands

to bring about order

that

Madeleine Albright, reaffirmed

world's leading democracy,

transition

move

George Bush

told the

that stand

American
is

25

again,

familiar

in partnership

— Once

with others to help nations in

again, this nation and

accept this responsibility.

our friends are

it

all

has a responsibility to lead, to assist other

human

rights.

John Quincy Adams, “Warning Against the Search

for

‘Monsters to Destroy,” 1 82 1

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950

at

all

27

“Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Sustaining Democracy

(

all

peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm.
are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of
at

States continues to believe

Speech delivered

Secretary of

public:

countries to democratize and enhance

24

later,

United States had a “responsibility, as the

that the

work

between a world

we
mankind. And we

The United

to

the

to a higher stage of democratic development.” 26 In
2003, President

Americas duty

Once

...

we make

and justice by means

consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy.” 25
Fifty years
State,

The

Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, January

http://secretary.state.izov/www/statements/2000/000

1

1

18,

,

in the

Volume

I.

Twenty-First Century"

2000

8.html ), April 30, 2003.

27

U.S. White House, President George W. Bush, "State of the Union,” (January 28, 2003)
http://www.wh itehouse.uov/news/releases/2003/0 /20030 28- 9.html March 16, 2003.
1

1
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A Recent History: Exceptionalism and Foreign Policy
These ideas encompassed by exceptionalism
and foreign policies of past centuries, have been
just

that

were prevalent

in the doctrines

as relevant to the foreign policies

of

the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This
section will briefly highlight the
influence

of this identity and

its

related values

and norms on American foreign policy over
the

last

one hundred years.

The decision of the United

States to join the allies in

major foreign policy decisions, based on numerous

factors.

World War I was,

However,

considerable evidence that American exceptionalism played
a crucial
certainly used to justify

President

American involvement. For example,

Woodrow Wilson

always carried nearest

there

role.

own

authority to have a voice in their

It

was

War Message,

in his

we have

democracy, for the right of those who submit to

governments... the day has

come when America

privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth.

helping her she can do no other .”

peace of the world .”

29

Though

28

He

most

is

declared: “...we shall fight for the things which

to our hearts- for

like

later

argued that “America

is

..

is

God

necessary to the

the United States entered an isolationist period after

WWI

the values and beliefs inherent in exceptionalism remained influential (for example, the

United States

28

still

President

Relations Volume

II:

saw

itself as a

Woodrow

model

for the rest of the world). After

Wilson, “Wilson’s

War Message,”

in

Major Problems

Since 1914 Thomas G. Patterson and Dennis Merrill, eds. (4
,

th

WWII American

in

American Foreign

ed.) (Lexington,

MA:

D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 37.

29

President

Woodrow

South Dakota, September 8,”

Thomas G.

in

Wilson, “Wilson Defends the Peace Treaty and the League: Sioux Falls

Major Problems

Patterson and Dennis Merrill, eds. (4

in

lh

American Foreign Relations Volume

ed.) (Lexington,

42.
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MA:

II:

Since 1914,

D.C. Heath and Company, 1995),

foreign policy again

became charaeterized by a preference

for active international

leadership.

Although Cold War policies were often dominated
by other material and
goals, the ideas

embodied by exceptionalism played a

American perception of their country

significant role in the period.

The

as the leader of the “free world” and
as the

exemplar of democratic governance translated
definition,

realist

into the foreign policy arena.

Almost by

American foreign policy championed democracy and defended
freedom.

Many

scholars have described the influence of these ideas
on American foreign

policy during this period. Siobhan

McEvoy-Levy argues

revisionist theories of the origins of the

American exceptionalism.

In the

that “[b]oth

Cold War contain

at their

orthodox and

cores a conception of

orthodox view, the United States’ cause was the

righteous and inevitable one. Revisionist historians contended that
exceptionalism was a
30
large part of the motivation for the United States’ aggressive expansion
abroad.”

editor of the

The

World Policy Journal, James Chace wrote:

The other America, equally though

often quixotically moral,

is

the

America of

Woodrow Wilson and John
"make

Foster Dulles, the crusader nation prepared in 1917 to
the world safe for democracy" or to roll back communism by liberating

Eastern Europe in the Eisenhower-Dulles years. Even as the United States grew
from 13 colonies into creating a global imperium, with military bases flung far
across the world, American leaders could with

some justification view

this as the

fulfillment of Jefferson's "empire of liberty." True, the United States departed

time and again from moral behavior
friendly to us did not

—

—covert

action to ensure that governments

become communist reached

its

apogee

in the

Eisenhower

but always our actions could be justified by appealing to the larger cause
of overthrowing Soviet oppression. Whatever wrongs we committed, surely, we
believed, they were in the service of a higher end
the establishment of

years

—

democracy and free markets, which would bring about prosperity
Immanuel Kant's ideal of perpetual peace.

30

the

Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and

End of the Cold War (New

York: Palgrave, 2001), 29.
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US Foreign

for all

Policy: Public

and

Diplomacy

at

In his analysis of American foreign
policy,

Howard Wiarda, maintains

the United States had three basic
goals, one of which

and freedom.”
Baritz writes

was

that in this period

to “stand firmly for

democracy

31

In his analysis

“The myth of the

of American involvement
city

on a

hill

became

in the

Vietnam War Loren

the foundation for the ritualistic

thinking of later generations of Americans.
This myth helped to establish
nationalistic

orthodoxy

in

America.

It

began

to set

an American dogma, to

Americans about themselves and about the

rest

fix the limits

of thought for

of the world, and offered a choice
about

the appropriate relationship between us
and them.” 32

These ideas appear over and over
in the rhetoric

all

American people

NSC

recognize that the victory which

classified, refers to the

democracy and freedom.” 34 The

*

“American

like

it

has placed upon the

responsibility”

The

and

the early

Cold War period.

Wiarda, American Foreign Policy, 38.

32 t

fight the

“Whether we

ideas of American exceptionalism were repeated in

documents and speeches throughout

31

we have won

that:

the continued burden of responsibility for
world leadership.” 33

68 of 1950, then highly

similar

and classified documents and

of the period. In 1945 President Truman declared

we must

or not,

in both the public

Loren

Baritz, Backfire

way we did (New York

:

a history of how American
W. Morrow, 1985), 29.
:

culture led us into Vietnam

and made us

33

Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress Recommending the Establishment of the
Department of National Defense,” December 19, 1945 In Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961). Quoted in Jutta Weldes, “The Cultural
Production of Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles
Laffers,

Hugh Gusterson and Raymond

in

Cuba,”

in

Cultures of Insecurity, Jutta Weldes,

Duvalls, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

42.

34

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950,
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Volume

I.

Mark
1999)

However, the Vietnam War

raised serious doubts about the
guiding principles

behind the conduct of the United States
abroad. McEvoy-Levy argues
eroded the American belief in their
exceptional character and
their vision

and “save the world.” 35

Vietnam on U.S. policy
the

The

result

and freedom

in their desire to

ways. Howard Wiarda asserts
possibilities for

was a severe questioning of the

had drawn the United States

into the

that the United States

Vietnam
spread

other scholars have also described
the effect of

Cold War consensus and undermined the

foreign policy...

that

in similar

Many

that

war

for in

“Vietnam destroyed

an effective American

basic foreign policy premises

in the first place.

was standing

that,

Was

Vietnam?”

it

really

democracy

36

The break with these ideas most clearly occurred
during the Nixon and Ford
administrations.

Henry Kissinger (1969-1977) believed

attempt to export

its

that the United States should not

values but recognized that these ideas have had
considerable

influence over American foreign policy.
...the singularies that

its

explained:

America has ascribed

produced two contradictory

America serves

He

attitudes

to itself throughout
toward foreign policy. The

values best by perfecting democracy

its

history have

first is that

home, thereby acting as
America’s values impose on it
at

a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that
an obligation to crusade for them around the world.” 37

Kissinger was convinced that the United States should limit itself to the

United States was

35

36

still

McEvoy-Levy,

first

option.

The

seen as a model for others to follow but Kissinger’ s views

29.

Wiarda, American Foreign Policy 39.
,

37

Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 18. Quoted in Michael
Cox, “Democracy Promotion Under Clinton,” in American Democracy Promotion Michael Cox, G. John
Ikenberry and Takshi Inoguchi eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 218-239.
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reflected the strong

American

push

for isolationism in the

United States during

Vietnam drove foreign policy

failure in

this period.

in that direction during the

The

Nixon and

Ford presidencies.

However,

it

was not long before

all

the ideas

exceptionalism reasserted themselves. Though

were long

lasting, the

embodied by American

many of the consequences of Vietnam

break with exceptionalist thought was not
permanent. Tony Smith

writes:

By the mid-1960s, following the setbacks in Indochina and
the evident failure of
the Alliance for Progress, the voices calling
for the promotion of democracy
abroad were momentarily

stilled. By 1973, congressional
opposition to what
the ^morality’ of the foreign policy crafted
by President Richard
Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, led to
demands that
democratization be fostered in a variety of areas.... 38

many termed

McEvoy-Levy argues

that President Carter

eroded by the Vietnam War.
said,

He

quotes Cartels

through failure [of Vietnam]

principles and values, and

renewed the idea of exceptionalism

we have

we

have

regained

May

1977 speech

now found
lost

our

at

way back

confidence.”

39

that

was

Notre Dame. Carter
to

our

own

Similarly in his 1977

inaugural address. Carter declared:

Ours was the
of human

first

society openly to define itself in terms of both spirituality and

unique self-definition which has given us an
exceptional appeal, but it also imposes on us a special obligation, to take on those
moral duties which, when assumed, seem invariably to be in our own best
liberty. It is that

interests.... The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there
can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of
a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane.

We are a strong nation, and we will maintain strength so

38

39

Smith, America’s Mission

McEvoy-Levy,

,

6.

30.
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sufficient that

it

need not

”

be proven in combat-a quiet strength
based not merely on the size of an
arsenal.
but on the nobility of ideas. 40
Carter brought the ideas of American
exceptionalism back into the American

consciousness and they quickly regained
influence in foreign policy.

Though
policies

the results

were dramatically

different, President

Ronald Reagan’s

were also informed by the idea of American
exceptionalism.

In his 1981

inaugural address. President Reagan, echoing
Winthrop, referred to the United States as
a

shining city upon a

Ambassador

to the

architects of the

hill

’

that could

“remake the world

all

over again.” 41 The former U.S

United Nations and one of the most important
foreign policy

Reagan

era,

Jeanne Kirkpatrick, has described the intimate
connection

between exceptionalism and foreign policy during

this period.

She

asserted,

“American

exceptionalism expresses the conviction that the U.S. has a
moral mission which flows
out of its identity and which should guide

was

its

policies.

Our exceptional

character,

which

originally used to justify disdaining alliances and quarrels
of the so-called old world,

has often been cited as the grounds to improve the world.

4

“

Tony Smith argued: “no

administration since Wilson’s has been as vigorous or as consistent in

its

dedication to

the promotion of democracy abroad as that of Ronald Reagan.” 43

40

(

Inaugural Address of President

Jimmy

Carter Thursday, January 20, 1977

http://www.iimmycarterlibrarv.org/documents/speeches/inauuadd.phtml) (March
.

41

42

President Reagan’s Inaugural Address, reprinted in the

Cited

in

2003)

York Times January 21, 1981.

Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy 5th ed.

Martin’s Press, 1996), 259.

43

New

14,

Smith, America’s Mission 304.
,
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(New York:

St.

The idea

that the

United States

is

an exceptional country and a leader
of

democratic nations did not fade with the end
of the Cold War. The

Union buttressed
Presidents

the notion of American exceptionalism.

Bush and Clinton were devoted

to

As Ole

fall

of the Soviet

Holsti points out both

America’s moral mission to expand

democracy. Holsti claims that these two presidents used

their State

of the Union

addresses and other means to direct American foreign
policy in this direction. Both
believed that the United States should be committed
to advancing democracy

worldwide.

President George Bush Sr. told Americans on the
eve of the Gulf War, that:

For two centuries, America has served the world as an
inspiring example of
freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led
the struggle
to

preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And, today, in
a rapidly changing
world, American leadership is indispensable, Americans know
that leadership
brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also know why the
hopes

of humanity turn

to us.

We are Americans. We have an unique responsibility to do the hard work of

freedom.

As Americans, we know

there are times

accept our responsibilities to lead the world

away from

toward the brighter promise of a

better

James Baker, President Bush’s Secretary of State,

called

dictators,

the

compass of American

respect for

and above
earth.”

many

45

46

in

-

American foreign

the principles to which

policy:

I

rights,

adhere... Finally

believe, like Lincoln, that the United States has a special role in

make

46

Though

45
.

—Freedom, democracy, equal

dignity, fair play

presidents before him, George

these goals.

44

all, I

day

step forward and

the dark chaos of

and values

world, a special contribution to

this

Like

human

ideals

when we must

his rhetoric often out

—

as he put

it,

“the

H.W. Bush committed

last,

best

hope for

the United States to

paced many of his foreign policy decisions, his

01e R. Holsti, “Promotion of Democracy,” 151-180.

U.S. White House, President George Bush, “State of the Union Address, January 29, 1992.”

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents (1989) (GPO

Smith, America’s Mission 313.
,

105

1990), January 20, 1989, 4.

Quoted

polices toward
emphasis.

many

countries including those of Eastern
Europe reflected this

47

The Clinton administration was
Bill Clinton claimed: “In

to

also focused

on

the

American mission. President

an era of peril and opportunity, our
overriding purpose must be

expand and strengthen the world’s community of
market-based democracies.’’ 48

The

ideas, values,

and norms encapsulated by exceptionalism
influenced a great deal of

American foreign policy during

As

the twentieth century.

the twenty-first century begins

it

appears as though these ideas will endure.
In

2003 President George W. Bush declared:
Like other generations of Americans,

human

liberty against violence

strength to others.

actions

As

the

we

By our

Head of U.S. Delegation

meet the responsibility of defending
and aggression. By our resolve, we will give

courage,

will secure peace

we

we

will

will give

and lead the world

to the

hope

And by

to others.

to a better day.

Commission on Human Rights

our

49

in

2003, Jeanne

Kirpatrick stated:

Why

should

person that

we

care that everyone has a right to

life,

liberty

and security of

respected by his government, that no one should be subjected to
arbitrary or brutal intrusions into his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
is

nor to mendacious attacks on his honor or reputation? Why do we believe that
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, speech, conscience, religion,
including the right to change his religion or teach it to others? We believe in
these principles because they are the principles on which the United States of

America was founded, and by which we have
are right for individuals and right for states....

47

See chapter eleven

48

Bill Clinton,

in

lived

We believe they
states a

dream and

Smith, America’s Mission for a discussion of the Bush presidency.

September 27, 1993. Quoted

in

Smith, America’s Mission, 311.

49

(

and thrived.

Our Declaration

U.S. White House, “President Bush Outlines
www.whitehouse.gov ) March 16, 2003.
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Iraqi Threat,”

October

7,

2002

a doctrine of government

by consent. An important part of the history
of the
United States has been devoted to making
a reality of this dream for all
Americans. As the world has shrunk, we have
sought to share the dream beyond
our borders. For the United States, the enjoyment
and protection of the rights
stipulated in our Declaration of Independence
and institutionalized in our
50
Constitution lie at the heart of our identity as a
nation.

Throughout American history the same themes have been
echoed

The United

policy.

States, as a special nation, politically,

in

American foreign

economically and socially

superior to others, has additional rights, and feels a
responsibility to further democracy

and freedom worldwide.

The Missionary Zeal

in the

The American missionary
American

relations.

The

Western Hemisphere:

countries of the Western Hemisphere are understood to be part

by the

to the

and duties of the U.S., as expressed by exceptionalism, are

sphere of influence.

The Monroe

fifth president

limits to

Case

zeal has particularly shaped the course of U.S.- Latin

of the U.S. sphere of influence and are thus of special concern
rights

A Special

intensified in this

Doctrine, delivered to Congress on

of the United

States, declared that the

United States. The

December

2,

1

823

American hemisphere was off

European powers. President James Monroe justified

this policy

European countries were monarchies and thus could only have

on the basis

evil designs

on

the

that

newly

independent countries of Latin America. In contrast, President Monroe asserted that since
the United States

50

was a

republic

it

did not pose a threat to

lh

its

southern neighbors.

Session of the United nations Commission on Human
by Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, Palais des Nations,” (March 18, 2003) (http://www.humanrights-

United States Delegation to the 59

Rights, “Address

usa.net/statements/03

1

8Kirpatrick.htm) April

1

9,

2003.
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.

In 1904, President Roosevelt
reinterpreted

States the role of policeman in the
hemisphere.

Monroe’s message, giving the United

The Roosevelt Corollary was

embodiment of many of the elements of exceptionalism.

It

the

declared:

follows that a self-respecting, just, and far-seeing
nation should on the one
hand endeavor by every means to aid in the development
of the various
movements which tend to provide substitutes for war, which
tend to render
nations in their actions toward one another, and
indeed toward their own peoples
more responsive to the general sentiment of humane and
civilized mankind; and
on the other hand that it should keep prepared, while
scrupulously avoiding
wrongdoing itself, to repel any wrong, and in exceptional
cases to take action
which in a more advanced stage of international relations
would come under the
it

head of the exercise of the international police. A great
free people owes it to
itself and to all mankind not to sink into
helplessness before the powers of evil. 51

As such

the United States

was

the judge that determined that

if:

shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency
and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need

a nation
social

in

fear

no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an
impotence
which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in
America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation,
and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the
Monroe

may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of
such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. 52
Doctrine

Thus, the United States was the civilized nation that had a duty
especially

its

neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

Not only
historically, they

In

are Latin

American countries within the ‘sphere of influence’ but

have also been considered inferior and thus,

Beneath the United States Lars Schoultz argues that

51

to lead other nations,

The Roosevelt Corollary

Congress. (December

6,

to the

Monroe

in

need of U.S. guidance.

“[a] belief in Latin

American

Doctrine, Theodore Roosevelt’s Annual Message to

1904)

(http://www.uiowa.edu/~c030l62/Common/Handoiits/PQTUS/TRoos.htinl ). March 2 1 200
,
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1

inferiority is the essential core

of United States policy toward Latin
America...” 53 This

view has influenced American policy toward
the region and has most
the history of U.S. interventionism in the
region.
its

foreign policy in an attempt to

The United

mold Latin America

in its

certainly influenced

States has consistently used

own

image. For example, the

United States’ Agency for International Development
(USAID) pressed for birth control

countnes (contrary

in these

in 1980s.

54

paying to

to the Catholic tradition) during the

1970s and open markets

Lars Schoultz explains the “U.S. Agency for
international Development

is

U.S. style adversarial criminal procedures in
four different Latin

install

American countries.” He goes on

to point out that creating Latin

image and seeing Latin America as

inferior are

America

own

in its

two sides of the same American

Schoultz illustrates “the government-funded National

Endowment

for

coin.

democracy

is

prepared to assist any Latin American country to hold a clean
election, while no Latin

American country has ever offered
turnout...”

to help the

its

low voter

55

The Americans have attempted
into

United States boost

American

to reconfigure Latin

style democracies although

American

democracy means

political

different things to Latin

Americans. Howard Wiarda points out the differences. For example, he shows
welfarism

is

the

most important

feature of democracy in

Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States:
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), xv.

A

systems

Uruguay and

that

that strong

History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America

1

Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, An Introduction
Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 165.

55

Schoultz,

xiii.
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to Latin

American

Politics

and

government often defines many conceptions of
democracy

in the region.

Wiarda reminds

us that, “those, to North American ears, are
very strange definitions of democracy
and

smack of the

statist, mercantilist,

56
top-down, and paternalistic regimes of the
past .”
Steve

Smith similarly explains, “[o]ne of the main limitations
of US democracy promotion
that the policy

has been accepted as universally applicable

when

in fact

it

is

is

a culturally

57
and historically specific version of what democracy
means .” Wiarda also points out

that

the Western -style elements of democracy that
were imported or imposed on Latin

America by the United

States

the region’s experiment with

and others, are encountering

democracy

difficulty

and putting much of

in jeopardy.

Conclusion
Certainly,

that their political

to

many
and

other states espouse democracy and freedom and

social systems are excellent, if not superior.

which these values and ideas influence

United States
policy.

It

is

not unique because

may be unique

because

its

its

US

policy

is

Howard

J.

Nau

explains: “the

domestic democratic ideals influence

foreign policy promotes domestic ideals

Nau

believe

However, the degree

unique. Henry

consciously than the foreign policy of other countries .” 58

56

many

its

foreign

more

self-

continues, “...while the

Wiarda, “First World, Third World, Western, Non-Western, What? Latin America’s

Search for a Model and Theory of Development,”

in

Non-Western Theories of Development Howard

J.

Wiarda, ed. (Fort Worth TX: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1999), 64-83.

57

Steve Smith, “Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions,” in American Democracy Promotion
Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takshi Inoguchi, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 63-82.

58

Henry Nau, “America’s Identity, Democracy Promotion and National Interests: Beyond
in American Democracy Promotion, Michael Cox et ah, eds. (Oxford: Oxford

Realism, Beyond Idealism,”

University Press, 2000), 131.
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United States tends to moralize in foreign
policy, Europe has a penchant to ideologize,

and Japan to commercialize foreign issues .” 59

Owen

Harries, an Australian diplomat, and

founder of an American foreign policy journal.
The National Interest, compares the
influence of these ideas in the United States with
similar ideas in other countries.

He

writes:

What

translates into

is the doctrine of American
Exceptionalism: the belief that
exceptional, in the double sense that it is superior
and that it is
different, not only in degree but in kind. This has
been and is a powerful force in
the country.... One could multiply such examples
over and over. Now it is true of
course, that other countries— France, Britain, Russia—
have from time to time in
their history felt a sense of mission, of carrying
their civilisation to other peoples
it

America

and

is

territories.

But

usually limited to

in their

when

cases

their

it

has been episodic and not deeply rooted—

power was

at its zenith

and usually clearly

recognisable as a rationalisation for what they were doing for other
reasons. In the
case of the United States, it has been constant and central 60
.

From

era of Alexis de Tocqueville to time of George

W. Bush,

exceptionalism has been a

constant and central element in American foreign policy.

The

identity

and role of the United States

in the

world as understood by

Americans has an indisputable influence over U.S. actions throughout
Americans see themselves

the globe.

as an exceptional country with special rights particularly in the

Western Hemisphere, but also globally. Foreign policy documents and
unofficial rhetoric repeatedly stress these

official

same themes. Obviously, the United

and
States

chooses to take certain actions on the world stage for many reasons, some decisions are
based primarily on strategic calculations or economic motives and have

59

little

do

to

with

Ibid., 147.

60

Owen Harries, “Understanding America,” CIS Lectures, March 4, 2002, The Centre for
Independent Studies ( http://www.cis.om.au/Events/ClSlectures/2002/Harries030402.htm ) March 15, 2003.

Ill

the ideas or values inherent in
exceptionalism.
factors

and dismiss the

crucial piece

influential role

of the puzzle.

cultures, values,

it

that

emphasize these

played by ideational variables are missing
a

The next chapter

and norms within

However, scholars

will argue that this identity

and the ideas,

are crucial to the understanding
of American policy

toward Cuba.
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CHAPTER

5

US CUBA POLICY

Introduction

A

decade after the end of the Cold

appears to be one of the
security threat

last

War

vestiges of this

posed by Cuba,

this island

the

American

bygone

era.

relationship with

Despite the

Cuba

much diminished

country continues to be thought of as an
enemy

of the United States and relations between the two countries
remain

tense.

Although

having gone through various modifications since the early
1990s American policy toward

Cuba has remained,
the height of the

in its essence, the

same approach adopted by President Kennedy

Cold War. U.S. public opinion continues

association with Cuba.

A 2001

1

This chapter explores the reasons

many

this

way. To

have a significantly negative

Gallup poll showed that almost 70 percent of Americans

had an unfavorable opinion of Cuba.

developed in

to

at

why

the United States’ policy toward

fully understand this policy

it

is

Cuba has

necessary to problematize

elements of the U.S.- Cuban relationship including Cuba’s status as a threat and the

power of the Cuban American community. Adopting

a constructivist approach and

applying methods used by comparative politics scholars

I

will demonstrate that social

context matters.

Constructivists claim that

many

things exist simply because

we make

or construct our realities.

It is

easy to see

humans have given them meaning. Concepts

1

like

Darren K. Carlson, “Forty Years After Bay of Pigs, Most Americans Have an Unfavorable
Opinion of Cuba,” Poll Analysis- The Gallup Organization
(http:www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010417b.asp), August
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13,

2001.

how

marriage and sovereignty exist because
as social facts

3
.

we

act like they

Other things are more than social

For example, cars,

fields, buildings, or

facts.

do

2

John Searle

.

They

refers to these

exist in a physical reality.

guns have a physical existence beyond any

meaning we might give them. But Constructivists
demonstrate

that the significance

people or whole societies give these things have great
relevance and make them much

more than

their physical existence.

Money

and a flag assumes significance beyond

its

is

more than

cloth.

printed paper and stamped metal,

Constructivists point out that different

people or societies give different meanings to the same things
and thus
very differently.

More and more

through a constructivist

lens.

treat those things

scholars are beginning to look at relations between
states

They

are discovering that

how and why

states interact

each other often emerges from the perceptions shared by policy makers
of their
role in the

world and their perceptions of other international

Jutta

Weldes argues

“state officials

approach international

do not approach international

politics with

state’s

actors.

politics with a

blank slate on to which meanings are written only as a result of actions among
Instead, they

with

states.

an already quite comprehensive and

elaborate appreciation of the world, of the international system and of their place within

it.

This appreciation, in turn,

in part, in

2

necessarily rooted in meanings already produced, at least

domestic political and cultural contexts .”

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy

Politics,” International

3

is

is

What

States

4

Make of It: The

Social Construction of

John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The Free

4

Jutta

Power

Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

Press, 1995).

Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International Relations

3 (1996): 275-318.
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2,

The United
will reveal that the

States does not have a blank slate

American

interpretation of

upon which

“Cuba" has had a

foreign policy toward the island country. This
interpretation

American

identity

and the

set

is

to understand

Cuba.

significant impact

1

on

rooted in a particular

of ideas, values, norms, and perceptions
that contextualize

the relationship.

The American
U.S. policy toward
States

is

exceptionalist identity has influenced the course
and content of

Cuba

in

numerous ways.

First,

exceptionalism asserts that the United

not only special but superior to other nations.

From

the earliest times, the United

States has thought of Cuba as inferior. Secondly,
exceptionalism influenced the

development of the Monroe Doctrine and helped

to perpetuate its longevity. This doctrine

implies that the United States has additional interests, rights and
duties in the hemisphere

because of the geographic proximity of the countries to the United States.
Cuba
only within this “American sphere of influence” but
shores. This idea has affected the relationship

the

is

not

especially close to America’s

between the United States and Cuba since

government of President Monroe, often implying

was considered an American

is

that intervention in

right or obligation. Thirdly, the

Cuban

affairs

American emphasis on

the

values of democracy and freedom and their desire to influence the development of

American-style democratic institutions and values in other countries have had an
especially important influence on the relationship, especially since the

After 1959

Cuba was seen

The American

to

Cuban

revolution.

be an anathema to everything the United States represented.

self-identification as the guardian of

freedom and democracy and

contrasting images of Cuba helped to construct American policy.
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their

In this chapter,

I

will also

examine the conventional explanations

for the

continuation of U.S. policy. Both traditional
realist and domestic
politieal/interest group

explanations have been advanced to explain
the U.S. relationship with Cuba.
Both have

provided considerable insight into this policy
question, but,

I

argue they are incomplete

because they ignore the weight of ideational
factors such as ideas, perceptions,
identity

and norms. Thus,

will both causally link these

I

outcomes and show how the

generally,

American

also influenced

Cuban

by

Cuba emerges from

society, understand

their understanding

relationship.

to actual policy

traditional explanations are incomplete.

U.S. Identity and
U.S. policy toward

norms and ideas

Cuba policy

is

what

Cuba Policy
the

it

way American

means

to

officials

and more

be “American.” This policy

of Cuba and their perception of the American-

constructed by foreign policy officials in the State

Department, White House, Congress, and in the various other
agencies involved

making foreign policy decisions

in

5
.

It is

also heavily influenced

powerful Cuban American community, based primarily

in

by the large and

Miami and

electorally

represented by the

Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Each of these decision-makers make
sense of the Cuban- American relationship within a context that contains certain

assumptions and worldviews. One of these worldviews revolves around the notion of

what

it

means

to

is

be American.

The American perception of the United

States as an exceptional nation, and as

such, the protector of democracy and freedom and as a world leader has had a major

5

See Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes (New York:
HarperCollins College Publishers, 1999) for a discussion of the myriad number of different government
agencies involved in the construction of foreign policy.
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impact upon their approach toward Cuba.
In the early days of the US-Cuban
relationship

American exceptionahsm influenced the

US

approach toward the

the United States has been intimately
involved in

Cuban

affairs.

island.

For centuries,

Elements of American

exceptionahsm were, even prior to the SpanishAmerican War, seen

to

be a factor behind

the U.S. interest in the island. Jose Marti, the
revered father of Cuban independence
said

United States

that the

crown

right to

is

“a nation that, due to geographic morality, has
proclaimed

itself ruler

North America and

that

of the continent and has announced... that

its

made us adept

and senile peoples..

.

in

He

government

marked

has

that

the

lead in the regeneration of the world...” 7

to establish

we may

system where chaos reigns.

administer government

liberty

Cuba and

Woodrow Wilson echoed

the Philippines he referred to

and self-government” and

6

among savage

American people as His Chosen nation

sentiments. In 1902 in a speech about the Spanish American
responsibilities in

of

1898 war because God has made

in the

Americans “the master organizers of the world
has

entitled to all

imperial right should be acknowledged...” 6 Senator
Albert

Beveridge justified American involvement

He

it is

its

to the Filipinos

these

finally to

same

War and American

Americans as “apostles of

and Cubans as children. 8 These

Jose Marti, “Congrreso intemacional en Washington

(II) “La Nacion (Buenos Aires), completas,
Quoted in Rafael Hernandez, “Cuba and The
a Changing International System,” in U.S. -Cuban Relations

vol 6 (Havana: Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 1975): 56-62.

United States: Political Values and Interests
in the 1990s,

Jorge

in

Dominguez and Rafael Hernandez,

eds. (boulder:

Westview

Press, 1989), 34.

7

Quoted in Stephen W. Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of
Three Cold Warriors (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 22.

8

Woodrow

Wilson, “The Ideals of America.” (1902)

Hollinger and Charles Capper, eds.

(New York: Oxford
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in

The Liberal Intellectual Tradtion, David

University Press, 2001).

elements of the American identity have
continued to influence foreign policy
toward

Cuba ever

since.

Democracy and Freedom
Within the exceptional^ identity

is

belief that the United States represents the

with the American missionary

spirit,

an emphasis on democracy and freedom
and a

embodiment of these

ideals.

When combined

the United States assumes an identity
as the

defender of democracy and freedom, especially in

its

own

‘backyard.’ This identity has

considerable influence over American policy toward Cuba.

References to democracy and freedom appear consistently in
documents.
speeches, interviews, and other public declarations of policy
toward Cuba.

More

importantly, they also appear in confidential documents, and were
repeatedly mentioned

during confidential interviews. This identity and
institutionalized in

American

The perception

that

policies

Cuba

is

and

its

related

norms have been

actions.

antithetical to the values

of democracy and freedom

influence the content and intensity of US statements and policies toward the island.
is

represented as an

enemy of democracy and freedom

speeches and most media reports. President George
a July 13, 2001 speech.

He

stated that the

Cuba

in U.S. legislation, official

W. Bush emphasized

these images in

Cuban government:

all the freedoms that make us human. The United States stands
such tyranny and will oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against
the Castro regime until it respects the basic human rights of its citizens, frees

routinely stifles

opposed

to

political prisoners, holds

9

13,

2001,

democratic free elections, and allows free speech.” 9

Department of State, “The United States and Cuba,” Speech by President George W. Bush, July
August 20, 2001.

(http:// usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/),

1

How the US

how the US

sees itself and

other identity. Policy toward the
island
identities that are taken for granted.

sees

is

than any other

respected in

Cuba

comments on

state.

in

hand, each reinforcing the

constructed in a large part by these
images and

10

The American perception of human
critical

Cuba go hand

rights

under Castro

Most countries perceive

that

is

human

consistently

rights are not fully

but they disagree on the extent of the
violations.

this matter are

more

The American

almost always more vehement than other
countries. Helms-

Burton describes the human rights abuses in
Cuba as “massive, systematic, and
extraordinary.”

1

The United

States has,

by

far,

opponent of the Castro government’s human
In 1998,

it

appeared to

many

that the

been the most

critical

and outspoken

rights record.

human

rights situation in

Cuba was

improving. For example, that year the Organization of
American States reported that

“some

positive steps have also been taken

listed eight categories

advances

in press

on human

rights [in Cuba].”

The

OAS

report

of positive change including greater religious freedom and

freedom,

among

others.

12

Similarly,

Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian

Foreign Minister, defended Cuba, stating that there have been “major
changes” in the

10

Just as important, for the bilateral

United States. However, that

"

is

Cuban-American
beyond the scope of this work.

“Cuban Liberty and Democratic

relationship

is

how Cubans

perceive the

Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996,” P.L. 104-1 14.

(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm) August 26, 200

12

Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1998 Annual
Report ( http://www.oas.oru/cidh/annualrep/98emz/chapter%20iv%20cuba.htm l (March 24, 2003).

human

rights situation in

changes, they were

Cuba.

much more

13

Though

the United States recognized

some of these

skeptical of the developments, declaring:

The Government's human

rights record remained poor. It continued
systematically to violate fundamental civil and
political rights of its citizens
The Government denied citizens the freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, and”
association. It limited the distribution of foreign
publications and news to selected
party faithful and maintained strict censorship of
news and information to the

public.

The Government restricts some religious activities but
permits others.
visit by Pope John Paul II, permitted some
public processions on

It

allowed a

feast

days, and reinstated Christmas as an official holiday,
but has not responded to the
Papal appeal that the Church be allowed to play a greater
role in

Cuban

society...

The American perception of the democracy and human
generally

is

more adamant and

critical

rights situation in

Cuba

is

than other countries’ perceptions of the island. Cuba

consistently represented as the antithesis of everything the United
States represents.
Official policy decisions

and statements

faithfully reflect the values

and ideas

contained in the American exceptionalist identity. According to the U.S. Interests
Section
in

Havana: “U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S. policy

toward Cuba

-

to help bring

democracy and respect

Vicki Huddleston, then Principal Officer

at the

“there are three pillars of United States policy:

13

March

Jeff Sallot,

US
1-

for

human

rights to the island.”

Interests Section in

Havana

The promotion of human

“Cuba Policy Gives Ottawa Leverage

for

Change,

PM Says,”

15

asserts:

rights,

The Globe and Mail,

17, 1999.

14

U.S. Department of State,

Cuba Country Report on Human Rights

(http://www.state.gov/www/global/human

15

rights/1

Practices for 1998

998_hrp_report/cuba.html) March 24, 2003.

and Current Issues for Congress
American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division and Maureen Taft-Morales, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense,
2 ) March 22, 2001.
and Trade Division ( http://usembassv.state.gOv/posts/cul/wwwhcrs.html#
January

17,

U.S. Departmnet of State. RL30806: Cuba: Background

2001 Mark

P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin

1

120

.

democracy and

the rule of law-, 2-

communications systems; and 3disease, terrorism

declares:

The promotion of open economic and

A reduction of global scourges to the environment

and crime around the world.” 16

A January

“Once Cuba has a transition government

-

that

is,

the establishment of a fully democratic,
pluralistic society

of

1997 government document
a government committed to

-

the United States will be

prepared to begin normalizing relations and provide
assistance to support Cuba's
transition.”

17

American government

officials both publicly

democracy and freedom (including respect

for

and privately emphasize

human

rights) are

among

that

the top, if not the

top priority of their policy toward the island. State
Department officials in Washington

and American diplomats
in

US

policy toward

in

Havana emphasized

Cuba during

the importance of democracy promotion

18
interviews conducted by the author in 1999 and
2000.

Michael Kozak, a former head of the U.S. Interest Section

in

Cuba began

a recent speech

with “I have spent major portions of the past 20 years working on the
problem of how to
bring about a transition to a democratic Cuba.” 19 Richard Nuccio, the top
advisor on

Cuban

affairs during the first Clinton administration, maintains that

Vicki Huddleston,

2000

(

U.S. -Cuban Relations After Elian Gonzalez” The

http://iisembassy.state.gov/posts/cul/wvvwhhiid.html

)

March

democracy

is

a top

Commonwealth June
,

5,

22, 2001

I7

U.S. Interests Section Havana, Cuba January 1998 “Basic Policy: To Support Peaceful Change
from Within,” (http://usembassy.state.gov/havana/wwwh0012.htmn March 24, 2003

18

Confidential interviews with senior government officials, 1999-2000.

19

Michael Kozak, “Doing Business in Post-Castro Cuba.” Ambassador Kozak gave the author
copy of this speech he delivered in Miami. It was not dated.
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a

of U.S. policy. 20 Daniel W. Fisk, a
senior staff member of the Council
of the

priority

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that drafted the 1996 Helms-Burton
Act, has
explained:

“US

foreign policy contains a “democracy
agenda,” especially in the

relations towards the

of State for

Western Hemisphere.” 21 Jeffrey Davidow,
the Assistant Secretary

Inter- American Affairs stated: “It
is

concepts of democracy and freedom that

government so

different

The Cuban government

listed as

Cuba’s implacable

make our

hostility to the

relationship with the

Cuban

from our relationship with the other nations
of the hemisphere.
actively opposes the aspiration of its
people to democracy.” 22

Democracy and human
post-cold

its

rights are slated as a top priority in
almost every

major

war American document concerned with Cuba. The
promotion of democracy

one of the top

US

goals in the region as stated by the Presidential

is

Review

Directive process (PRD-21) for the Latin American
and Caribbean region. The Americas

Free Trade Act introduced in the Senate on January
22, 2001 to authorize negotiation of
free trade

factors.

agreements with the countries of the Americas heavily emphasizes
these

The Act

states that

Cuba

will

freedom has been restored

in

remain an exception to free trade

Cuba, for purpose of subsection

until:

(a),

unless the

President determines that—

20

Richard Nuccio, “Cuba; A U.S. Perspective,” in Trans-Atlantic Tensions; The United
States,
Europe, and Problem Countries, Richard Haass, ed. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution
Press,

1999),

Daniel W. Fisk, “Cuba in US Policy: An American Congressional Perspective,” in Canada,
US and Cuba Helms-Burton and Its Aftermath, Heather N. Nicol, ed. (Kingston, ON: Centre for
International Relations,

22

Queens University, 1999),

Jeffrey Davidow,

the

46.

“The U.S. Vision: Cuba and Hemisphere Policy,” Remarks to the American
Hayek University (Cuba Vision Series) (Washington DC, July 28, 1997)

Enterprise Institute and Friedrich

(http://www.state.tzov/www/reuionsAvha7970728-davidow.htmI (April
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19, 1999).

co nst itutionally guaranteed democratic
government has been
?
established in Cuba with leaders
(1)

chosen through

and fair electionshave
been
restored and are
f
effectively
protected and broadly exercised
inCuba;
(3) Cuba has a currency that is fully convertible
domestically and
(2

J

he

n

hts

of individuals

free

to private property

internationally;
(4) all political prisoners
(5) the rights

have been released in Cuba; and
of free speech and freedom of the press
in Cuba are
23

effectively guaranteed.

Similarly, bills that

rights

to

remove

restrictions

on trade with Cuba

also

emphasize human

and democracy promotion. For example, the Free
Trade with Cuba Act, introduced

in the Senate

on February 22, 2001

democratic change

and

aim

in

states that “the

Cuba by promoting

United States can best support

trade and

commerce,

travel,

communications,

academic, and scientific exchanges.”" 4 These types
of statements and

cultural,

corresponding policy decisions reflect the American exceptionalist
identity and

its

emphasis on these values.
This

is

more than just a

desire to see

foreign policy establishment considers

where

US

it

a duty to ensure that

policy, particularly, stands out.

(Libertad) Act (also

known

as the

rights

23

24

it

in the Charter

United States Senate, Free Trade with Cuba Act, February 22, 2001.
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of the United

( http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-

:./temp/~clQ7usOUxu ) March 22, 2001.

is

Solidarity

a moral obligation, to promote and protect

U.S. Senate, America’s Free Trade Act, January 22, 2001
1

Cuba democratizes. This

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic

and fundamental freedoms as expressed

bin/query/D?c 107:1

States’

Helms-Burton Act) declares “The United States has

shown a deep commitment, and considers

human

Cuba democratize. The United

Nations and

in the

25
Universal declaration of Human
Rights.”
Helms-Burton also

“The Cuban people deserve

declares:

to

be assisted

in a decisive

manner

to

end the

tyranny that has oppressed them for
36 years, and the continued failure to do so
constitutes ethically improper conduct by
the international community." 26
Daniel Fisk

explained

miss

US

policy toward

Cuba

‘mission’

is

He

said

many

accounts of the policy totally

Americans

elite

27

The United

States considers itself to be

feel obligated to

American policy toward Cuba

the views of a significant

world and

how this

on a moral mission

its

related values has

in

in

Cuba.

Cuba.

been an important element of

for the past half century reflecting the

American

identity

corresponding duty to advance freedom and democracy. Democracy
promotion

their

is

more than just

a

means

combined with other elements
apparent

in the

promote democracy and freedom

Democracy promotion and

Cuba

of America’s mission

is,

played out through the structure and interaction
of the policy-making

institutions.”

in

way.

an essential element of American foreign
policy, that

segment of the foreign policy

and

this

how

demonstrate

in

to another end.

American exceptionalism

they work together to direct this

how these

However, when these values

US

policy.

it

are

becomes even more

The next two subsections

will

values, in combination with additional elements of

25

“Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996,” P.L. 104-1 14.
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm) August 26, 2001. The Helms-Burton Act
was a tightening of the embargo. Among other things it expanded the categories of parties that were targets
of sanctions including foreign individuals and companies. It also sets out the conditions that Cuba must
meet before

the U.S. can re-engage with

codifies these regulations and thus

Cuba

removes

including the ouster of Fidel and Raul Castro.

the President’s

26

Ibid.

27

Fisk, 45.

124

power

to significantly alter

The Act also
U.S.-Cuban policy.

exceptionalism, account for the content and
intensity of the American approach
toward

Cuba.

The United

The
superior

is

model the

belief that the United States

better (and less inferior)

centuries the

in all these categories

that the

state is to the

as well

and thus seen as quite inferior.For

meaning children

progress and civilization.”

who

Nixon

28

under the providence of God and

Cartoons as

this time, senior

as a naive,

late as the

in the

name of human

1950s portrayed Cubans as children in
this

image was alive

Washington statesmen viewed Cuba’s leader as a wayward

talked about needing to lead Castro “in the right direction.” 30

The American view of human
comparison between the

US

rights

Quoted

in

and democracy

and Cuba. For example,

Committee on Foreign Relations, Dante

‘8

need of tutelage.

required American guidance. For example.

need of American guardianship. 29 Even as Castro assumed power

child.

in

said that Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico
were a “great trust”

United States taken on

and well. At

United States’

Cubans (and other Latin Americans) were portrayed

uncivilized and child-like people

McKinley

economically and morally

Cuba, for most of its history, has been
considered

it is.

Cubans were looked upon

Prior to the revolution

President

is politically, socially,

fundamental to exceptionalism. The closer a

from the United States

distant

States as Superior

in

in

Cuba

is

re-inforced by the

1984 the Chairman of the

Fascell asserted “just

come

to

M. Hunt Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale

my

State

and look

University Press, 1987),

38.

29

Ibid, 6.

30

Thomas G.

Paterson, Contesting Castro

(New York: Oxford
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University Press, 1994), 257.

at the smiling,

happy faces of almost

freedom, and I’m sure
the opportunity.” 31

in

More

Havana from 1999

learn

many

how to govern

million people

1

others in

Cuba would

who came from Cuba to

like to

do the same thing

recently, Vikki Huddleston, the Chief
of the

until

2002 remarked

themselves.”

that “[i]t is

if

the land of

they had

American Mission

fundamental that Cubans begin to

32

Surveys of the American public reveal that they
also believe that Cuba

A 2000 poll asked “Generally speaking, is the US

is inferior.

system of economics and government

morally superior to the Cuban system of economics and
government?” Sixty-three
percent said yes, another 28 percent answered that they
were not sure and only nine
percent disagreed with the statement. 33 Another survey
asked respondents to compare
Fidel Castro to

“Adolph

Over 43 percent

was worse than

Hitler,

said Castro

Hitler.

when he was

was

as

Cuba

is

Germany during World War

II.”

bad as Hitler and an additional 12.5 percent said he

34

American policy makers and the
categories,

dictator in

US

public share the opinion that in numerous

inferior to the United States. This contributes to the sense that the

United States knows what

is

best for the island and the corresponding policies that

31

Human

US House of Representatives, Human Rights in Cuba: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on
Rights and International Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on

Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98

3

~Vicki Huddleston,

13

“US-Cuba

th

Congress, second session (June 27, 1984),

2.

Relations After Elian Gonzalez.”

Polling the Nations (1986 through 2001), Portrait of America (Matthews,

NC: Rasmussen

Research, 2000).

34

Howard W. Odum

Institute for

Research

in Social

Science, Survey Collection: Harris/ 1643,

IRSS Study Number: S1643 (The University of North Carolina
August

17,

2001.

126

at

Chapel

Hill) (http://veblen.irss.unc.edu )

attempt to dictate Cuba's future. The idea
that
strengthens the

factor in

"US knows

American Cuba

best" attitude.

it

will address the role

of this

Within U.S. Sphere of Influence

is

hemisphere as being within their
as

intimately tied to the United States

The next section

American foreign policy makers have

norm

is

policy.

Cuba

a

Cuba

own

historically conceptualized the western

“sphere of influence.” This

is

both a perception and

encapsulates consequential behavior. Behavior that
would be considered

inappropriate in other areas of the globe

is

considered normal within the western

hemisphere. The reference to Latin America and the Caribbean
as America’s “backyard”
reflects the

American perception

that these countries are not

wholly independent.

Consequently, the United States government believes they have latitude
to intervene in
the internal affairs of the countries in the region. This attitude

1823,

when

President

Monroe warned European powers

was

that Latin

officially expressed in

America and

the

Caribbean were the exclusive concern of the United States of America. This policy,

known

as the

Monroe

Doctrine, marked the beginning of an historical pattern that has

characterized U.S. policy toward the region ever since.

territories

now known

as Texas,

New Mexico,

The American annexation of the

and California from Mexico

in the first

half of the nineteenth century, and the confrontation with the British over the Venezuelan
border, after the

American

civil

war, were early examples of the

Monroe Doctrine

in

action.

Cuba, by virtue of it proximity and historically close

ties to the

United States

perceived to be even more within the American sphere of influence and in need of
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is

American guidance. 35

In fact, a former senior U.S.

“Geography was the most important
Americans were interested

government

factor determining

official asserted that

U.S.-Cuban relations.” 36

in the island as early as the colonial
period

when

they traded

with Cubans. Once Florida was purchased from
Spain in 1819 American leaders became

even more aware of the

growing perception

island. Strategic concerns over

that

Cuba would one day become

Cuba were complemented by

part of the U.S.

needed American guidance. President Martin Van Buren
thought
to

Spam

or to the United States because

themselves.

Spain.

37

that

Cubans

Cuba should be

Cubans were incapable of governing

tied

the island

Consequently, the U.S. made repeated attempts to purchase
Cuba from

38

When

the U.S. intervened in Cuba’s

declared that the U.S.

was carrying

out

American intervention ended the war
occupy Cuba

until

1

902.

The

Platt

its

war with Spain

same

that

at

McKinley

our door.”

39

year, but the United States continued to

Amendment, which

Cuban government should operate and

in 1898, President

duty because the island “is right

subsequently attached to the Cuban constitution,
the

that

and

the

listed

the U.S.

government

numerous conditions under which

stated that the United States

had a right

to

35

Jorge Dominguez makes the argument that U.S.-Cuba policy is a continuation of a pattern going
back to the Monroe Doctrine in his paper, “US-Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War.”
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39, 3 (Fall 1997): 49-73.

36

Confidential interview with senior

37

US

government

official,

2000.

•

Louis A. Perez,

Jr.

Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University

1988), 109.

38

39

Leland Jenks, Our Cuban Colony: A Study

April

1

1,

in

Sugar (New York:

Amo

1898, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, 757.
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Press, 1970), 13.

Press,

intervene in

to exercise

Cuban

affairs.

immense

40

American leaders

influence on the island.

fully believed in this right

By

1906, the U.S. military was once again in

control of Cuba. This second intervention
only lasted three years, but

American

attitude that

reinforced the

it

Cubans could not govern themselves. 41

Americans continued

to

view Cuban sovereignty

the U.S. refused to recognize the

Amendment

and continued

new

nationalist

invalid and initiated reforms that

as pliable. For example, in 1933,

government

that declared the Platt

would reduce American influence and

holdings on the island. 42 In 1934, the United States assisted
the more conservative and

pro-American faction

in the revolutionary coalition, lead

by Fulgencio

Batista, to

assume

power.

During the
influence in

first

half of the twentieth century American economic and
political

Cuba was enormous. At

refineries, ninety percent

in

1959, Americans

had one

the

Cuba was on

the decline

Luis E. Aguiar, “Cuba

Cambridge University

42

its

in

all

of the

c.

oil

43
utilities.

height in the early 1920s, by

Cuba.

44

The statement made by

1902 remained relevant in Batista’s Cuba,

Juan Del Aguila, “Development, Revolution, and Decay

and Development, Howard Wiarda and Harvey

41

from

billion dollars invested in

American Secretary of War, Elihu Root,

40

Americans controlled

of the mines and eighty percent of Cuban public

Although investment

still

this time,

in

Cuba,”

in

Latin American Politics

Kline, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 378.

1860- 1930,” in Cuba: a short history, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge:

Press, 1993), 43.

Paterson, Contesting Castro

,

5.

43

Ibid, 14.

44

Ibid.
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fifty

years

later.

and morally
Its

it

He

said.

“Although [Cuba]

is

technically a foreign country,
practically

occupies an intermediate position.” 45
Cuba by virtue of its’ location and

history of ties to the United States

was seen

to be intimately

to the

United

Since the end of Spanish domination, the
United States had looked upon Cuba
as

States.

a parent would an irrational child, in need
of U.S. control for

The American norm

Cuba was

that

in its sphere

the early 1960s.

When

its

own

good.

of influence continued

influence U.S. policy even after Fidel Castro
tore the island

away from

Castro challenged American domination of
Cuba,

him. Castro

came

interference.

The perception

States is revealed

to

it

was

natural

failed, to

oppose

power touting Cuban sovereignty and denouncing American
that

Cuba was

by the language used

Government

to

the U.S. fold in

United States to assume they could buy Castro off and,
when that

for the

time.

connected

officials frequently

not wholly independent from the United

to describe

Cuba and US-Cuban

relations at the

spoke of the “loss” of Cuba. Consequently, tension

characterized even the earliest relationship between the United States
and Castro’s

regime.

Castro’s challenge to the U.S. perception that

American sphere of influence

intensified the

Cuba was

firmly within the

growing animosity between Havana and

Washington. In 1960 Congressman Mendel Rivers (D-SC) told Congress
assert the

Monroe

Doctrine.

necessary, and, if conditions

45

46

Quoted

in Paterson,

We

should threaten Castro with Blockade.

demand

it,

occupy Cuba.”

Contesting Castro,

46

“We should

We

should, if

During the Cuban missile

crisis

5.

David Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine (Westport: Greenwood
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Press, 1999), 125.

the United States policy makers
turned back to the
just as valid in

1962 as

it

was

in

been replaced by the new and
international

communism.”

Not understanding

Monroe Doctrine

far

more menacing

political

the strong support within

Cuban people supported Castro during

that entitled

them

“is

and ideological imperialism of

47

U.S. invasion. Consequently, President

Cuba

it

1823, though the old imperialism of
Western Europe has

Cuba

northern neighbors, American leaders thought
that the

Bay of Pigs, American

asserting that

policy makers

Kennedy and
the ill-fated

still

to intervene in

for independence

from

their

Cuban people would welcome

his advisers

Bay of Pigs

a

were shocked when the

invasion.

Even

after the

believed they had a special relationship
with

Cuban

affairs. Yet,

throughout the rest of the Cold

War, Castro remained ardently protective of Cuban sovereignty
and continued

to

challenge the American perception of U.S.-Cuban relations.
These different perceptions

go

to the heart

of the U.S.-Cuba

hostility.

Each side

moral high ground. To many Americans, Cuba
dictator

who

to protect

threatens his

Cuba from

to control their island

The norm

that

own

Castro.

is

is

convinced that they occupy the

a state run by an evil totalitarian

people and American values. They believe

To many Cubans,

and reduce Cuba

to a

the U.S.

is

toward Cuba after the end of the Cold War. Cuba

47

US

their

duty

an imperial power that wants

influence, that

legitimate right to complete sovereignty, continued to influence the

Jeffrey

is

dependent position.

Cuba should be under American

American sphere of influence.

it

Davidow

Department of State, Bureau of Public

is still
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did not have a

American approach

considered to be within the

told an audience in

Affairs, 1962, 6.

Production,” 43.

it

Quoted

in

1997

that the

Weldes, “The Cultural

“repression and hardship
parents, brothers,

and

is

happening just 90 miles from our shores

sisters

of U.S. citizens

end of the Cold War has done nothing

in

a country of

1 1

to,

among

others, the

million people.”48 The

to erase this long held perception

of Cuba within

the United States.

Cuba

location,

s

and

all that it

implies, continues to influence policy.

Burton Act, more strongly than any American document
of the Cold
demonstrates that the United States
Section 205 states that

government releases

Cuba

still

believes

it

prisoners,

makes

establishes tree and fair elections. In addition,

States,

to

all political

activity legal,

Helms-Burton also

Cuban

affairs at

48

new government must

Essentially, if the

Jeffrey

to

American

1

invalid.

According

also allow for the unfettered transmission of

Marti. Furthermore, this Act dictates that

and return property

and

Fidel Castro as their leader in a free and fair election, the United

Helms-Burton, the

TV

Cuba

give up

its

socialist

system

Jorge Dominguez, a well-respected expert in

citizens.^

Harvard University, asserts

that:

Davidow, “The U.S. Vision: Cuba and Hemisphere Policy,” Remarks to the American
Hayek University (Cuba Vision Series) (Washington DC, July 28, 1997)

Enterprise Institute and Friedrich

(http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/970728-davidow.html (April

49

50

Jorge

Dominguez ,“US-Cuban

US House

Relations:

From

the

19, 1999).

Cold War

to the

Colder War,” 49-75.

of Representatives, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
sec. 201.

(Washington DC, 1996), Report 104-168,

51

49

states that both Fidel

under Helms-Burton, would automatically declare the election

Radio and

affairs.

government when the Cuban

and Raul Castro must be absent from the new Cuban government. 50

Cuban people chose

era,

has a right to dictate Cuban

will have a transitional

all political

War

The Helms-

Ibid, sec. 206.
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of these desiderata go well beyond
any internationally recognized
catena for the determination of democratic
all

or transitional democratizing

governments under the charters of the United
Nations or the Organization
of American States. Mandating them

in US legislation as defining
characteristics of a democratic or transitional
Cuban government makes a
mockery of the pledge to respect Cuban
.' 2

sovereignty

In

many

respects,

pre-Castro days

Helms-Burton takes the United

when

American perception
affairs

States-

the United States openly violated

that the

Cuban

Cuban

relationship back to the

sovereignty.

United States has a right to interfere

in

The

Cuban domestic

has greatly influenced the course of policy
toward Cuba. Castro’s challenge to

these elements inherent in

American

identity is

one of the reasons behind the American

perception of Castro’s regime.

The United
with a clean

slate.

States does not approach

its

decisions regarding policy toward

American exceptionalism with

its

Cuba

emphasis on democracy, freedom,

and human rights has an influence on the policy. In addition, the belief
that the United
States

is

superior to

the United States

Cuba and has

knows what

is

best for Cuba. These factors have influenced the

direction of this foreign policy for

to

special rights in the region contributes to the belief that

many

years despite considerable international pressure

normalize relations. The next section will demonstrate that the norms directing

Cuba policy have become

institutionalized, thereby ensuring the longevity

approach.

52

Jorge Dominguez, “US-Cuban Relations”.
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of the

US

Norm
The

institutionalization

Keohane and Judith Goldstein

Institutionalization

of norms increases their power and
longevity. Robert
explain:

Regardless of how a particular set of beliefs
comes into influence politics use of
those ideas over time implies changes in
existing rules and norms...Once
ideas
have influenced organizational design, their
influence will be reflected in the
incentives of those in the organization and
those whose interests are served by
SenSC ldeaS Can haVG
impact even when no one generally

^

believes in

them
According

to Jeffrey Checkel,

embedded

in organizations (bureaucratic

norms have become

institutionalized

when they become

measure) and when they become incorporated

into judicial codes, laws or constitutions (legal
measure).

Using both measures and Keohane and Goldstein’s description
world-view shared by the foreign policy community and
institutionalized.

The acceptance of these ideas

policy debate. American policy toward
years.

One

for so

Cuba has remained

involved in the continuation of the current policy

the

a fair

5

Political

'

it

more

in legislation.

Cuban Liberty and Democracy and

change the American approach

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, Ideas

Change

54

difficult to

unchanged

for forty

amount of inertia”

54

and Foreign

For example, the Cuban

Solidarity Act (also

Helms- Burton Act) embody these ideas and norms about

and make

has constrained

.

These ideas have become institutionalized
the

relatively

was

clear that the

been

many decades

senior American official admitted that “there

Democracy Act and

CANF has

it is

the

to

known

as

U.S.-Cuban relationship

Cuba. Helms-Burton

Policy: Beliefs, Institutions,

itself

and

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 20.

Confidential interview with senior U.S, government official, Washington D.C.,
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May

15,

2000.

furthers the longevity

of this approach since the Act removes
the President’s power

to

lift

the embargo.

They have

also

become

institutionalized through the acceptance
of the

American National Foundation as an expert

in U.S.

- Cuban

relations.

Cuban

CANF, and

consequently, their norms and ideas, have been
able to gain and wield influence

ways

similar to

how epistemic communities

Emanuel Alder explain

that epistemic

in

some

extend their influence. Peter Haas and

communities wield influence by “diffusing ideas

and influencing the positions adopted by a wide range
of actors, including domestic and
international agencies,

government bureaucrats and decision makers,

corporate bodies, and the public.’

legislative

and

While epistemic communities are normally thought

'

of as international communities and as the above definition indicates
influence
international agencies, and although

sway policy formulation

CANF

an American lobby group, they are able to

is

in a similar fashion.

This lobby group has become accepted as the expert on Cuban affairs

Washington. According

to the

CANF’s

in

website:

For two decades CANF has worked tirelessly to forge a broad bipartisan
consensus on U.S. policy toward Cuba and has built bridges of close
communication with the executive and legislative branches. Our influence extends
internationally, where we raise awareness of Cuba's plight with world leaders and
in capitals around the globe. CANF's research, education, and information efforts
are designed to enlighten the media, academia, policy makers, and public opinion
-

domestically and abroad

Business magazine to call

devoted solely to Cuba ."'
55

-

on Cuban

CANF

issues.

These

efforts

6

Emanuel Alder and Peter Haas, “Conclusion: epistemic communities, world

creation of a reflective research program,” International Organization 46,

56

(

have led Hispanic

"the leading clearinghouse for information

“About the Cuban American National Foundation,”

http://www.canfnet.org/About/aboutmain.htm ), August
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17,

2001.

1

order, and the

(Winter 1992), 379.

CANF’s

ideas have penetrated a

Cuba policy. For example,

number of key

CANF

institutions involved in formulating

officials are frequently

given the floor during

congressional hearings where they are granted
a chance to present their opinion
and

counter opposing testimony. For example, the
then Vice Chairman of CANF, Jorge

Canosa

testified before the

House

International Relations

Subcommittee on Western

Hemisphere Affairs on March 24, 1999. He countered
the proposals
food and medicine to Cuba.
unconditionally, as
57
it.”

some

He

Castro

s

Cuba

enemy

as an

enemy of the United

is

is

not the answer...

become

it

more

difficult to

institutionalized. Their hard line approach,

Nonns

norms

that favor

open

relations with Cuba. Clearly, the United States has

those pressures. Other states, have and continue

American policy within
American

institutionalized thereby,

strength of these domestic ideational factors enabled the U.S. to
resist strong

international

felt

become

change policy.
International

The

The perception of

of democracy and freedom and subsequently
an

including their support tor the embargo, has likewise

making

of

We simply cannot allow

often accepted without question. 58

to the values

States has

to allow the sale

stated “Mr. Chairman, selling Castro
food and medicine

are suggesting,

Their version of events

Mas

States

to,

voice their opposition to

this

international forums like the United Nations, the Organization of

(OAS) and

the

World Trade Organization (WTO), amongst

others.

The

United Nations has frequently condemned the U.S. approach toward Cuba. In 1992 the

^“Testimony of Jorge Mas, Vice-Chairman, Before the House International Relations
Subcommittee On Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington D.C. March 24, 1999,” For the Record, The
Cuban American National Foundation.

58

Confidential interviews with senior U.S. government officials, 1999, 2000.
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UN

General Assembly adopted resolution
19/47 that called for the end of the
embargo

against Cuba. That year 59 states voted
for the resolution, 3 against and
74 others
abstained.

the

Each year

since, the

American embargo.

against

it

and 4

UN has passed a similar resolution calling for an end to

In 2000, 167 nations voted in favor
of the resolution, 3

states abstained.

to the policy. In 2000, the

American

friends

and

allies

have voiced

were

their opposition

EU representative to the General Assembly declared:

The European Union noted with concern the findings
of United Nations agencies
and programmes in situ, and deplored the adverse and
often dramatic effects of
the United States economic embargo on Cuba’s
population, in particular,

women and children Members
the draft resolution.

Though Cuba policy

is

9

on

of the Union would unanimously vote

in

generally not a top priority of visiting heads of states,

favour of

many

senior officials have subtly, and sometimes not so subtly,
raised their opposition to the

embargo and especially

to the

Helms- Burton Act with American policymakers. 60 For

example, Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian foreign minister, was especially
U.S. embargo.

He

stated “the

counterproductive...

It

whole embargo and the Helms-Burton

just doesn’t work.”

61

The United

approach toward Cuba despite considerable pressure
allies

bill is totally

States has not changed their

end the embargo from numerous

and international organizations.

59

for

to

of the

critical

United Nations, Press Release GA/9814 “For Ninth Successive Year, General Assembly Calls
States Embargo Against Cuba,” November 9, 2000

End of United

(http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/2000 1 1 09.ga98 1 4.doc.html).

60

61

Confidential interview with senior U.S. government official, 2000.

Paul Koring, “Axworthy, Helms aide slug

it
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out on Cuba.” Globe

and Mail, March

7,

1998.

Furthermore, the moral issues raised by
Pope John Paul

II

during his visit to Cuba

1998 and, since then, other religious
leaders as well, have come to
bear on the

in

American

ideational factors that influence the
continuation of the embargo. Unlike
the

numerous

UN resolutions, the pressure from religious leaders has had

American policy toward Cuba.

US

some impact on

foreign policy so closely tied to a notion
of a “moral

mission” could not completely ignore calls from
the Pope. Consequently, there was
some

change
in

in

Amencan

March of

1998.

However,

policy,

Pope

He

stated:

left.

s visit

“The

in the series

of measures enacted

62

in its essence, U.S. policy has

international pressures.

the

most specifically resulting

Gordon

Griffin, a

remained unchanged despite these

US Ambassador to

Canada, emphasized

that

did not result in any serious change to American
policy toward the island.
fact is

American

we’ve seen no material change (within Cuba) since

(the

Pope)

officials assert that the sanctions will continue until
they see

considerable change in Cuba’s political, social and economic systems.
President George

W. Bush announced
pressure on the

that before

in the

summer of 2001,

Cuban regime. 64

any change

is

US

that his administration

In 2002, the

policy

is

Chief of the

US

would apply more

Mission

in

Havana

stated

considered “there needs to be fundamental change

6

‘
These measures include the resumption of direct charter flights between the U.S. and Cuba,
allowing Cuban- Americans to send up to $300 four times a year to their families in Cuba and the
expedition of the sale of medicines to Cuba. See President Clinton’s “Statement on Cuba” Administration
of William J. Clinton, 1998 (March 20, 1998), 475.

63

64

David

US

Israelson, “Anti-Castro

law defended,” The Toronto Star { April

17, 1998).

Department of State, “The United States and Cuba,” Speech by President George W. Bush,

July 13, 2001, (http:// usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/), August 20, 2001.
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in

Cuba," including democratic elections and
human rights improvements. 65

Bush team ordered a review of Cuba policy but
continued
in relations

between the

US

and Cuba

to maintain that

only be possible

'‘will

In 2002, the

improvement

when Cuba moves

to a

more

democratic system and a market economy.” 66 Thus,
despite international norms and some

domestic pressures to relax tensions with Cuba, the
embargo remains the cornerstone of
U.S. policy, a reflection ot the degree to which the
domestic norms and ideas have been
ingrained.

Alternative Explanations

The

literature

for this policy

on U.S. foreign policy

have generally

fallen within

the Realist national security paradigm

to

Cuba

extensive.

is

However, explanations

one of two categories. During the Cold War

was prominent and

in

many

quarters remains the

dominant interpretation of this approach. However, the most popular
explanation since
the end of the

Cold War has been the

role of the

Cuban American community. This

section addresses both these models, demonstrating that neither offers a
complete

account.

The Domestic

Most of the

Interest

Group Explanation

current scholarship that examines the U.S.

stresses the importance

of the Cuban American community

-

in the

continuation of the embargo. Indeed, this large ethnic group has
electorally powerful groups in

65

American

Cuban

relationship

development and

become one of the most

politics, consistently voting as a bloc,

managing

“Chronicle on Cuba,” Cubasource (February 2002) (http://www.cubasource.org ) April

66

James Carragher, Director of Cuban Affairs, State Department, quoted
Cubasource (February 2002) (http://www.cubasource.org ) April
2002.
1
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,

in

1,

2002.

“Chronicle on Cuba,”

to

sway the outcomes of elections

crucial

swing

in Florida,

state in national elections.

which as

the

2000

election proved,

is

a

Furthermore, they are represented by
a well-

connected interest group, that has access

to

many prominent Washington

officials,

including the President and Congress
members. They have consistently
out-maneuvered

many

other powerful groups that want to establish
normal relations with Cuba, including

many

business and agricultural lobbies, and the

How has this

group been able

constructivist concepts

to

become

Chamber of Commerce.

to wield this

much power?

I

argue that

go a long way toward explaining how Cuban
Americans managed

so influential in Washington.

espoused by Cuban exiles help explain

The American perception of Cuba and

ideas

their disproportionate influence.

Following the revolution, Cuban exiles were given
preferential treatment by the
U.S. government because their ideas resonated with, and
reinforced, the

US

approach

toward the Castro regime. The American identity as the “beacon
of democracy” and the

image of Cuba

as the

enemy of those

toward Cuba. These contrasting

values have influenced the United States approach

identities

have influenced the American perception of

Cuban immigrants and consequently have had
The

first

wave

a significant influence over policy.

that arrived in the United States just after Fidel Castro

control of the island were characterized as political refugees or exiles

because they were persecuted for their
for freedom. Indeed,

political opinions.

many of the Cubans who

left after

who

assumed

fled

They were engaged

Cuba

in a fight

Castro took over were likely

motivated by fear of political persecution. Yet, the American image of these "refugees

from communism" or “freedom fighters”obscured
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their other reasons for leaving the

island.

They were

socialist plan in

The

the wealthiest

Cubans and

lost the

most

financially

when Castro

set his

motion.

later arrivals

have proven

Angeles Torres reports that the exiles

to be

even

less politically motivated.

Maria de

los

that arrived during the 1980s, the
Marielitos:

generally held a

more balanced view of Castro’s programs, often praising
its
systems of healthcare and education, its sports programs,
and its gutsy
nationalism... they parted ways with Cuba’s leadership
because of its inefficient
governance and poor economic performance... They wanted
moremore
economic and educational opportunities, more consumer goods,
more sexual
freedom, more liberty to travel. 67

Furthermore, the search for a better economic future continues to
motivate the most
recent arrivals.

The increase

in the

Soviet subsidies dried up and the
general, the

more

number of rafters during

the “the special period” after

Cuban standard of living plummeted,

recent arrivals are not as

much

indicates that in

fleeing from fear of political persecution

as they are running toward a better economic situation. However, for decades their

economic motives

for leaving

were overshadowed by

their political

image which

influenced and then reinforced the American response to the Castro regime.

The American perception of Cubans

as political refugees

sources of their influence over U.S. foreign policy.

It

was one of the main

gave the community

credibility

and

access to the highest levels of policymakers. Maria de los Angeles Torres in her analysis

of Cuban exile politics

in the

United States asserted:

In the first instance the political incorporation of postrevolution
into the United States resulted
political

from

their

symbolic and

Cuban emigres

political utility... the

development of Cuban exiles has not followed the typical path of other
first obtained political power at the local level in

immigrant communities that
67

Maria de

los

Angeles Torres, In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile

(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan

Press, 2001), 113.
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Politics in the United States

order to gain access to resources such
as jobs and service.

S^l^“^
Jorge

Dominguez

fiCmCe

...

Cuban

exiles

^ thC f° reign P0HCy rCalm flFSt and in the d0mestic

asserts that “the U.S.

government promoted

virtually unrestricted

migration from Cuba, suspending parts of the
U.S. immigration statutes because these

were “refugees from communism .’” 69 Because Cubans
shared with American
policymakers a similar perception of Castro’s Cuba and
were perceived as on the side of

democracy and freedom they were admitted
immigrants, allowing them to bypass
immigrants.

As

to the U.S. as political refugees, not

many of the normal

restrictions placed

a result, Cubans became permanent residents and
then citizens faster than

other immigrant groups, facilitating the rapid growth
of the
in Florida

and

their subsequent ability to wield

American perception of Cuba

Cubans
to

on other

as a

Cuban American population

major influence over election

communist enemy

in the

The

results.

American backyard and

the

as exiles, freedom fighters, or political refugees led to the
special status accorded

Cuban migrants and consequently,
The U.S. government

into a focused

populace.

When

was a short-term

They were eager

wisdom on

also facilitated the organization of the

and powerful group.

Florida believed that he

contributed to their domestic political power.

to

Cuban population

Castro assumed power, the Cuban exiles in

dictator

who

lacked the support of the general

push him out of Cuba. This view was also the accepted

Capitol Hill and within government agencies. The Eisenhower and Kennedy

administrations, believing that Castro’s regime did not have the support of the

68

Cuban

Torres, 182.

69

Jorge Dominguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies Toward Cuba,” in
Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy Christopher Mitchell, ed. (University
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 31- 88.
,
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people, authorized the training and organization
of Cuban exiles in Florida to take part in
the

Bay of Pigs

Cuban

invasion. This shared perception led directly
to the invasion and gave the

exiles access to the highest levels of
government for the

The influence of Cuban Americans increased
Reagan who encouraged

(CANF

70
).

the establishment of the

Reagan understood

complemented

his

own

that the

credibility to his

own

communism and

Castro.

still

significantly under President

Cuban American perceptions and

perception of Cuba. According to Patrick

perfectly with their [the

CANF

leadership]

ideas and also

saw

to Latin

the group as an ally in his

receives federal funding, through the National

issues.

“

Members

to help

ideas

Haney and Walt

own worldview .” 71 He wanted

Radio and T.V. Marti and was given funding

Ronald

America coincided almost

Democracy and other programs. The government has allowed

Florida.

time.

Cuban American National Foundation

Vanderbush “the Reagan administration’s approach

CANF

first

to give further

war against

Endowment

for

the Foundation to run both

Cuban Americans

resettle in

are frequently called to Capitol Hill to provide testimony on

The Cuban American National Foundation was given money and

Cuba

influence by the

policy makers because their ideas and perceptions of Cuba resonated with American
leaders.

70

Peter Schwab, Cuba: Confronting the U.S.

Embargo (New York:

71

Policy:

St.

Martin’s Press, 1999), 137.

Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, “The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign
The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1991),

341-361.
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Even though
mobilize votes, there

CANF. They

CANF has a
is

a significant element within the

are represented

Amencan Committee,

large base of support in the

Miami

area and

Cuban community

that

able to

oppose

by other Cuban American groups such as the
Cuban-

the Cuban- American Pro-Family Reunification

Cuban-American Coalition, which
groups have not garnered

is

much

in contrast,

Committee and

the

advocate dialogue with Cuba. These

influence despite having at times significant
bases of

support with the Cuban-American community.

As

Torres points out three thousand

people attended a breakfast meeting during the
1988 presidential race held by the Pro-

Family Reunification Committee. Torres argues that Clinton
would have gained a greater
percentage of the Cuban-American vote in Florida in the
1992 presidential election

if

had altered

77

his policy vis-a-vis

Cuba and came down

solidly for

improved

he

relations.

Despite the potential number of votes available, presidential
candidates have not

attempted to tap into the pro-dialogue segments of the community nor have
those Cuban

Americans been given a voice

in policy decisions.

normalization segment of the community,

Given the potential votes from

CANF’s

influence must derive from

the pro-

more than

the group’s electoral base. Their influence has been institutionalized and will remain
so
as long as policy

relationship.

makers and

CANF

share the

same perceptions of the U.S. -Cuban

American policy makers continue

to support

CANF’s

influence because of

these shared perceptions.

Furthermore, even though
formation,

CANF has a comparatively large influence over policy

many of the government

said that the

community’s influence

officials

is

I

interviewed in Washington and in Flavana

often exaggerated, that the

73

Torres, 147.
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power over

this policy

remains firmly
the

in the

hands of Washington policymakers.
They said

government have used the Cuban American
lobby

to see enacted.

policies they

When

make

it

former Cubans
difficult for

opponents of the

credibility

elements within

push for policies

attest to the atrocities in

the United States to argue facts or
policy about

Cubans automatically have more

to

that

policies.

It

that they

Cuba and push
is

for certain

hard for someone

Cuba with someone from

and thus are valuable

to

want

bom

the island.

in

The

pro-embargo policy

makers. In short, Cuban Americans do have a voice
but not because they have demanded
that

power. To a great degree they are influential because
a significant number of policy

makers want the Cuban American view

to

be heard.

Richard Allen told Patrick Haney that the lobby
was created by Reagan’s people
to

be used “as an effective tool to promote the President’s
aggressive Latin American

policy .”

74

Haney and Vanderbush

Cuban- Americans

...

were both faced with the need

issues at a similar period of time.
part of the

Caribbean.

also point out that “[t]he

From

threats in Central

was an

on

related

integral

America and the

Torres explains that the exiles “fulfilled the ideological functions of

communism

preferred to flee to a free country .”

is

a repressive system; they had

76

Haney and Vanderbush, “The Role of Ethnic

Ibid, 347.

76

to shift public perceptions

the beginning, the role of Cuba

Reagan explanation of security

providing evidence that

74

Reagan team and some

Torres, 59.
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Interest Groups.”

shown

that they

One

senior official put

overblown. Their job

is

it

this

way: “the influence of the CubanAmerican lobby

one of reminding the government of the reason
for

toward Cuba .” 77 Another senior

official

Reagan administration.

An

official

their policy

explained that the government chooses

consult with the community. This was especially
true before

who had worked

is

when

to

CANF was created by the

in the Carter administration

explained that although the Cuban Americans were
regularly consulted by the
administration before decisions were made, Carter’s people
did not consult with the

community when they knew

that the

Cuban Americans would oppose

example, the administration did not confer with the community

in

their decision. For

advance of an

important meeting with the Cuban government over maritime issues.
Only after an

agreement was reached between the two countries did the administration inform
the

Cuban American community.
to present

it

to

them

Carter

knew

as a fait accompli

78
,

the

community would be opposed and wanted

The Clinton administration’s

return of Elian

Gonzalez, the Cuban boy that was the center of an international incident for months,

more
the

is

a

recent and public example of the government going against the expressed wishes of

community.
Thus, although the Cuban American lobby

over policy toward Cuba their influence
policy toward Cuba. The

is

is

powerful and does hold some sway

a product of shared ideas and agreement on

Cuban American community gained

preferential treatment

and

access to the upper echelons of the government because they reinforced the perceptions,

77

78

Confidential interview with senior government official, 2000.

Confidential interview with senior government official, Washington, 1999.
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beliets

and ideas of a significant segment of the
government. Their power was most

dramatically increased under Reagan, the
President whose view of Cuba most
closely

matched

their

own. The Reagan administration was instrumental

in the creation

and

rise

of the Cuban American National Foundation
and successive administrations have
frequently used the lobby as a tool to advance
their policy goals.

Additionally, although the lobby

own, independent of the

is

able to exert considerable influence
on their

preferential treatment given to

them on Capitol

Hill, they are not

always successful. Certainly, many of their ideas and
influence have been
institutionalized as they are regarded as experts
level officials

Cuba

on Cuba matters and given access

and committees. These ideas and perceptions are found
widely

bills that are

consult with the

in

to top-

most

eventually passed into law. Yet, the government does
not always

community and occasionally takes

a stance contrary to their stated policy

goals.

The
that

root

were held

in

and continued power of the community

common by

They would not have

the

influential

power or

is

directly a result

Cuban Americans and

the ability to

sway policy

the policy

of the ideas

community.

if they did not share ideas

and perceptions with the foreign policy establishment. Contrary

to

popular belief CANF

has not held the U.S. government hostage. Thus, the scholarship that purports to explain
policy toward

Cuba

solely

not only exaggerates their

to exert influence.

on the basis of the effectiveness of the Cuban American lobby

power but often neglects

to explain

why and how

A constructivist examination reveals the missing link.

147

they are able

The Security Explanation
Both

classical

Realism and Neorealism paint a picture
of a perpetually anarchic

and insecure world where power and security

interests are

paramount

maintain that this ‘’world” should not be taken
as a given because

79
.

it is

Constructivists

socially

constructed, a product of our culture, identities,
norms, ideas and perceptions.

It is.

according to Nicholas Onuf, “a world of our
making .” 80 Constructivists have made a
habit out of challenging Realism.

They have shown

variety of state actions including, but far

continuation ot

NATO,

Realism cannot explain a wide

that

from limited

to,

the end of the Cold War, the

and the existence of nuclear capable

states that refuse to

develop

nuclear weapons.

The Cubans have never been able

Cuba

is

a threat. According to a leading

U.S. security or that

it

to understand the

Cuban

scholar “-that

pretends to change the U.S. regime-

Cubans... Why the United States

is

more

hostile toward

nation-excepting only those countries against which

Viet

Nam? Why

China?”

is

it

more

recalcitrant against

American perception

it

is

Cuba

that

constitutes a threat to

unbelievable for most

Cuba than toward any

other

has waged wars, such as Korea or

Cuba than

against the Soviet

The focus of successive American administrations on

the

“Cuban

Union or
threat” is not

See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA:
Addison- Wesley, 1979).

80

81

Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making (University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

“Cuba and the United States: Political Values and Interests in a Changing
U.S.-Cuban Relation in the 1990s Jorge Dominguez and Rafael Hemhndez,eds.

Rafael Hernandez,

International System,” in

.

40.
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.

only unbelievable

to

Cubans

but poses a problem for Realism,
especially in a post Cold

War world.
The

Realist explanation tor

US-Cuban

relations

was given

scholars and the public alike during the height
of the Cold

War when Cuba was

as a significant threat to the security of the
Western Hemisphere.

secunty naturally resonated with scholars during
be said for the Realist explanation during that
great deal of US policy toward

Though

the

Cuban

Cuba during

this period

era.

the

Soviet support and under Soviet protection,

The

of history. There

argues though

Cuba “did not pose a

unusual circumstances

[it

is

Cuba could marshal

the capabilities to

at that

mount

time

threat to

of Latin America. As Gregory Treverton

of the United

could] pose such a threat to Mexican or Venezuelan

late

hypothetical but not out of the question.”

to

significant threat, with Soviet support

direct threat to the territory

of interest to the United States.” In the

much

on

Cold War.

most scholars and policy makers thought Cuba presented a greater a security
allies or interests in other parts

portrayed

Realist emphasis

a serious challenge to American security during the Cold War. 82
However,

American

by

Indeed, this theory does help explain a

was not a

military alone

serious attention

States... in

oil fields

1980s he stated “the U.S. security concern

is

83

82

Though Cuba did represent a security concern, the magnitude of the threat, without massive
was comparatively small. In 1985 Cuba had 297,000 people in the armed forces and spent
$1,335 million on the military, which equaled 4.5% of their GNP. In 1985 the United States in comparison
Soviet support,

had 2,244,000 people in the armed forces and spent $2,58200 million on their military, which equaled 6.4%
of their GNP. Thus, though Cuba did represent a security concern the magnitude of the threat was
comparatively small to warrant the emphasis received in the US government. See Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,”
(

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acdaAvmeat95/tabi95.txt ) August

83

Ibid, 69.
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1

9,

200

1

As

the

Cold

War began

to

wane

in the late 1980s, there

Cuba's threat was exaggerated. Howard

American

affairs

demonstrated

who

resisted. In retrospect,

ls-a small,

America.”

Wiarda, a well-known expert

J.

often acts in an advisory capacity to the

Cuban

at the time: “the

it

seems

was a recognition

threat

seemed very

clear that the threat

was

that

in U.S.- Latin

American government,

real indeed,

and had

vastly overstated.

to

be

Cuba was-and

weak, dependent, underdeveloped country, incapable
of destabilizing Latin
84

Since Realism emphasizes actual material capabilities
and downplays perception
it

has

some

difficulty accounting for

American policy during

account of the relationship during the Cold
role

War would

this period.

benefit

A Realist’s

from acknowledging the

of perception. Since policy makers assumed that Cuba was a significant
security

threat they acted accordingly.

Once perception

is

factored into the equation, Realism

otters considerable insight into the events during this period. Yet,
perceptions are crucial
to the

explanation of US policy toward

identity (leader

Cold

Cuba

in the period.

Furthermore, the American

of the west and on the side of freedom) and images of Cuba (during the

War Cuba was

seen as a Soviet puppet and as an exporter of revolution) reinforced

the perception of threat.

Though Realism

offers considerable insight into the

Cold War US- Cuban

relationship, as an explanation for this relationship after the

fall

Realism loses most of its explanatory power. Cuba became,

to

small state with limited resources after

it

lost its

of the Soviet Union,

an even greater extent, a

Soviet support.

It

was

quite clear that

84

in

Jorge

Howard J. Wiarda, “Cuba and U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America: The Changing
Dominguez and Rafael Hernandez eds. U.S. -Cuban Relation in the 1990s, 166.
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Realities,”

they were no longer able to support
any external military effort in either
Latin America or

Most of the

Africa.

were

very

in

little

states in the

Western Hemisphere by

that time

danger of succumbing to a communist
revolution, and given the Cuban

economy, the regime was not capable of that
type of support

War it became
presented

had democratized and

in

any case. After the Cold

apparent to even the most ardent anti-Castroites
that

much of a

security threat in the traditional sense.
This

Pentagon in 1998. According

Cuba no longer manifests a
Realism,

itself,

definitions of threat

with

to a

Some

was confirmed by

Defense Intelligence Agency report issued

the

that year

serious threat to the United States. 85

its

focus on material capabilities and corresponding

would no longer consider Cuba a

the continued policy?

Cuba no longer

scholars

would maintain

threat.

that

How can a Realist explain

Cuba

represents a threat in

nontraditional ways- such as through a migration crisis or
as a drug trafficker.

There has been some concern about Cuba
but there

is

no solid evidence

the drug trade.

s

role in the Caribbean narcotic trade

to indicate that Fidel Castro is involved or

The spokesman

for the Federal

Drug Administration

in

even complicit in

Miami, John

Fernandez, explained after the 1989 drug smuggling scandal within the Cuban

government

that there

presidential palace

85

Times

May

was “no reason

were

Steven Lee Myers,
7,

in

to believe that Fidel Castro or people (in) the

sympathy with the smugglers.” 86

“A Pentagon Report Now

In

1989 Jorge Dominguez

Menace Posed by Cuba,” New York
Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security,”

Belittles the

1998. See also: U.S. Department of Defense, “The

Report Prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency,
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the National Security Agency, and the United

the

States Southern

Command

Joint Intelligence Center

(May 1998)

(http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/cubarpt.htm)

86

Quoted

in

Max

Azicri,

Cuba Today and Tomorrow

2000), 99.
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(Gainesville: University Press of Florida,

stated that the strong opposition of
both

Cuba and

the United States to drug trafficking

could be a possible basis for future US-Cuban
cooperation.
narcotics, the

US

87

The

stated

“With regard

to

and Cuban governments are firmly on
record against the individual

consumption of drugs;
caught.’’

He

threat

their

laws and practices severely punish drug
traffickers that are

posed

to the U.S.

by Cuba’s involvement

in the narcotic trade

appears to be relatively minor.
Clearly,

Cuba could cause a problem

citizens to take to the boats.

would most
Castro.

likely arise

in Florida if

The migration danger

from

is

it

more

encouraged or aided

its

and immediate but

real

it

Cuba, for example after the death of Fidel

instability in

88

Yet, the magnitude of these potential threats remains
small compared to other

security threats and even smaller

compared

War. Yet, the most hard-line Cuba policy
after the

Cold War was considered

migration are of traditionally

little

to the

to pass

danger Cuba posed during the Cold
through Congress was approved well

history. In addition, as threats to security drugs

concern

to Realists

and even

less

and

concern to

Neorealists.

That

said,

Since September

terrorism

is

one security issue

1

bound

horrific events in

is

likely to

become

central to

U.S.-Cuban

1,

2001, Cuba

to

dominate discussions of U.S. policy toward the

New York and

s

place on the American

Washington,

this status

list

was

of countries

essentially ignored because

Havana

Jorge Dominguez, “The Obstacles and Prospects for Improved U.S.-Cuban Relations:

Perspective,”

88

sponsor

island. Prior to the

as Vicki Huddleston, the head of the United States’ Interest Section in

87

that

relations.

in

Dominguez and Hernandez

eds. U.S.-

Cuban Relations

in the 1990s, 29-30.

Confidential interview with former senior government official, 2000.
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A

U.S.

acknowledged “Cuba

is

continues to be on that
principally what

from

this

list

happened

list, it is

of the West

on the

bound

tries to

terrorist list for acts

because

it still

some

Cuba

Constructivist argument

to

American

Cuba

that portrayed

insult to the

1

security

open

also

is

removed
rest

it

does not

to criticism since not only has the
actual

and yet the United States

War ended and

as a military threat did decline, the other constructivist
elements at

Cuba

as an undemocratic

enemy, as a human

rights violator, as

an

American way of life only ninety miles from the coast of Florida, among

others have not changed and continue to have a major influence over
the

make

is

is

2001. Even

1,

ardently anti-Castro policy. However, even though
the Cold

the perception ot

work

Cuba

it

in the past or in the present.

threat declined, the perception of threat has diminished,

its

until

grapple with the devastating events of
September

explain American policy toward

maintains

But the issue

U.S.-Cuban relations as the United States and
the

though terrorism has become the most serious threat

The

terrorists...

and not the present.” 89 Yet,

in the past,

to affect

harbors

committed some 20 years ago. and

way Americans

sense of their relationship with Cuba.

Thus, the Realist explanation of this particular foreign policy has a number of
important

failings.

While we shouldn’t

understanding of the relationship,

we pave

the

way toward

it

is

a richer and

entirely dismiss Realism’s contributions to our

only through identity, images, norms and ideas can

more complete explanation of U.S. policy toward

the island of Cuba.

89

(

See Vicki Huddleston,

“US Cuban

Relations After Elian Gonzalez”

http://usembassv.state.gov/posts/cul/wwwlihud.html

)

March
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Conclusions
In conclusion,

although Realism and the domestic
interest group explanation do

offer insight into the formation of
Cuba policy they either ignore or take for
granted

elements that are problematized by constructivism
and, as such, cannot explain key
events and issues in U.S.

The United

Cuba

policy.

States approaches

Cuba policy with

a

number of ingrained

perceptions, norms, and images. These are not
simply byproducts of the relationship
but
are fundamental to the

development of the relationship

United States understands
Just as our identity

identity of states,

its

own

role in the

world

is

itself.

Furthermore,

how the

just as important to the relationship.

molds everything we do and influences how we see
the world, the

do the same. These

factors can explain

why

the United States has not

fundamentally changed their policy toward Cuba despite the
end of the Cold
recognition that

Cuba

is

no longer a

threat.

Not only do these

War and

the

variables explain the

anomalies not accounted for by Realism and other similar gaps

in the

“Cuba

story” but

Constructivist variables also illuminate the whole narrative. For
example, they offer a

coherent account of how the

Cuban American National Foundation became

to be

regarded as one of the most powerful interest groups in the country. Thus, to
understand
the U.S. approach to

need

to turn to the

Cuba from

the time of the

Monroe Doctrine

power of perceptions, images,
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ideas,

to the Elian saga

norms and

identities.

we

CHAPTER 6

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES:
DRIVEN BY IDENTITY

Introduction

The Canadian

somewhere

in

identity has preoccupied

between the Americans and the

insignificant, yet in

some ways,

Canadians for generations. Caught
British,

American influence without much

is still

that

Canada’s problem

it is

for real.”

to

felt rather

superior. In fact, for years, Canadians
felt their country

lacked an identity. In 1967, Lester Pearson
said:

1974, John Holmes, the well

Canadians have often

“We moved

from British influence

to

feeling of purely national identity in
between.” In

known Canadian diplomat and

convince foreigners- and

to

political scientist, wrote: “It

some extent

its

own people—

1

However, Pearson and Holmes’ successors would argue

that since their

predecessors uttered those words, the Canadian identity has
matured. This chapter will

demonstrate that Canadians do have a unique identity that

reflects a particular set

values. This chapter looks at the Canadian identity and

influence on foreign policy.

Canadian Values and

its

of

Identities

Canadians traditionally place a heavy emphasis on the values of peace, order,
moderation, compromise, and social justice. The importance of these values to Canadians
has been well documented by scholars

who

trace the

Canadian identity

Both quotes are from David Olive, Canada Inside Out:
see us (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd, 1996).

155

to

Canada’s

How we see ourselves and how others

historical experience. 2

Canadian

political culture

has been understood to be primarily

influenced by a combination of
Lockean liberalism and tory conservatism.
Scholars such
as

Gad Horowitz, who,

building on the

work of Louis

Hartz, argued that the root of

toryism can be traced to the United Empire
Loyalists. These scholars maintain
that
the Loyalists rejected the

on the

common good

American revolution and

fled north, they brought an

with them to Canada, which today
manifests

acceptance of socialist ideas and values such as
peace, order and

Much of the

itself in

stability.

when

emphasis

a greater

3

scholarship on Canadian identity has developed
in a comparative

manner, contrasting Canadian and American history
and values. For example. S.M.
Lipset

compared

the United States

the

two

societies in Continental Divide: The Values

and Canada.

to differ considerably.

Lipset concludes:

America

“Canada and

reflects the influence

oriented, statist, deferential to authority..." 4

explains:

the

“Canada

is

American Whigs’

still

the United States continue

of its classically

individualistic, antistatist, populist, ideological origins.

comparative North American perspective, can

and Institutions of

Canada,

liberal

at least

from a

be seen as Tory-mercantilist, group-

The Economist

agrees.

A March 2003

thus the land of the Tories, the counter-revolutionaries
revolt.

Whig,

article

who jibbed

at

While the American Declaration of Independence celebrates

2

See for example: Gad Horowitz, “Tories, Socialists, and the Demise of Canada,” Canadian
Dimension 2, 4 (1965): 12-15; William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and
Ideologies
Canada, 3 ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990); and Denis Stairs, “The political culture of
Canadian foreign policy,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 15 (December, 1982): 667-90.

in

r

3

See Gad Horowitz, “Tories, Socialists,”; Gad Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and
in Canada: An Interpretation,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science
32, no. 1
(1966): 143-71. See also Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc.), 1964.
Socialism

4

Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and
Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990), 212.
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Institutions

of the United States and

'life,

liberty

and the pursuit of happiness’, Canada’s
founding document promises ‘peace,

order and good government ."' 5 Lipset
maintains that these differences produced
“disparate Weltanschauung (world view)
ideology.... Americans

peoples, tend to

view

international politics in nonnegotiable
moralistic

terms. Canadians, like Europeans, are
reflections

more than other western

more disposed

and ideological

to perceive international conflicts
as

of interest differences and, therefore, subject
to negotiation and

compromise .”

6

Regardless of whether one agrees with Horowitz,
Lipset, or other scholars of

Canadian value orientations, surveys reveal

on compromise,

that

social justice, and international

World Values Survey compared

materialist

Materialist values are those that emphasize

Canadians do place a greater emphasis

law than most other

nationalities.

and post-materialist values

economic and physical

in

many

The

countries.

security including

such things as strong military and economic growth. Post-materialist
values are those

that

7
give a “heavier emphasis on belonging, self-expression, and the quality
of life .” The

World Values Survey

reveals that Canadians have exceptionally strong post-materialist

values, outranking

of the more than forty countries in the survey, except Finland and

the Netherlands

5

8
.

all

“These quality of life issues include a greater concern

“The Awkward Couple,” Economist.com (March

13,

for the

2003) (http://www.economist.com) (March

23, 2003).

6

7

Lipset, 220.

Ronald Inglehart, Culture

Shift in

Advanced Industrial Society

(Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1990), 66.

8

Change

in

Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodemization: Cultural, Economic and
43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 157.
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Political

environment and issues

like

human

when weighed

rights

more

against

materialist values

such as economic growth or a strong
defense.
Values and Canadian Foreign Policy
Scholars have tied these values to
Canadian international actions. Neil
Nevitte’s
analysis of the Canadian responses to
the

World Values Survey

links postmaterialism

cosmopolitanism. Those individuals with a
strong cosmopolitan attitude
identify

and

less

strongly with their local communities
and see themselves as belonging to
a wider, even

community. Nevitte argues

global,

likely than materialists to

likely to

Marc

O

that “postmaterialists are about
three times

have these cosmopolitan identifications
and are

have subnational identifications.” 9

An

interesting study

more

much

done by Erin

less

Carrierre,

Reilly and Richard Vengrofftie the Canadian
postmaterialist and cosmopolitan

outlook to Canadian internationalism and commitment
10
to peacekeeping.

Canadians are interested
in the international

arena."

in the

wider world and support an active role for Canada

A poll taken in

1998 reported

that:

The public s democratic moralism is so powerful that Canadians
are quite
prepared to foreswear trade opportunities as a cost of advancing
democratic
values. Part of the reason for Canadians' willingness
to

Neil Nevitte,

(Peterborough,

The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change

ON: Broadview

make

in

sacrifices

on the

Cross-National Perspective

Press, 1996), 67.

1

Erin Carrierre, Marc O’Reilly and Richard Vengroff, “’In the Service of Peace’:
Refexive
Multilateralism and the Canadian Experience in Bosnia.” Paper presented at the International
Studies
Association Conference, Washington D.C. (February 16-20, 1999). Located on Columbia International
Affairs Online (https.7Avwwc.cc.cohimbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf7cae01/cae01.html) June
4,

11

For example, see Giles Gherson, “Canadians are

Citizen, April 1998.
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activitsts at heart,

new

2000.

poll finds,”

Ottawa

and

hUma"

ri8htS

r^ht thing™ do^

More

^ SimP

'

y ' ha ‘ ' hey bdieVe this WOuld

recently, scholars have termed this
activism in Canadian foreign policy,
‘mission

diplomacy.’ According to

Kim

Richard Nossal, a well-respected expert
on Canadian

foreign policy, mission diplomacy
tradition in

initiative,

Canadian

[C] an

“very

much

in

keeping with a long-standing

statecraft- a tradition that puts a value

and getting involved

community .” 13 He

is

to solve a

problem

on seizing the day, taking the

that confronts the international

asks:

we conclude

would argue

that mission diplomacy constitutes a
Canadian vocation?
that everything certainly points in this
direction: the pride that

I

and policy makers take in these initiatives; the persistent
willingness to engage in worthwhile initiatives year
after year; the fact that even
those who come to power knowing little about foreign
policy (like Mulroney), or
who are not inclined toward activism (like Chretien) or who are actively
opposed
to foreign-policy initiatives (like Trudeau) all end
up pursuing
political leaders

foreign policy.

initiatives in their

4

Canadians are not just interested

in

world

politics; they

have specific ideas about the role

they want their government to play on the global stage.

Surveys confirm that Canadians expect
reflect a certain set

of values and

identities.

their

When

most respondents (ninety-five percent) asserted

government’s foreign policy

asked about foreign policy

that pursuing

to

priorities,

world peace and protecting

12

“Eighth Article in the Southam News/CNC-ISS Poll on Foreign Policy: Spreading Democratic
Values-Strong Interventionist Consensus,” April 24, 1998 ( http://www.compas.ca/html/archives/spreading
demo_surv.htm) January 30, 2002.

13

Kim

Richard Nossal, “Mission Diplomacy and the ‘Cult of the

Policy,” in Worthwhile Initiatives?

Initiative.’ in

Canadian Mission-Oriented Diplomacy. Andrew

Geoffrey Hayes eds., (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2000),

14

Ibid, 4.
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1.

F.

Canadian Foreign

Cooperand

the global environment should be Canada’s
top concern.

Over eighty percent of those

asked also emphasized the importance of discouraging
human rights abuses and
participating in the United Nations. 15

When

over 60 percent of Canadians answered

asked about their international objectives

that they

wanted “a

lot

more emphasis” on

protecting the environment and almost half wanted
“a lot

more emphasis” on promoting

democracy and human

lot

increasing exports.

16

rights.

Only 42 percent wanted “a

The bar graph

more emphasis” on

that follows reflects this poll about

Canadian foreign

policy objectives.

Figure

2:

Canadian Foreign Policy

Source: Southam

News/CNC-ISS

Priorities

Poll on Foreign Policy (April 24, 1998)

This survey also revealed that Canadians want the twin goals of “getting other countries
to respect rules of

war and peace,” and “spreading democracy around

the world”

15

Canada Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of National Defence and the
Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian Opinion on Canadian Foreign Policy, Defence
Policy and International Development Assistance (1995) conducted by Insight Canada Research.

16

“Eighth Article in the Southam News/CNC-ISS Poll on Foreign Policy: Spreading Democratic

Values-Strong Interventionist Consensus,” April 24, 1998 (http://www.compas.ca/html/archives/spreading

demo_surv.htm) January 30, 2002.
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emphasized over other foreign policy
world

affairs.

goals, such as increasing

Canada’s influence over

17

Similarly, another survey taken in 2001,
reports two-thirds of Canadians
said that
their

hurt

government should promote human
Canadian

concerns.

first

A

trade.

18

rights in other countries,

even

if

doing so would

Likewise, Canadians chose these values over
geopolitical

1998 poll showed that Canadians think

and foremost to countries

that

that

development aid should be given

“have relatively honest and effective governments.”

This survey reported that the other considerations carry
less weight with the public,”
including if the country

UN.

is

“friendly to Canada” or “vote[s] with western
countries

These surveys confirm

that

Canadians want

these values above, and beyond, other economic or

at the

to see their foreign policy reflect

more pragmatic

considerations. Thus,

Canadian foreign policy has consistently been characterized by Canadian

scholars, policy

makers, and the public as actively promoting the values of peace, order,
mediation and
social justice.

This set of values and their relationship to Canadian foreign policy has been
especially noticeable since the mid-1950s.

played in solving the 1956 Suez

crisis

Many

scholars point out that the role

Canada

and Mike Pearson’s subsequent award of the Nobel

17

Ibid.

18

Centre for Research and Information on Canada, “Trade, Globalization and Canadian Values,”

Montreal: Centre for Research and Information on Canada, 2001),

19

“Fourth Article

in the

Southam News /CNC-ISS

Poll

18.

on Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid-Division

over Money, Unity over Principle,” April 24, 1998( http://www.compas.ca/html/archives/foreignaid
surv.htm) January 30, 2002.
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Peace Prize influenced the Canadian

self-identity.

proud of the role their government played
experience grew “an inchoate sense that

governments

The

try to

in

it is

20

Canadians were, and

solving this international
right

and good and just

still

crisis.

that

are; very

Out of this

Canadian

embroil themselves in international matters...” 21

foreign policy establishment acknowledges
this connection between values

and foreign policy. Louis

St.

Laurent, Canada’s prime minister from 1948-1957,
but

at

the time secretary of state for external affairs,
told an audience in 1947 that, “[n]o
foreign

policy

is

consistent or coherent over a period of years unless

it

is

based upon some

conception of human values.... If Canada’s liberal humanitarian
values are not reflected
in

Canada’s foreign policy, then popular attachment

itself decline.”

to

them domestically

will likely

22

Similarly, the Liberal government’s 1994-1995 foreign
policy review

stated:

Foreign policy matters to Canadians. They have deep-rooted values that they
carry over into the role they want Canada to play - nurturing dialogue and

compromise; promoting democracy, human

rights,

economic and

social justice;

Scholars have explained this tendency in Canada’s foreign policy behavior in a variety of
ways.
describe Ottawa’s foreign policy actions in terms of middlepowermanship. Initially the term
middle
power was limited to describing Canada’s place in the international hierarchy. In 1944 Lionel Gelber

Some

explained that Canada was not a great power, and yet with Canada’s “natural wealth and human capacity
she is not a minor power like Mexico or Sweden. She stands in between as a Britannic Power of medium
rank. Henceforth in

world politics, Canada must figure as a Middle Power.” See Lionel Gelber, “A Greater
Canada Among the Nations,” Behind the Headlines (1944), quoted in Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics
of
nd
Canadian Foreign Policy 2 ed. (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall, 1989), 48. However, during the post
WWII years Canada became increasingly involved in international mediation, the highlight being Ottawa’s
mediation of the Suez crisis in the mid-1950s. As a result, Canadians began to associate an emphasis on
and order with ‘middlepowermanship.” See John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace:
University of Toronto Press, 1979) for an excellent
introduction to middlepowermanship.
international peace

Canada and the Search for World Order (Toronto:

21

22

Nossal, “Mission Diplomacy,”

Quoted

Good Governance
Policy,

in

6.

Paul Gecelovsky and

Initiative,” in

Tom

Keating, “Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The

Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era

1984-93 Nelson Michaud and

Kim

Richard Nossal, eds. (Vancouver:

162

in

Canadian Foreign

UBC

Press, 2001), 194.

caring for the environment; safeguarding
peace; and easing poverty. And they
can offer corresponding skills- mediating
disputes; counseling good governance
in a diverse society, helping the
less fortunate; and peacekeeping. 23
In 1995

Andre Ouellet, the Minister of Foreign

Affairs,

echoed

St.

Laurent, stating that

although the government was undertaking
a comprehensive review of the country’s
foreign affairs, he assured Canadians that
they

would not attempt “to overturn

values that have guided us in conducting our
foreign policy until now.”24

Nossal argues “expectations

now play an

One of the consequences of Suez was
the attentive public in Canada, that a
minister.”

the

Richard

important role in shaping mission diplomacy.

that

it

created an expectation, particularly

good foreign minister

is

an

initiative

among

minded foreign

25

The Canadian emphasis on these values can be understood
connected

Kim

all

identities.

stage. Firstly,

Both

identities

promote an active

role for

Canadians see themselves as good international

as part of two highly

Canadians on the world

citizens.

Canadians value

dialogue and believe that they have excellent communication skills
that can be used to
solve international problems. Canadians traditionally have a high
respect for international
law, non-intervention, and multilateral organizations. These qualities are
understood to be
essential elements of

good

citizenship.

"Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada’s Foreign Policy:
and Priorities for the Future Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian

Principles

Foreign Policy (November 1994),

1.

24

Politics

Quoted in Dean Oliver, “Foreign Affairs and National Defence,” in Canadian Annual Review of
and Public Affairs, 1994, David Leyton-Brown, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000),

79.

25

Nossal, “Mission Diplomacy,”

6.
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Secondly, Canadians identify themselves
as peacekeepers. Though often
included

under the good citizen umbrella,
category. Peacekeeping

is

this identity is

so influential that

it

deserves

a source of pride for Canadians and
guides

international action and policy.

As

this chapter will demonstrate,

its

own

much of their

Canadians believe that

they are excellent mediators and often attempt to
solve, for good or

ill,

international

disputes.

Canada
In

world

affairs,

good neighbor, block

as a '‘Good International Citizen”

Canadians see themselves as the international equivalent
of the

parent, the family that brings the rest of the

and helps out whenever asked. According
wished

to think

to

community together

David Black “Canadians have generally

of themselves as naturally ‘good international

citizens,’ particularly

on

issues ot peace and justice. Instances of high profile activism on ethical
issues (e.g.,

peacekeeping, nuclear diplomacy, North-South mediation, landmines, and the
International Criminal Court) are constructed as representative of Canada’s ‘natural’

vocation

in

government

world
to

affairs .”

conduct

its

26

Canadians embrace

this identity

foreign policy based on

Components include a high

its

and they expect

their

components.

respect for international law, the principle of non-

intervention and sovereignty. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade

(DFAIT): “Canadians recognise

a stable, rules-based international system .”

26

David R. Black,

“How

27

that their interests are best served

by

Ottawa has consistently promoted

Exceptional? Reassessing the Mulroney Government’s Anti-Apartheid

‘Crusade’,” in Diplomatic Departures., 190.

21

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada’s International

Human

Rights Policy ( http://www.dfait-maeci.iic. ca?foreign policy/human-rights/hrl-rights-en.asp ) (February 19,

1999) April

4,

2003.

164

international legal organizations. For
example.

Canada launched

28
the creation of an International Criminal
Court.

can be proud of Canada's role

at the forefront

a

The government

of the

campaign

to

asserts that

promote

“Canadians

effort to establish the International

Criminal Court.” 29

Canadians also have a strong preference for recognizing
the government of the

day and Ottawa recognizes new governments expeditiously.
There have been a number of
important exceptions but most of these are a result of
external pressures, mainly from the

United States. Ottawa’s decision not to recognize the
People’s Republic of China was a
direct result of the importance of

China

against the Americans on this issue

Kim

By

Americans. Ottawa determined

would have been too

Richard Nossal points out “Washington’s attempt

international affairs
30

to the

was seen

in

Ottawa

costly for Canada.

to

that

However, as

keep Beijing isolated

in

as both mistaken and exceedingly short-sighted.”

the 1960s surveys reveal that a majority of Canadians

felt that

China should be

recognized by Ottawa and admitted to the United Nations. 31 Pressure for Ottawa
its

policy was strong. In 1966 the Canadian delegation advocated that both the

Taiwan be seated
Security Council.

in the
3

“

going

General Assembly and that the

PRC

to alter

PRC

and

should take the seat on the

Recognition of China was one of Pierre Trudeau’s campaign

28

See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada’s ICC
Campaign,’’ (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign policv/icc/icc campaign-en.asp April 4, 2003.
’)

29

See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and the ICC,”

( http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign

30

Nossal,

Kim

policv/icc/canada icc-en.asp#leadership ) April 4, 2003.

Richard, ed. The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy 2

nd

ed. (Scarborough, ON:

Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1989), 32.

31

J.L. Granatstein

and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 179.
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promises in 1968. Thus, under Trudeau,
Ottawa

Trudeau made an

official visit to the country in

Robert Jackson, a Canadian
asserts that

officially recognized the

PRC

and

1973

political scientist specializing in
sovereignty issues

Canada has been especially supportive of the
doctrine of non-intervention. He

explains:

Canada’s traditional role has been

uphold the universal framework of
its detractors, and to remind
those who are apt to
orget.... that it remains the only
conceivable normative foundation of world
politics. Of course it is maintained at
the expense of those who live in
chaotic or
police states; they pay a heavy price for the
universal doctrine of nonto

international society against

intervention.

Foreign Affairs officials often find their desire to
take

initiatives, at

odds with

their

support for the principles of non-intervention and
sovereignty. Prime Minister Jean

Chretien spoke out about this issue during the

UN Millennium Summit in September

2000. At that meeting he proposed the creation of the
International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to address this
dilemma. In response to the

discussions begun by the prime minister, the Canadian government
sponsored a

Commission
community

to:

“produce a comprehensive report that would

in reconciling respect for the sovereignty

face of humanitarian crises.”

34

assist the international

of states with the need

to act in the

This report, issued in 2001, reflects the Canadian concern

32

Ibid, 180.

33

Robert H. Jackson, “Morality, Democracy and Foreign Policy,” in Canada Among Nations
1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy, Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, eds. (Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1995), 58.

34

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Media Room: Canada Launches
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,” (December 18, 2002)
( http://www.dfait-maeci.uc.ca/iciss-ciise/press2-en.asp )
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April 5, 2003.

for sovereignty.

.(

cautions that: “exceptions to
the princip.e of non-intervention
should

he limited. Military intervention for
human protection purposes must be
regarded as an
exceptional and extraordinary measure,
and for

it

to

be warranted, there must be
serious

and irreparable harm occurring to human
beings, or imminently
Canadians have also been very reluctant

imposed sanctions but not as a routine
multilaterally.

tool

to

likely to occur.” 35

use economic sanctions. Ottawa
has

of statecraft, and in those cases,
almost always

For example, Canada did not follow the
American lead

in the 1950s

and

impose economic sanctions against the People’s
Republic of China. Kim Richard Nossal
argues that “Canada’s historical reluctance
attributed

merely

Canadian wheat

to greed.”

He points out

sales to the

to

invoke economic sanctions cannot...
be

that the

Canadians engaged China long before

communist country became

profitable.

36

Similarly, Canadians believe that a “good
international citizen” uses dialogue, not
force.

The report of the

reflects this preference.

International

It

Commission on Intervention and

states that coercion should

be used as a

State Sovereignty

last resort, after all

other methods have been exhausted. 37

Policy makers believe that Canadians are especially skilled

DFAIT document

maintains:

“We have

at dialogue.

been called on by other countries

experience with dialogue and the peaceful resolution of differences;

A recent

to share our

many

opportunities

35

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, The Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (December
2001)
( http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report2-en.asp#criteria ) April
5, 2003.
36

Nossal, The Politics, 66.

37

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “The Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,” (December 2001)
( http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report2-en.asp#eriteria )
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April

5,

2003

exist for us to serve a
mediating role.’-

The Dialogue on Foreign Policy
paper published

by the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Internationa.
Trade
international tensions,

fostering dialogue

home and

abroad,

Canadians may he able

among

to play

to

show

with shared core values of democracy,

all

“Amid

current

an important global role

different cultural communities.

we can work

asserts:

By

in

reaching out to partners at

nations that diverse religions
are compatible

human

rights, diversity

The emphasis on communication
and dialogue
global initatives. For example,
at the Santiago

Summit

is

and

civility.”

39

evident in a variety of Canadian

in 1998,

Canada promoted

a

Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue Group
on Drugs to address the problems
associated with the
international narcotics trade in the
Western Hemipshere.

Secretary of State, David Kilgour
stated:

"We

believe that dialogue

of the Americas can be an effective mechanism
illicit

drugs,

which

affects

human

to deal concretely with the

illicit

drug problem

security issue, rather than one of only
enforcement,"

38

r

6

41

is

to see

it

as a

the countries

problem of

He

also

human

Dialogue means engagement. The

D e P artn ent of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “A Dialogue
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stressed that: "Canada's approach to the

A

During the subsequent meetings.
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39

Ibid.

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
News Release “Kilgour to
Travel to Latin America to Promote Canada’s Hemispheric
Dialogue on Drugs Initiative ” (Januarv 22
1999)( http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca ) April 4, 2003.

41

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release “
Kilgour to
Travel to Central America,” ( http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca ) April
4, 2003.
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Canadian government favors engagement
and almost always
sanctions to multilateral actions

The emphasis on

promoted these values
to

42

dialogue, engagement, and the rule
of law

rights, yet,

rights issues abroad.

it is

is

how

evident in

Canadians value

Canadians traditionally have not aggressively

in their foreign policy. Furthermore,

advance these values,

use of

.

Canada approaches democracy and human
democracy and human

restricts their

when Ottawa

has attempted

through dialogue, not coercion. According
to

Tom

Keating,

an accepted authority on democracy in Canadian
foreign policy, “Taking up the “White

man’s burden” has never been
at least until recently....

of

particularly appealing to

Promoting democracy abroad has been an established

American foreign policy

for a

good

hand, have been more reticent about,

part of the past century.... Canadians,

if

still

superpower which periodically understands

making of Canadian foreign policy

,

at the

on the other

its

has the problem of living beside a
historical role as that

destined to be the vanguard of democracy in the

democratic values while balking

tradition

not deeply suspicious of, such adventures .” 43

Robert Jackson similarly argues: “Canada

for the

Canadian foreign policy makers,

is

modem world. The

of a country which
special

awkwardness

Canada's sharing and avowing the same

Hegelianism of America’s

historic self-

,.44

•

conception.

42

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canadian Economic
Sanctions,” (http://wvvw.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/sanctions-en.asp April 4, 2003.
')

43

Tom

Implications,”

in

Keating, “Promoting
Ethics

and Security

Democracy in Haiti: Assessing the Practical and Ethical
Canadian Foreign Policy, Rosaland Irwin, ed. (Vancouver:

in

Press, 2001), 208.

44

Jackson, 58.
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is

UBC

.

However, sinee the early 1990s, Canadian
foreign policy has more

championed democracy and human

good govcn ““ cc ” policy

rights.

initiative.

The change has been expressed

The term was adopted by

actively

in

Ottawa’s

the government of Prime

Minister Brian Mulroney in 1990 and
refers to the combination of
three values: “respect
for

human

rights, for

nghts, democratic government, and
sound public administration.”

example, traditionally had a place

in

45

Human

Canada’s foreign policy but had generally

been “non-aggressive and often understated.” 46
With the advent of good governance
the early 1990s the twin values of human
rights and

of Canadian foreign policy. Some say
fundamental changes

in

this

democracy became an

in

integral part

development represents one of the most

Canadian foreign policy

in recent time.

However, scholars and

policy makers alike, both emphasize that ‘good
governance’

is

natural evolution of, the traditional Canadian
identity.

scholars refer to this

Some

consistent with, and

is

a

enlarged foreign policy agenda that combines traditional
values and good governance as
internationalism. Heather A. Smith states that “there remains
a broad
ideal ot internationalism,

commitment

to the

which includes an emphasis on dialogue, compromise, and

mediation as well as the promotion of democracy, peace, prosperity,
and good
governance.”

47

Keating, 210.

46

Gerald

Among Nations
Press,

1

992), 24

47

J.

Schmitz,

“Human

1992-93, Fen Osier

Rights, Democratization, and International Conflict,” in

Hampson and Christopher Maule,

Canada

eds. (Ottawa: Carleton University

1

Heather A. Smith, “Niche Diplomacy and Mission-Oriented Diplomatic Behaviour:
in Worthwhile Initiatives?, 14.

Assessment,”
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A

Critical

Canada as a Peacekeeper
Closely tied to Canada's identity as a
“good international citizen”
identity as a “peacekeeper.”

International Trade

peacekeeping

is

The

first

is

the Canadian

sentence of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and

(DFAIT)’s introduction

to

peacekeeping reads “For Canada,

an important aspect of our national heritage,
and a reflection of our

fundamental beliefs .” 48 Though Canadians have
nothing to match the scale of the
Statue

of Liberty, the monument to Canadian peacekeepers
near the Parliament Buildings
certainly represents vital

Canadian values. As a paper presented

to the International

Studies Association so aptly stated:

Engraved are the words, “In the Service of Peace,” This
monument, which so
eloquently characterizes Canadians’ view of their
most important role in world
politics, highlights a self-image that

has become an integral part of the Canadian
permeates the thinking of both elites and the general
citzenry,
the printed and electronic media, school social
studies texts, the foreign and
defense policy statement of most political parties and even
traverses the broad
cultural divide between English and French Canada 49
political culture.

It

.

According

to

Canadian

political scientists,

Manon

Tessier and Michel Fortmann:

Peacekeeping is so firmly rooted in the collective Canadian ‘psyche’ that it is
almost impossible to imagine an elected government openly opposing or
fundamentally questioning the importance of peacekeeping in the country’s
foreign policy. This unconditional support

is

accumulated expertise. It
collective Canadian imagination feeds on and
tolerance, respect,

and mediation. Within

more than just a feeling of
of founding myth that the

fuelled by

pride, a vocation, or

is

sort

that refers to the societal values

this logic,

peacekeeping

is

of
custom-made

48

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Backgrounder: Canada and
Peacekeeping,” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/Deacekeeping/back-e.asnl/23/02') January
23, 2002.
49

Erin, Carrierre

Marc O’Reilly and Richard Vengroff,

Multilateralism and the Canadian Experience

in

“’In the Service

Bosnia.” Paper presented

of Peace”’ :Refexive

at the International

Studies

Association Conference, Washington D.C. (February 16-20, 1999). Located on Columbia International
Affairs Online (https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/cae01/cae01.html) June 4, 2000.
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and opposition

Peacekeeping and the values

it

to

it

is

tantamount to a rejection of ‘Canadian

represents are fundamental elements of
the Canadian

identity.

Canada has a long
involved

1

990.

decade

places such as

after the

Suez

crisis,

Ottawa sent peacekeepers around

Yemen, Cyprus and Lebanon. Over

the next

attempted to mediate the Korean and Vietnam conflicts,

numerous

to

2
list.'

in

the globe to

few decades, Canadians

among many

The Chretien government has continued

Canadian foreign policy by becoming immersed
example,

Canada was

most number of peacekeeping missions of any
country between 1948 and

in the

In the

history of mediating international
conflict.

this

others too

mediating tendency

in

in disputes all over the world. For

1997 the Canadian government organized a meeting between
Peru’s

President Alberto Fuijimori and Japan’s Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto in Toronto to
discuss the hostage crisis

5U

Manon

Peacekeeping,”

51

in

at the

Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru,

in 1997.

Tessier and Michel Fortmann, “The Conservative Approach
Diplomatic Departures, 14.

Andrew

53

From

the

to International

1

F.

Cooper, “The Evolution of Multilateralism

in an Intermediate State: The ReEconomic and Security Arenas,” in Paths to Power, Andrew Hurrell
et al., eds. No. 244 (Washington D.C The Latin American Program, Working Paper Series,
Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2000), 13.

orientation of Canadian Strategy in the

52

See Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and
Peacekeeping,” ( http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menu-en.aspO April 4, 2003.

53

Though

the crisis

Toronto appeared to be
Online Newshour on PBS
in

was ended by

the Peruvians

fruitful at the time.
(

when

they stormed the embassy, the discussions

See transcript of interview with Fuijimori on James Lehrer’s

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin america/february97/fuiimori 2-3.html )

(April 2, 2003).
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war

in the

Great Lakes region

in

Africa to Yugoslavia, the
Chretien government has

attempted to reduce international
tension.

Canada's peacekeeping identity has
weathered a number of blows.
The most well

known

recent example

was

the Somalia incident.

The image of Canadian

soldiers

torturing and killing a Somali
teenager in 1993 raised doubts
about Canada’s traditional
international role, as did the failure

of peacekeepers to stop the
genocide

in

Rwanda

in

wedded

to

1994. Despite these and other, less
well-known, failures, Canadians
remain
this identity

and continue

to support

Canadian peace operations around the
globe.

Furthermore, just as American exceptionalism
other countries as

it

is

match

others.

better

world

allies at best

is

sometimes

Canadian perceptions of their global

world’s problems and overestimate the
degree

accept Canadian moral leadership. Fen Osier

Canada

is

international opinion. Canadians often
have an inflated sense

ability to solve the

idea that

often not viewed as positively
by

domestically, Canada's emphasis on
these values

viewed as self-righteous behavior by
not always

is

is

Hampson and Dean

role

of their

to

which others

F.

Oliver claim: “The

will

particularly suited to lead coalitions of the
willing in pursuit of a

another oft-repeated assessment that would leave

perplexed and

diplomacy demands the

at

worst infuriated.” 54

initiative taker take

Kim

maximum

many of our

closest

Richard Nossal notes: “mission
credit.

But

this is a strategy

guaranteed to annoy other actors whose involvement might
have been crucial to the
successful outcomes.”

Nossal

cites the

Canadian spin on the landmine treaty as an

54

Fen Osier Hampson and Dean F.
(Summer 1998) (Summer 1998): 379-406.

55

do

Nossal, “Mission Diplomacy,”

Oliver, “Pulpit diplomacy,” International Journal 53 3

10.
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example of “how

to

annoy one’s

friends.”

56

Dean Acheson’s chapter

in

Livingston

Merchant’s book Neighbors Taker, For
Granted, entitled “Canada: ‘Stem
Daughter of the

Voice of God,’” advises Canadians that these

efforts

can be seen as self-righteousness. 57

Nossal also reminds us that “sticking one’s
nose into someone else’s thorny and
intractable

problem can produce outcomes

Canada’s efforts

to stop the

civil

worsened an already

terrible situation.

order, mediation,

as

one had not anticipated.” 58 He gives

American bombing of North Vietnam

combat the Algenan

Whether seen

that

war

good

in

citizenship or self-righteous behavior, the
values of peace,

democracy and human

would

Ottawa always

reflect the

1965 and attempt to

1997 as examples where Canada’s involvement

rights

have guided Canadian actions on the

world stage. They have played a constitutive role
to say that

in

in foreign policy.

However,

this is not

acts accordingly, nor does so simply because
those actions

Canadian

identity or values. Clearly, there

pragmatism involved. As many have pointed

out,

is

a significant element of

Canada’s actions do not always

reflect

these principles, and foreign affairs officials often use the
peacekeeping or good citizen
roles to gain advantage;

economy, so

reliant

environment that

economic or otherwise on the world

stage.

The Canadian

on international trade clearly benefits from a predictable and peaceful

facilitates trade.

56

Ibid.

57

Dean Acheson, “Canada: ‘Stem Daughter of the Voice of God’,” in Neighbors Taken for
Granted: Canada and the United States, Livingston T. Merchant, ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 1966), 134-147.

58

Ibid, 10.
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However, Realists and others are
mistaken
this

to ignore the influential
role played

element of the Canadian identity.
The Cuba case examined

the problems related to relying
solely

Chapter Seven will demonstrate

Canada’s policy toward the

that

on the economic explanation of
Canadian

Am erican” and Canadian Foreip n Policy

asked for a description of what

become an

identity,

which often has

policy, is an intense desire to
be distinct

emphasize how Canada

differs

it

means

to be

from the United

a significant influence

from the United

States.

Canadian most Canadians

States.

will

Being “not American” has

inherent element of the Canadian identity.

Canadians have always been somewhat anxious
about
powerful neighbor.
about outright

Two

hundred years ago and occasionally

territorial annexation.

economic independence

their

since,

Today, they worry more about

vis-a-vis the United States.

much

in anti-free trade

commercials

that

commercials

in

in a series

their cultural

These commercials, referred

and

television.

news programs

More

recently,

of very popular Molson beer

which “Joe Canada” proclaimed Canadian uniqueness and

vis-a-vis the U.S.

more

During the Free Trade debates of the

dominated Canadian

anti-Americanism was given expression

larger and

Canadians worried

early 1980s these concerns were voiced daily in
Canadian newspapers,

and

actions.

economic motivations cannot adequately
explain

Another element of the Canadian

When

study demonstrates

island.

Being “Not

on Canadian foreign

in this

by

to as “I

am

superiority

Canadian,” started a wave of

national pride and demonstrate that Canadians continue to identify
themselves in relation
to the United States.

There

is

no sign

that this attitude

indicate that anti-American feelings are

on the
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rise in

is

changing. In

Canada.

A

fact,

2003 polls

February 2003 poll

reports that 40 percent of Canadians
want their country to

Only

States.

8 percent said they

wanted Canada

the lowest percentage expounding
this

to

become

become more

less like the

like the

United

United States,

view since 1996/1 997. 59

This need to emphasize their independence
from the United States has an
important influence on Canadian foreign
policy.

Americans

if

1989 poll asked Canadians and

they supported Canada and the United
States “adopting

identical policy related to

all

Canadians responded positively. 60
the statement that:

common

In a

was a good idea whereas under half of

2002

poll,

‘The U.S. has no business

65 percent of Canadians agreed with

telling

Canadians

to increase defense

to support U.S. foreign policy as these are
sovereign issues for

As would be

and

matters related to defense and foreign
affairs?” Nearly

eighty percent of Americans thought this

spending or

A

Canada.”

61

expected, this attitude influences the bilateral
relationship. Over the

years there have been countless disputes between the two
countries that can be traced to

Canadian insecurity about

their sovereignty in the face

of their

much more powerful

neighbor. For example, Canada has always considered the arctic
waters of the Northwest

Passage part of its

59

territory.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s

Ekos/CBC/SRC/Toronto Star/La Presse

(February 21, 2003) (http://www.ekos.com) (April

Poll, “Presentation to
3,

this

was an

Media

issue in

Partners,

Ottawa”

2003).

Macleans 102, no. 27 (July 31, 1989). Polls done in the last ten years continue to report similar
opinions. See for example, Canada Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of National
Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian Opinion on Canadian Foreign
Defence Policy and International Development Assistance (1995) conducted by Insight Canada

Policy,

Research.

61

(

Ekos/CBC/Toronto Star/La Presse

Poll,

“Canada-US Relations (December

http://www.ekos.com/admin/articles/6dec20Q2CanUS.pdf) (April
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2,

2003).

6,

2002)

Canadian-American relations as the United

States argued that the passage

international waters. Ottawa’s response
to this challenge reflected
the

was

common

perception that the United States has designs
on Canada. J.L. Granastein and
Robert

Bothwell describe the Canadian position:
“Canadian nationalist nerves were tetchy.

Canadians

felt their

resources were on the verge of another
American

government must step

in.”

62

In another example,

economic independence terms) was the

‘steal’

Canadian sovereignty

and the

(in cultural

and

crucial issue for Canadians during
the debates

over the Free Trade Agreement. During the
election debate in October 1988, John
Turner, the leader of the Liberal Party, declared
that the Free Trade Agreement
would

remove “the
to

political ability

of this country

remain as an independent nation

election....”

He

told

-

to [resist] the influence

that has

gone forever, and

I

am

that is the issue

States,

of the

Prime Minister Mulroney “With one signature of a pen,
you’ve...

thrown us into the north-south influence of the United
reduce us

of the United

sure, to a colony

go, the political independence

is

of the United

States,

States, because

sure to follow.”

and will reduce

when

the

us, will

economic levers

63

J.L.

Granastein and

Norman Hillmer

argue that in that debate “John Turner’s impassioned declarations
expressed the doubts

and fears of countless Canadians.

The Canadian concern over

profoundly influenced the course of Canadian-American

62

its

independence has

relations.

Granatstein and Bothwell, 80.

63

Quoted in J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worse: Canada and the
United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), 288.

64

Ibid, 289.
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The influence of this
bilateral relationship, as

the world, that

Canada

identity

on Canadian foreign policy goes
beyond

Canadians want to demonstrate

is

to themselves,

a distinct country with an
independent

set

the

and to the

of

rest

of policies. For

example, the Canadian government’s
recent embrace of the human
security agenda was
clearly influenced

by a wide range of factors, both
internal and external

the need to be different from the
United States

to

was acknowledged even by

statesmen. In Lloyd Axworthy's
introduction to

Human

Security

Canada

65
.

Yet.

senior

and The New

Diplomacy, he writes:

The best Canadian foreign policy remains an
independent policy based on our
competences and capacity to deliver.... This
independence is a credit to Canadians
and their desire to have a distinctive
significant given that

we

live

international voice. This is especially
next door to the world’s political, military,
and

economic superpower. Canadians want their country
to be more than a junior
They expect their government to have a voice

partner to the United States.

that

reflects their priorities

and concerns.... to promote an agenda of international
peace, security, and development 66
.

This change in the Canadian foreign policy paradigm,
one that embraces and promotes
this

new

definition of security,

decisions

made

in

Ottawa,

is

is

the result of many factors, but like

most foreign policy

influenced by the Canadian perception of their relationship

with the United States. This aspect of the Canadian identity, the
need

on the world

stage, has

to

be a distinct actor

had a major influence over a wide range of Canadian foreign

policies.

65

Human

security focuses on protecting individuals and includes initiatives like the campaign
to

ban landmines.

66

Lloyd Axworthy, “Introduction,” in Human Security and The New Diplomacy: Protecting
People Promoting Peace, Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds. (Montreal: McGuill-Queen’s University Press
2001 ), 8
.
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Conclusion
In 1974,

He

Canadian

historian, G.L. Granatstein
described the

Canadian self-image.

wrote: “All too often Canadians had
found themselves regarded as
Americans

they traveled abroad...." This did
not

when

well with Canadians. Granatstein
continued:

sit

The Americans,

after all, with their wild west,
shoot first image, their huge
mthtary forces and their world-wide net
of bases, advisors, and arm sales
had a
e
peaceftl1 Canadians Canadians
were middlemen, honest
hrol
brokers,
helpful fixers in a world where these
qualities were rare. 67

rr/,V

'

This image of Canada on the world stage
continues. Canadians see themselves
as
fulfilling a

very particular and important role in
world

Canadian teenager behind the counter
policy makers will

differs

tell

you a similar

from the American

at

the local

story

documents, and

in policies that direct

demonstrate that these

identities

Everyone from the

Tim Horton’s doughnut shop

of Canada’s international role and

role in the world.

and associated values and ideas are found

affairs.

in

As

this

chapter has

shown

to senior

how that

these identities

speeches and statements, government

Canadian global action. The next chapter

and values are

integral to

will

Ottawa’s approach toward

Cuba.

67

J.L. Granatstein,

1974 ): 14 - 19

“Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality,” Canadian Forum (August

.
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CHAPTER

7

CANADA’S CUBA POLICY

Introduction
In the four

emerged from
Batista,

and

a half decades since 1959,

when

Fidel Castro’s band of rebels

the Sierra Maestra mountains to
overthrow the regime of Fulgencio

Canada’s approach

to Castro has at times

been warm and inviting and

at other

times been termed “coldly correct.” Yet,
Ottawa has always maintained diplomatic

ties

and when possible, economic, educational and
cultural connections with the Castro
regime. Officially, the Canadian foreign policy
establishment contends that these

between the two countries
political rights

is

the best

method of encouraging

and democratization on the

greater respect for civil and

island. This policy is

most often referred

one of ’constructive engagement.’ Likewise, the Canadian
public continues
sympathetic
the

two

to Fidel

C astro and

to

to as

be

supports the maintenance of a close relationship between

countries.

Canada has maintained

this policy

take a very different approach has

toward the island even though the pressure to

come from many

quarters,

Canada’s primary trading partner, closest neighbor and
chapter explores the reasons

why Canada’s

Canadian economic

self-interest.

However,

factors that play a crucial role, such as

most seriously from

friend, the

United States. This

policy has developed in this way.

Ottawa’s approach toward the island

Cuban

ties

is

most often understood

this

reasoning ignores a number of other

Canadian values,

situation.

180

as a reflection of

identity,

and perception of the

.

These variables have been most
recently studied by constructivists.
Though most
scholars of Canadian foreign
policy are relatively
great potential to shed light

new to

constructivist analysis

it

has

on the Canadian global experience.
As one scholar of

Canadian foreign policy wrote: “One
potentially promising way of
rescuing the concept
[of middle powers]

is

category defined by

go down a constructivist route—to see
middle powers not as a

to

some

set

of objective

geoeconomic circumstances; but

attributes or

by objective

geopolitical or

rather as a self-created identity
or ideology. This

is,

for

example, a potentially promising way of
making sense of Canadian ‘middle-

powermanship’ with

its

emphasis on responsibility, morality, and
multilateralism.”

Adopting a constructivist approach,

I

will demonstrate that the

created identity and corresponding values
influence the

make sense of the Cuban
I

will

show

that there is

situation

self-

policy makers

and consequently, have an enormous impact
on policy.

much more

than a rational calculation of interests involved
in

determining policy toward Cuba. Policy makers rely
on:
2) their ideas

way Canadian

Canadian

1

and culture (which includes values) and

1) their

own

self-identities,

3) their perceptions

and

and images of

other actors and situations, in order to determine the
appropriateness of different actions

and/or policies.

The

2

first

part

of this chapter reviews the case of Cuba, highlighting important

Andrew

Hurrell, “Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers in
International
Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States No. 244(Washington
D.C
The Latin American Program, Working Paper Series, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars
Institutions,” in

March 2000),

2

The

1

‘logic

of appropriateness’

additional information, see

is borrowed from the organization/bureaucratic literature. For
James G. March and Johan P. Olson, Rediscovering Institutions: The

Organizational Basis of Politics

(New

York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 23.
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milestones in the Canadian-Cuban
relationshtp, then demons,
rating that Canadian identity

and values, as well as the Canadian
understanding of the Cuban
and images of Cuba), influences the
development of a
then outlines

how the Canadian approach

Evidence from interviews, the secondary

Canadian

identity, values

situation

perceptions

(i.e.

specific set of norms. This
study

toward Cuba evolved from those
norms.
literature,

and archival research confirm

that the

and resulting norms have influenced
the development and

continuation of this policy.

To

fully understand

Ottawa’s approach

to

Cuba

it

also necessary to problematize

the existing narrative. Thus, the second
part of this chapter addresses the
traditional

economic explanation

for

Canada’s policy toward Cuba. The economic
argument

without merit and contributes to a

demonstrate that

it

full

offers an incomplete account because

identity, perceptions,

s

resources.

will

ignores the impact of values,

relationship with

Brief Overview

Cuba has enjoyed a

Trade considerations dominated the relationship
centuries.

it

I

and norms on the formation of this policy.

A
Canada

understanding of the policy. However.

not

is

Cuban rum and sugar were
Canadian financial

rather quiet, yet long, history.

in the nineteenth

and early twentieth

traded for Canadian lumber and other natural

institutions

were also active

in

Cuba

prior to the

3

Trade increased fairly steadily into the first quarter of the twentieth century. In 1902
Canada
exported US$265,000 worth of goods to Cuba and imported US$396,000 in Cuban goods.
By 1910 these
figures wereUS$ 1,87 1,000 and US$1,259,000, and by 1925 they had reached
US$8,619,000 and US
$6,455,000 respectively. See Harold Boyer, “Canada and Cuba:

A

Study

in International Relations,”

Ph.D.

(Simon Fraser University, 1972) and James Rochlin, Discovering the Americas: The Evolution
of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994).
dissertation,
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revolution.

4

Canada established diplomatic
ambassadors

When Fidel

in 1950.

of Fulgencio Batista

in 1959,

relations with

Castro’s rebel

Cuba

1945 and exchanged

in

movement overthrew

Ottawa officially recognized

and consequently, maintained normal
relations with the

the government

his revolution as legitimate

new

5

regime. This policy has

continued throughout Castro’s reign.
Though generally warm, relations
between Canada

and Cuba have not always been friendly
as a number of issues including
Havana’s
involvement in African conflicts, have come
between the two countries. However,
formal
diplomatic relations have never been severed

Canadian investment
in

in

Cuba dramatically increased

as the

Chapter 3 shows Canada was the largest foreign
investor

Cold War faded. As Table
in

Cuba during

3

the 1990s. In

2002, Canada was Cuba’s third largest trading
partner, after Venezuela and Spain. 6
Official

Canadian development assistance was re-established

in 1994,

and since, the

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
has disbursed $35 million

development

projects.

that trade, investment,

and Cuban economies, but

and aid are not only good for the Canadian

that these contacts will

encourage a movement toward

John Kirk, Back in Business: Canada - Cuba relations
Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 1995), 7.

Canada and Mexico were
Havana during this period.

(

Cuban

7

Ottawa believes

6

in

after

50 years (Ottawa:

FOCAL

the only states in the hemisphere that maintained normal
relations with

Canada Department of Foreign

Affairs and International Trade,

“Canada-Cuba Relations,”

http://www.dfait-maeci.gov.ca/latinamerica/cubarelations-e.asp l January 23, 2002.

7

Ibid.
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democratization and improved

civil

and

political rights in
8

the policy, frequently termed
constructive engagement,

work with

the

change and

Cuban government and Cuban

political

Cuba. According to DFAIT,

“means a determined attempt

to

society in order to encourage
institutional

and economic opening.’’ This
includes raising human

rights issues

with the Castro government and
in multilateral forums
like the United Nations.
In 1997,

Ottawa and Havana signed a fourteen
point

Joint Declaration,

which established

cooperation between the two
governments in a number of areas, including

and good governance

issues."

For example,

this declaration established

human

rights

cooperation

between Canadians and Cubans on legal
andjudicial matters, counter-narcoties,
and

enhanced communication between the
Cuban and Canadian parliaments, ministries
of
health and

NGOs. 10

The Canadian embassy

in

Havana keeps

and non-governmental organizations active

in

in contact with

Cuba.

11

human

rights activists

People to people contact

is

an

important element of the Canadian approach.
Various Canadian organizations such as
universities

and cultural groups maintain links with Cuban
counterparts.

Recently, relations between Ottawa and Havana
have cooled somewhat. The
initial tallout

arose from a 1998 visit by Prime Minister
Chretien to Cuba. Chretien’s

8

Ibid.

9

Canada Department of Foreign

Affairs and International Trade, "Canada’s Relations with

Cuba

”

(http/Avww.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latin/cuba/8 1 600-e.htm).

l0

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada-Cuba Joint
Declaration
Implementation Checklist,” Provided to the author by David Kilgour, Secretary
of State (Latin America
and Africa), Ottawa (October 1999).

"

Ibid.
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personal pica on behalf of four
dissidents that were scheduled
to be tried in
ignored.

1

-

Cuba was

Relations worsened during the
subsequent 1999 Pan-American
games held in

Winnipeg. Fidel Castro charged that
Canada allowed sports scouts to
promote the
defection of Cuban athletes, withdrew
metals from

and

tried to

countries. Furthermore, the

backfired as the

enterprise.

with Cuba.

in

14

1

false charges,

disadvantage Cuban teams. 13 In
addition, a number of Cuban
students

attending Canadian universities defected
while

two

Cuban winners under

CIDA

in

program

Cuban government used

it

to

Canada, creating tension between
the

modernize the Cuban taxation system

to hinder the establishment

of private

At the same time, Canadian businesses
were becoming more

'

disillusioned

John Manley, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs who replaced Lloyd Axworthy

2000, took a

much

Americas meeting

government cooled

harder line with Cuba.

Quebec

in

City.

As

Cuba was

not invited to the

Summit of the

a result of these problems, the Chretien

relations with Cuba. Official high level
visits to

Cuba were suspended

and a number of joint projects were reconsidered.
Despite these problems there
of constructive engagement.

embassy

in

Havana

Cuban

trial

in

2000

is

virtually

The author was
that

step backward,

no discussion of ending Canada’s policy

told

by a senior

official in the

Canadian

even after these problems, on the ground relations

Axworthy

says,”

Globe and Mail March
,

3,

1999

13

“Castro: 1999 on PanAm Games, Excerpts from the speech
given by Dr. Fidel Castro, President
of the Republic of Cuba, related to the Pan American Games in Winnipeg,
Cienfuegos, Cuba, July 26 th
1999 ” (bttp2Avww.pbs.org/stealinghome/sport/castro99b.htmP January
31, 2002
,

.

.

14

Archibald Ritter, Speech delivered
Graduate School, Cuba Project, 2001.

15

Ritter,

to the City University

2001.
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of New York’s Queens College and

between the two countries remained
essentially unchanged. 16
bilateral relationship has

well. Despite

its

1, is

remarkable that the

weathered often-intense disputes
between the two countries so

ups and downs, Ottawa’s policy
toward Cuba remains one of

engagement.
Thus, engagement best describes the
Canadian policy toward Cuba for
the past
fifty years, despite, at times,

considerable international pressure
to follow the American

lead of breaking relations, isolating

Cuba and

putting

immense pressure on

the

Cuban

regime, and despite bilateral divisiveness
that could have potentially
caused very serious

schisms

in the

Canadian-Cuban

pressures because

perceptions.

particular

it

is

relationship.

The Canadian policy has withstood

these

a fundamental reflection of deeply
held Canadian values and self-

The following

section highlights the influence of
these variables on this

Canadian foreign policy.
Canada’s Cub a Policy: The Influence of Ideational
Factors

This section will demonstrate that Ottawa’s policy
toward Cuba
certain logic of appropriateness.

17

dictated

by a

A country that places a premium on stability, peace,

order, social justice, dialogue, democracy,

itself as

is

human

rights,

and mediation; and one

that sees

an international “good citizen,” peacekeeper, and as
“distinct from the United

States,” contributes to a certain perception of the

Cuban

situation

corresponding norms. These norms play a constitutive role

and the

rise

of a

in policy formation

set

of

and lead

Confidential interview with senior Canadian government official,
Havana, 2000.

See James G. March and Johan P. Olson, Rediscovering
of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 23.
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Institutions:

The Organizational Basis

to a policy

Canadian

dominated by engagement and
dialogue. This chapter explains
how the

identity as a

good

citizen,

perceptions and norms about

Cuba

peacekeeper and “not-American”
influence

and. hence, construct policy.

Jhe 'good
Canada’s approach toward Cuba

citizen'

is

influenced by their self-image as
a “good

international citizen ” This identity
reflects,
that include,

among

and Cuba

and

is

informed by, a particular

others, peace, stability, international
law, social justice

set

of values

and dialogue.

This section reveals the connection
between these values and identity and
policy toward

Cuba.
Hie Canadian focus on communication
and dialogue contributes

to their policy

of

engagement. The federal government has consistently
advocated dialogue with the Castro
regime. The Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade explains

“Canada’s hope
rights,

do

for

Cuba

is

that.

a peaceful evolution to a society with full
respect for

human

genuinely representative institutions and an open
economy. Canada has sought

to

through engagement and dialogue, rather than isolation.” 18
During Prime Minister

this

Chretien

s visit to

Cuba

in 1998,

he told a Cuban television audience

that their

countries, “have always chosen dialogue over confrontation,

engagement over

exchange over estrangement and emphasized

approach

than ever.”

that

“now

this

is

two
isolation,

more important

19

This emphasis on communication has influenced

many

policy decisions. For

18

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ’’Canada’s Relations with
Cuba,’’ 1999, (http://www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latin.. ,tinent=Latin&country-l l&name=81600).

1

’

Paul Knox,

“PM

uses

Cuban

TV

to

push trade links,” Globe and Mail, April 27, 1998.
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example, though

it

has not been a consistent
goal of Canadian policy, Ottawa
has been

one of the most vocal proponents
of Cuba’s re-entry
possible re-admittance into the

"me

has

Come

for a11

OAS. 2 »

In

into hemispheric bodies
including

1998 Lloyd Axworthy told the

0AS “embers to consider when the suspended
35

organization, Cuba, could once again
be seated

Santiago Plan of Action the

OAS members

at

the table.”

21

OAS

th

“surely the

member of the

However, under the

further reiterated the importance
of

democracy, effectively solidifying Cuba’s
suspension.

Communication

is

a key feature of the bilateral
relationship. Direct discussions

between Fidel Castro and senior Canadian

officials including

Prime Minister Trudeau,

Lloyd Axworthy, and Prime Minister Chretien
are examples of the influence
of these
values.

Though

spoken

to Fidel Castro directly about

they have frequently been frustrated
with the lack of results, each has

reflected this identity.

human

The Declaration

rights issues.

The 1997

Joint Declaration

states:

Both Ministers reaffirmed

the high value of the longstanding and
uninterrupted
between Canada and Cuba since its establishment in
1945
They underscored the fact that Canada-Cuba relations
have always emphasized'
the importance of maintaining a frank and open
dialogue in a spirit of mutual
respect, not only on issues in which both sides
agree, but as well on issues on
bilateral relationship

which they

The Declaration

20

21

differ.

also states:

Paul Koring, “Axworthy, Helms aide slug

Quoted

in

Peter

it

out on Cuba.” Globe

and Mail, March

7,

1998.

M. Boehm, Ambasssador and permanent

Organisaton of American States, “Notes for a Speech

Democracy," Miami, September

12,

to the

representative of Canada to the
Annual Meeting of the Cuban Committee

for

1998 ( http://.dfait-maeci.gcxa/oas/oas04d-e.htm l January 23, 2002.
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The Ministers emphasized their
mutual commitment and their right
to conduct
al relatlons on the basis
of the defense of International
Law
They
eiterated the commitment to
peace of their respective

J“ "

peoples and their common
promote social justice in an atmosphere
of stability and unity
y
based upon the consensus of their
respective citizens. 22

endeavours

to

’

Canadian policy toward Cuba has been
significantly shaped by the
emphasis on
international law,

communication and dialogue inherent

in the

Canadian psyche. These

elements within the “good citizen” identity
influence norms about Canadian
policy

toward Cuba. To Canadians, dialogue
creates a preference for

is

key

engagement over

to being a

Canadian Cuba policy: “was primarily
produce changes

that

Canada has a
intervention,

with

its

to

international citizen. This

and contributes

isolation

policies such as the 1997 Joint Declaration.
Lloyd

good

Axworthy

open up a dialogue

to the

development of

said that this major piece of
to see if we

can support and

would open the system up.”^
tradition

and deferring

of recognizing the government of the day,
supporting non-

to the principle

of sovereignty. Canada’s

own

preoccupation

sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States, and the knowledge
that one of its

provinces might attempt to leave the federation have
influenced
the issue of sovereignty.

However, the Canadian

that values international law, also

approach

to the principle

of sovereignty.

Fidel Castro’s regime, they believe he

is

legitimate leader of a sovereign state and thus, maintain that Cuba’s
sovereignty should

“ Canada Department of Foreign

22

Affairs and International Trade, “Joint Declaration of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Canada and Cuba,” (January 22, 1997).

23

PBS Online NewsHour, “Lloyd Axworthy,” (January 23, 1997)
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/january97/canada_l-23.html) (April

189

to

identity as a ‘good international citizen’

embodies a deference

However concerned Canadians might be about

this cautious

own

3,

2003).

a

be respected. Charles Ritchie,
the Canadian ambassador
to Washington during the

Dtefenbaker era wrote: -Do

we

consider what has happened in

revolution and not a Russian-inspired

Communist

take-over?...

Cuba
It is

as a popular social

unthinkable that

anything similar to the developments
in Cuba should occur in
Canada, but

should

we

not regard this as our

maintained this approach

to

own

Cuban

if

it

did,

business and resent intervention?”24
Ottawa has

sovereignty. For example, decades
later during the

Elian Gonzalez saga, officials
at the Canadian embassy in

Havana

told the author that

they thought the boy should be
returned to his father in Cuba. They
believed so because
that decision

would be

international

law

treated like

is

in

accord with international law, implying
not only that

a key concern for Canadians, but
also the belief that

any other sovereign

state.

The Canada

The importance given
their

to

Cuba should be

as a Peacekeeper

/

Helpful Fixer

mediation and peacekeeping within Canada

approach toward Castro’s regime. Ottawa has,

at

is

evident in

various times, attempted to

mediate between the United States and Cuba. For
example, Joe Clark, as Secretary of
State for External Affairs (1989-1991), attempted
to bring the

He

two

asserted in 1990 that: ‘Canada can't solve the contest
between

States, but

we may

well be able to create

some

sides closer together.

Cuba and

conditions... to create

the principle actors might move.” 26 Ottawa repeatedly
stresses

its

the United

some room where

willingness to

work

24

Quoted in John Kirk and Peter McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations: The Other
Good Neighbour
Policy (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 41. Originally
from Charles Ritchie, Storm

Signals:

More Undiplomatic Memories, 1962-1971

(Toronto: Macmillan, 1983), 16-17.

25

Interviews with senior Canadian government officials, Havana, 2000.

“6

Cited

in

Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations, 134.
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With the governments of Cuba
and the United States. Canada
credibility with each side, usually

tries to

by offering sympathy and support

maintain

its

to both while

encouraging policy change.- For
example, when speaking to
Americans they emphasize
that Ottawa and Washington
have the same goals, while
highlighting the benefits of

engagement over

isolation.

When

asked about the different
approaches

to the

regime
during a joint press briefing with
Madeleine Albright, Lloyd Axworthy
said “we share the

end objective, which

is to

chosen different methods.

see a transition in

it’s

Canada

into a democratic society.

We don’t think an embargo works....

has been through a form of engagement.
think

Cuba

We have

[0]ur approach to

We made some progress over the past

Cuba

year.

We

worth continuing that kind of engagement...” 28
Thus, subtly, and not so subtly,

tries to act as

a mediator between

The Canadian people

also

want

closest neighbor

its

their

government

and Cuba.

to act as a

mediator between the

United States and Cuba. In 2001 the Anglican
Church of Canada “urge[d] the Canadian

Government, through the Department of External
Affairs

Cuba and

the United States with a

view

to offer to mediate

to a normalisation

between

of relations between the two

countries and the reintegration of Cuba into the
Organisation of American States.” 29

Policy toward
the

Cuba

is

clearly influenced

by the importance placed on mediation by both

government and citizens of Canada. The Canadian peacekeeping

emphasis on mediation and contributes

to the

norm

that

identity

embodies an

Canada should mediate

international disputes. Thus, a key undercurrent of Canadian
policy toward

Cuba

is

an

attempt to mediate between the United States and Cuba.

This approach has

its risks.

At times

it

has angered both the Cubans and the Americans.

28

U.S. Department of State “Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Canadian
Foreign
Minister Axworthy: Remarks in Press Briefing,” Ottawa, March 10, 1998

(http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980310a.html) February 22, 2002.

29

•

Anglican Church of Canada, “Resolution A280: Cuba,”
http://www.anulican.ca/gs200
(
l/rr/resolutions/resolution.php?res+a280 ) February 22, 2002.
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The values and

cmzen

identity associated with

Canada’s “helpful fixer” and
“good

roles in world affairs has
played an important role in
the design and
development

of policy toward Castro’s regime.
This emphasis on mediation
and dialogue produces a

norm

that extols the virtues

of engagement and thus
contributes

to the

Canadian decision

not to isolate the Castro regime.
However, other aspects of the
Canadian identity also
factor into the policy.

The next subsection

will highlight

how

the tendency toward anti-

Americanism has influenced Canadian
behavior toward Cuba.

Canada

as

“Not

Am e rican” and

Cuba Policy

Canada’s policy of ‘constructive
engagement’ toward Cuba has been
held up as
an example of independence vis-a-vis
the U.S. since 1959. While
reflection

of Canadian values and represents other
elements of the Canadian

emphasis on being non-American has played
an important
beginning. In

many

respects

Cuba

They can take an independent
since

this policy is a clear

Cuba

is

role in this policy since

its

represents a relatively “safe” issue for
the Canadians.

stance on this issue without fear of
significant reprisal

not one of the principal concerns of American
foreign policy makers. 30

Cuba became
administration.

The

President John F.

Castro's Cuba.

a symbol of Canada's independence during
the Diefenbaker

personalities of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker
(1957-1963) and

Kennedy (1961-1963) shaped

the

two

countries’ policies toward

The emphasis Diefenbaker placed on Canadian independence
was one of

the most significant factors that

would influence the development of Ottawa’s policy

toward Cuba. The Prime Minister was known for his nationalism and
tended

30

identity, the

to react

However, occasionally the Canadian government opposes American foreign policy
on more
The Canadian decision to oppose the 2003 US war with Iraq is a recent example.

significant issues.
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strongly against any real or
perceived American pressure.
This perception was greatly

reinforced by what has

become widely known among
Canadians

as the

Rostow memo.

His relationship with President
Kennedy, and his belief , ha, the
Kennedy administration

was attempting

memo
The

to 'bully'

accidentally

memo

left

stated that

him, worsened after the Prime
Minister found an American

by the President’s staff following
a meeting between the two
men.

Kennedy should “push” Diefenbaker on
a number of issues

Forgoing polite diplomacy, Diefenbaker
did not return the
with

it,

which

memo

31
.

but instead wen, public

infuriated the President. This
animosity intensified Diefenbaker's
desire to

forge an independent Canadian
foreign policy, particularly over
Cuba, since

seemed focused on moving Canada on

this issue.

Kennedy

Furthermore, tending to see Kennedy
as

a bully, he sympathized with Castro’s
determination to char, a course independent
of

American influence

32
.

Tension between Canada and the United States
over Cuba came
the

Cuban

missile crisis,

and implied

that the

when Diefenbaker

to a

head during

refused to put Canadian forces on

American version of events was possibly

unreliable.

full alert

Kennedy once

again voiced his anger, and Diefenbaker in turn
became more determined to take an

independent path on

this issue.

American lead over Cuba. At

The

stage

this time,

was thus

set.

Canada would not follow

Canada and Mexico were

the Americas that did not acquiesce to U.S.

demands

the

the only countries in

to sever relations with

Cuba

Though Cuba was not mentioned in this memo it convinced Diefenbaker to not follow
American lead on many issues. Cuba soon became a sore point in the bilateral relationship
and

in

the

eventually

developed into a symbol of Canadian independence.

See Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended
Border (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990) for a detailed discussion of the relationship between
the
two leaders.
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accord with the hemispheric
vote

Canadian independence

at

Punte del Este in 1962.

Cuba became a symbol of

in foreign affairs.

Every prime minister since has
been concerned about appearing
too pro-American.
Policy toward

Cuba has been

highlighted by each administration
as an example of their

determination to chart an independent
foreign policy for Canada.
However, Prime
Minister Pieire Trudeau (1968-1979;
1980-1984)

Canadian dependence on the United
has increasingly found

it

was

especially concerned about

Of the United

States.

Trudeau

America and

growing consciousness amongst Canadians
of the danger

to

our national identity from a

economic, and perhaps even military point of
33
view.” This was reflected

policy

was

country. First,

way

to increase

it

ties to

Trudeau government

first

leader of an

A

feature of

Cuba. Cuba was an important Third Option

served simply as an additional trading partner.
Second,

for the

Trudeau was the

Canada’s

to distinguish

American

Canada from

it

represented

the United States.

ally to officially visit Castro’s

Cuba.

Even Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984-1993), widely recognized
the

most pro-American Canadian prime

in the

that attempted to

reduce Canada’s vulnerability to the U.S. by
diversifying Canadian trade.

another

“Canada

that is reflected in a

Trudeau government’s promotion of the “Third
Option,” a policy

this

said,

important to diversify channels of
communication because of

the overpowering presence of the
United States of

cultural,

States,

minister, did not

34

as being

commit Canada’s support

to the

33

J.L Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 195.

34

James Guy, “The growing relationship of Canada and

(July-August, 1977),

6.
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and Canadian Foreign Policy

the Americas,” International Perspectives

embargo. In

fact,

he sent Louise Frechette, the
then Assistant Deputy Minister
for Latin

American and the Caribbean,
importance of Canadian
in

Havana during

the

-

Cuba

to

Cuban

in the spring

cooperation.

Mulroney years

of 1990 where she stressed
the

A senior official

at the

Canadian embassy

told the author that the
opportunity for

Prime

Minister Mulroney to demonstrate
to Canadians that he was
not an American “lapdog”

was an important reason behind
those years.

the continuation of Canada’s
policy toward

Prime Minister Jean Chretien
(1993-) has been even more adamant

Cuba

Cuba

in

35

that

Canada’s

policy remains distinct from
American policy toward the island. Andre
Ouellet,

Chretien’s

that this

first

Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted,
“I also indicated to Mr.
Christopher

government was determined

By being independent

we want

to see action

the end of the

I

do not mean

to set

that

its

we

own

independent course

are opposed to the

in foreign policy.

American policy but

being taken with a Canadian point of view
in mind. Our hope to see

American commercial embargo against Cuba

is

a clear affirmation of our

A senior official with the Canadian government during this period told

wish.

that

the

author that the need to be distinct from the United
States was just as important as any
other reason for Canada’s policy of engagement. 37

The enactment of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 has incensed
Canadians and
to

even more of a desire to oppose the American policy. The federal
government’s

35

36

parliament,

37

Author interview with former embassy

Andre Ouellet, “Canadian Foreign
March 15, 1994, 2259.

•

official,

Policy,”

Ottawa, October 1999.

Commons

Debates 133, no.37,

st

1

session, 35

•

Confidential interview with senior Canadian government official, Ottawa, October 1999.
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th

led

••Cuba: Trade

to

and Economic Overview” has
a section devoted

Helms-Burton.

It

states

“Canada does not

to the

Canadian response

tolerate the extra-, erritoria,
application

of

foreign laws contrary to our
laws and policy and accordingly
expects Canadian

companies

to carry out business

foreign country.” 38

A

1996

under the laws and regulations
of Canada, not those of a

poll revealed that only five
percent

of Canadians

Canadian government should ban trade
with Cuba and almost half wanted
retaliatory trade sanctions against
the

United States. 39

officials interviewed told the
author that

felt that

the

to institute

A majority of senior Canadian

Ottawa’s reaction to Helms-Burton
was

foremost an issue of Canadian sovereignty
vis-a-vis the United States, and

much

first

and

less so

about Canada’s relationship with Cuba.

Canadian policy toward Cuba was heavily
promoted and defended by Ouellets’
successor, Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy’s
policies were reminiscent of Trudeau’s
Third

Option approach.

He

actively sought to strengthen Canada’s
ties to other countries in an

effort to refocus policy

away from

Axworthy and Roy MacLaren,
of the Americas:

A Liberal

document stressed

that

relations.

outlined

by

Policy for Canada in the Western Hemisphere.”
This

Canada needed

More

was

the then Liberal critic for international trade,
in the “Part

Axworthy’s policy on Cuba was

American

the United States. This policy

to diversify

clearly influenced

its ties

by

to the rest

his position

so than past foreign ministers,

of the hemisphere.

on Canadian-

Axworthy was known

for his

outspoken opposition to the U.S. embargo of Cuba. In 1998 Axworthy
and Senator Jesse

38

39

“Cuba: Trade and Economic Overview,” (http://www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/cubatrade.htm).

Gallup

Poll, April 4, 1996.
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Helms exchanged heated words
over Cuba. Axworthy declared
“The whole embargo and
«he Helms-Burton

bill is totally

counterproductive.

I,

just doesn’t work...

a form of economic victimization
through the embargo.’’*

with the United Nations
for

them

in the early

1

Cuba

is

A senior Canadian diploma,

990s told the author that Cuba
was a “cheap

[the Liberal Party] to
distinguish

facing

Canada from the U.S.”

Canada’s unique relationship with
the United States has

way

41

infiltrated

most areas of

Canadian foreign policy, and policy
toward Cuba stands out as a
particularly relevant

example of this dynamic. Since Diefenbaker
angrily
mtssile crisis that, “That

young man has go,

said of

to learn that

he

Kennedy during
is

the

Cuban

not running the Canadian

government," Canadian prime ministers,
the foreign policy establishment,
and the public

have

held

all

policy over

relations

-

Cuba up

as an example of Canadian
42
independence. For

Cuba would involve much more than
it

would

Canada

to reverse

a recalculation of Canadian-Cuban

require a fiindamental adjustment
in Canadian thinking about
their

relationship with their largest neighbor, or
a very creative spin on the trilateral story
that

would allow Canada

to

keep

its

pride and maintain every appearance of
not “bowing to

the Americans." Thus, the Canadian identity
as “not American” creates
that

Canadian foreign policy ought
Clearly,

They

much of Canadian

are alike for

40

41

42

to be

norms

that argue

independent from American foreign policy.

foreign policy

is

similar to

American foreign

two main reasons. One, because Canadian and American

policy.

interests

Koring, “Axworthy, Helms”.

Interview with a former senior Canadian official with the United
Nations,

Quote from Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker,
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New

York, September

often coincide and, two,
because Ottawa often feels
pressured to adopt similar
policies.

Cuba has stood out

for a

number of reasons. Cuba

and international attention

at the

same time

Canada and

American

as the relationship between
President

Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker
was
helpful fixer identities in

issues began to attract both

deteriorating.

Given the good

and

citizen

the exceptional ist identity
in the United States the

two leaders disagreed on what was
happening

in

Cuba and how

to best respond.

Cuba

became a symbol of the animosity between
Kennedy and Diefenbaker and of the
Canadian leader’s desire

to

keep Canadian foreign policy

distinct.

Thus, Cuba grew to be

a symbol of Canada’s independence
in foreign policy, influencing
the direction of policy

toward the island ever
In

since.

summary, the

identities

and values reflected by the good

citizen, helpful fixer

and anti-American roles have had a significant
impact on Canadian policy

to

Cuba

because they not only create boundaries on
possible actions, but actually work
construct certain policies.

is

The norm

that

“engagement

is

to

the best approach toward

Cuba”

a direct outcome of Canada’s emphasis on values
such as mediation, dialogue and the

desire for international stability and order.
Canadians believe isolation

with either mediation or dialogue. They also argue
engagement
policy and,

Canadian

is

is

is

not an antagonistic

thus, less likely to lead to instability. This section
has also

identity as

“not-American” contributes to

essentially the opposite of the

toward Cuba runs deep.

It is

American goal

their policy

not compatible

shown

that the

of engagement, as

to isolate the regime. Thus,

it

is

Canada’s policy

a reflection of strongly held Canadian values and identity.
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Canadian Perceptions of Tnh;,
Another important pathway

front identity to

norms and policy outcomes

of perceptions. Our identity and
the ideas and values within
that

way we

way

identity, influence the

perceive situations and perceptions
limit the possibilities of
actions. This

subsection reveals

Cuban

travels the

situation,

how Canadian

values and identity lead to certain
perceptions of the

and thus, constructs policy.

The Canadian emphasis on

social justice

and the Canadian

identity as “not

-

American ” have influenced

Canada

overall positive.

is

the

way

they see Fidel Castro. The
perception of Castro in

Many Canadians admired

Castro

The young Jean Chretien was one of those
who held him
reporter that Castro

regime...

was

“was a very popular person,

He had been

in jail,

he had risked his

a

when he overthrew

in great

esteem. Chretien told a

young man taking on

life,

Batista.

the Batista

he wanted to change society... he

a star for a lot of us .” 43 Prime Minister
Diefenbaker identified with Castro because
he

saw him

as the leader of another state that must
contend with the overwhelming presence

of the United

States. Largely, all

Diefenbaker. Canadians
struggling against a

In the

43

much

similarities

this

sentiment with

perceive Fidel Castro as somewhat of a lone
ranger,

larger force in order to establish a better society.

same way, many Canadians

emphasize the

communist

still

prime ministers since have shared

feel

a natural connection to Cuba and tend to

between the two countries and

differentiate

Cuba from

countries. Trudeau's foreign policy advisor, Ivan Head,
said that

Bruce Wallace, “Jean and Fidel,” Macleans

3, 19
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(May

11, 1998): 30.

other

Cuba

represented “a departure from
classical

Communism. There

is

an opportunity

to

work

With these guys in the multilateral
field.- In 1998 the House
Speaker. Gilbert Parent

defended the Castro regime by
comparing

government of New Brunswick, where
provincial election. Parent said

in

it

to

Premier Frank McKenna’s one
party

1987, the Liberal Party

won

“You know, we do have some of our

all

58 seats

in that

provinces where

they only elected one party-I’m
thinking of New Brunswick....
I’ve never heard anyone

say that they weren’t carrying out
the wishes of their people
think

for us to dictate or tell other
people

it’s

referred to

Cubans

prisoners.

how to

down

there. Besides,

I

don’t

run their countries.” 45 Parent
also

as “fellow parliamentarians” and
discussed their “so-called political

Though

Parent s remarks did encounter
considerable criticism from other

members of the House of Commons, they do

represent a tendency toward a

favorable perception of Castro’s regime in
47
Canada. This perception

is

more

rooted in both a

desire to be independent from the United
States- notice Parent’s remarks
regarding
dictating to other countries’- and the

emphasis on social justice

These more positive perceptions of Castro and

his

in the

Canadian

government lead

such as the Joint Declaration. Canada’s policy of
engagement assumes
to

change the current Cuban government. The Joint
Declaration,

44

47

to policies

it

is

possible

was chiefly

Quoted Granatstein and Bothwell, 274.

MPs

46

that

that

identity.

irate

over

Cuba comments: House speakers remarks

“Canada’s Cuban Confusion,” Globe and Mail, March

assailed,”

Miami Herald, March

11, 1998.

This perception was also evident during interviews with senior Canadian

200

officials.

1

1,

concerned with increasing ,he
dialogue between Canada and
Cuba, was based on

this

assumption. Jus, after the Join,
Declaration was signed, Axworthy
said tha, he believed:
-that there are

some changes

worth making an effort

to

respect for our differences

with Cuba.”

taking place.

promote them.

on

this

I

. .

approach

in

Canadian

rights situation in

perceive

we may be

human

rights in

Cuba

potential

change

Cuba

can maintain a healthy

some

They

Canadians

American

social rights,

also believe

are very possible, and thus, are

real

changes

more

related to

programs. This

to conceptualize the

counterparts. Canadians

and thus, look more

improvements
easily

Canadian

in civil

and

political

encouraged by signs of

in these areas.

1990s Ottawa was confident that the

was improving. In 1996

helped lead to reform. Cuba

human

state

of human rights

in

Cuba

the Secretary of State, Christine Stewart told
an audience in

Ottawa This constant dialogue

in

economic and

is directly

their social welfare

differently than their

rights as including

In the early

changes too,

we

they’ll go, bu, a, leas, it’s

able to see

Cuba

rights in

political culture leads

kindly on Castro’s nghts record.

48

think as long as

I

and values. Canadians pride themselves
on

emphasis inherent

human

where

48

The way Canadians perceive human
identity

can’, predict

is

that

Cuba has had with Canada and

moving ahead with changes

rights areas.”

49

In

to

other countries has

economic

policy. There are

1998 Prime Minister Chretien told a reporter

PBS

Online NewsHour, “Lloyd Axworthy,” (January 23, 1997)
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/january97/canada_l-23.html) (April

3,

2003).

49

“Notes of an Address by the Honourable Christine Stewart, Secretary of State (Latin America
and Africa), to the Symposium on Helms-Burton and International Business Sponsored by the
Canadian
Foundation for the Americas and the Center for International Policy,” Ottawa (May
(http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/statements/96 state/96 023e.htm
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)

16,

1996)

February 22, 2002.

.hat -I think

change; the
reporters in

he [Castro]
fact that

1

998

I

changing. The fact that

is

met the Cardinal

“We made some

the Pope’s visit, agreed to accept
a

changes.”

Canada.”

is

Lloyd Axworthy told

We think it’s worth

We have for example, just recently, as a

number of political

a large

prisoners,

who

will

follow-up to

be coming

51

In 1999,

Axworthy described

these changes in

Cuba

as “major

52

Although Canadian
potential tor

at least

in public...” 50 Similarly,

progress over the past year.

continuing that kind of engagement.

directly to

my speech was on the air

human

some reason

rights

officials

have become more disillusioned with
Cuba’s

improvement than they were

to be hopeful.

Canada remains concerned about

A 2001

in the 1990s,

government document

the “continued lack of respect in

they continue to see

states that

Cuba

though

for civil

and

political rights,” they stress that:

On

the other hand, systematic violations of the
integrity of the person (torture,

forced disappearances,

summary executions) have not occurred since the early
1960s. Despite a deterioration in services due to the
state of the economy, Cubans
continue to enjoy widely accessible systems of health,
education and social
security. ,..[T]he Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister continue to raise

human

rights concerns directly with the Cuban government,
and provide
leadership to other Western counterparts who are only now
beginning to engage
with Cuba. Canada is also working hard to support the creation
of practical space

for

50

non-governmental actors in Cuban society, including improved practices
with

Bruce Wallace,

“I

Think He

is

Changing,” Macleans

1

1

1,

no. 19

(May

1

1,

1998).

“Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright and Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy
Remarks in
March 10, 1998,”

Press Briefing Ottawa, Canada,

( http://secretary .state.gOv/www/statement.s/1

52

(March

Jeff Sallot,

“Cuba

998/9801 0a html) February 22, 2002.
1

Policy Gives Ottawa Leverage for Change,

17, 1999).

202

PM

Says,” Globe

and Mail

unconditional release of political
prisoners

th

53
.

Despite the recent disappointments,
Canadians remain hopeful that
Castro’s Cuba win

move toward
engagement

a greater respect for

will

human

They

rights.

still

believe their policy of

encourage more changes than a
policy based on

isolation.

Canadian government documents concerned
with Cuba are careful
civil

and

political rights

from economic and

social goals

stress,

“Cubans continue

to

education, and social security .” 55 Canadians

demarcate

of the Cuban revolution. Foreign

policy officials stress that economic
and social rights are respected

above, Canadians

to

54
.

As

in the

quote

enjoy widely accessible systems
of health,

may

not agree with

communism

but they are

sympathetic to what they understand to be Castro’s
goals. Prime Minister Chretien has
said Castro, “still wants to use

communism;

politician- that doesn't

don’t have goals, that

I

mean

I

I

don’t believe in

m just not doctrinaire on the means. My view

there will be

more money

for

governments

I’m not in politics to make the rich
different technique.

53

18,

The values

richer.

is

I

I’m a

practical

don’t want to have social justice.

we have

to give to

it...

to

people

have growth

who

world so

are suffering in society.

Castro wants the same thing.

that contribute to a greater

in the

He has a

emphasis on economic and

Canada- Cuba Relations (http/Vwww.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/cubarelations-e.asp)
March

2002.

4

Confidential interviews with Canadian officials in Ottawa and Havana, 1999
and 2000.

55

Canada Department of Foreign

Affairs and International Trade, "Canada’s Relations with

(http//www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latin/cuba/8 1 600-e.htm).

56

Bruce Wallace, “Jean and Fidel,” 30.

My emphasis.
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Cuba”

social rights within

more sympathy

Canada

for the

(at least

when compared

economic and

social goals

Canadians also identify with the current
regime
Canadians perceive the revolution and
critical

of the regime and more

Engagement thus becomes

None of these

why Canada has

its

in

to the

United States) give Canadians

of the Cuban revolution. As
such.
Cuba. Consequently, because

goals in this

way they

likely to favor less drastic

are

more

likely to

be less

measures to encourage change.

the preferred policy.

identities, values,

and perceptions are enough, alone,

to explain

maintained a policy of engagement toward
the Castro regime for over

four decades. Yet, taken together
these variables reinforce each other
and direct policy in

one

direction. Interviews,

government documents, policy statements
and press releases

reveal the crucial undercurrent played by
these identities and perceptions.

all

Though other

countries have had similar relationships with
Cuba, Canada has stood out as one of

Cuba’s closest friends

in the

West, despite the

fact that as a close friend

and neighbor of

the United States, Ottawa has been under the
greatest pressure to “get in line” with
policy.

As

US

such, the Canadian-Cuban relationship has been
the focus of many scholarly

endeavors. The next section reviews the most popular
explanation put forth by these
scholars for this policy and points out the problems with
this account of the relationship

between the two countries.
Other Explanations
National economic interest arguments are frequently put forth to justify
Canada’s
role in

world

affairs. In

Canada’s involvement

1

in

999, Axworthy told an audience in Princeton,

Kosovo was

tied to

increasingly interconnected world, where

we

Canada’s national

New Jersey that

interest because: “in

are travelers, exporters and importers.
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an

investors and donors,

we cannot

afford to ignore the problems
of others

wanted to.- Yet, as scholars of
Canadian foreign policy have potnted
case,

-[new Canadians

same can be

travel there, export to or

said of virtually all the other
places

from

there, or invest

- even

if

out, in the

money

where the Canadian Forces

we
Kosovo

there.

The

recently have

been deployed on peacekeeping or
peace enforcement missions .” 58
Thus, the national
interest is not always, or

some would

argue,

is

rarely,

enough

to explain

Canadian foreign

policy.

Yet, a variant on this argument

most often put forward as the explanation

is

Canada’s Cuba policy. Current Canadian
scholarship emphasizes the

role

Ottawa’s approach toward Cuba. Trade
does have a significant impact on
its

of trade

for

in

this policy but

influence has often been exaggerated.
For example, the popular impression
that the

Diefenbaker government welcomed the
American embargo as a potential windfall for

Canadian business

Canada

that

is

not correct.

Many

to profit

from the tension

Canadian-American Committee,

Quoted

in

to

59

visit

.

Cuban

relations.

According

The Canadian government did not

to the

invite the

Prime Minister Diefenbaker asserted

that

it

is

Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Lloyd Axworthy’s Legacy,”
International Journal

(Winter 2000-2001):

1

in U.S.-

this is false.

mission and was embarrassed by the

LVI, no.

of the Cuban Trade Mission

occurred very shortly after the U.S. embargo was
initiated as evidence that

Canada attempted

57

cite the visit

2.

58

Ibid, 2.

Canadian-American Committee, Canada’s Trade with Cuba and Canadian-American Relations
1961), 6. The Canadian-American Committee was ajoint committee of the Private Planning
Association of Canada and the National Planning Association, USA, which included leaders
of big business
(February

in

6,

both countries.
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“not our purpose to exploit the
situation arising from the
United States embargo, and

have no intention of encouraging
what

in effect

would amount

to the bootlegging

we

of

goods of United States origin.” 60
In addition, while

Canadian exports

to

American embargo, so did Canadian
exports
to

Cuba

Cuba

to other Latin

American

countries. Exports

rose from $17.5 million in 1955
to $52.6 million in
1965, a three-fold increase.

However, exports

to

Argentina went from $6.8 million to
$32.7 million

years, an almost five-fold increase;
and exports to

million to $73 million during that
to be substantial,

mere

did increase after the introduction
of

five percent

it

same

period.

in the

same

ten

Venezuela increased from $30.8

Even though

this bilateral trade continues

comprises a relatively small percentage
of Canada's overall trade, a

61
of total Canadian exports to Latin
America.

Additionally,

many Canadian companies

because of the special

difficulties related to

are hesitant about investing in

Cuba

Cuba’s economic system. The Canadian

government counsels caution. The government publication
Cuba: A Guide for Canadian
Business warns potential investors
risks are substantial.”

relatively

62

that,

“Cuba

Thus, though trade

minor and risky market

for

is

is

not for the timid or the unprepared. The

important to Canada, Cuba represents a

Canadian businesses.

Furthermore, according to a senior trade specialist in the
Department of Foreign

60

Ibid, 7

61

Statistics

(Statistics

Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean: Exports and Imports: December 1996

Canada, Merchandise Trade

Statistics,

May

1997).

62

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Cuba:
Business (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, July 1997), 5.
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A

Guide

for

Canadian

Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT), Canadians did not

Cuban Democracy Act and

the

Cuban Liberty and Democratic

they might interfere with Canadian
trade with Cuba.
that the bills are further

The

beeome incensed about

evidence that the U.S.

extraterritoriality provisions

is

They were angry because they

law.

companies

Given Canada’s strong

American encroachment,
concerns for Canadian

-

it

in

fully respect

American

tradition

is

think

attempting to dictate Canadian
policy.

to

Canadian sovereignty. 63

Additionally, various aspects of
Helms-Burton, such as Title
citizens to sue foreign

Solidarity Act because

were disturbing because they offer
further evidence

Canadians that the United States does not

the

III

that

allows American

courts, are not in accord with
international

of support

for international

law and concern over

not surprising that these considerations
predominate over

Cuban

trade, demonstrating that trade with

Cuba

is

not the only

reason behind the current policy of engagement.
It

trade considerations were Canada’s

American attempts
American trade

to

to the

discourage Canadian

-

main

Cuban

Canadian economy, then

bow to American pressure.

it

priority vis-a-vis

Cuba, given

trade and the importance of

would follow

that

Canada would

Canada’s relationship with the United States

is

likely

much more

important than any benefits accrued from trade with Cuba.
Trade with the United States
represents eighty-four percent of Canadian exports and accounts
for twenty-eight percent

of Canadian GDP. 64 The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs
others largest trading partner, with US$1.2 billion in trade

now

asserts:

“We are

crossing the

each

Canada-US

63

Confidential interview with senior Canadian government official, Ottawa, October 1999.

64

Canada Department of Foreign

Affairs and International Trade,
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Canada

-

U.S. Relations, 1999.

border every single day.” 65 In
2002, Canada’s

total

exports to

Cuba were Cnd. $259

million. In comparison, in
2002, Canada’s total exports to the
United States

$346

billion.

Import figures are similar- Canada’s

Cnd. $325milhon and from the United
States a

total

total

imports from

of Cnd. $218

David Malone, a former Canadian
Deputy Ambassador
a specialist in Canadian

-

were Cnd.

Cuba amounted

billion.

66

to the United Nations

Caribbean relations, emphasized to the
author

to

that

and

even small

aspects of Canadian trade with the
U.S. outweigh the importance of all
Canadian trade

with Cuba.

He

asserted that the

Canada’s trade with them.

It is

“Cubans have an erroneous view of the
importance of
not nearly as crucial to

stressed that Canada’s relationship with

Cuba

is

Canada as they assume.” 67 He

“more so about Canada’s place

also

in the

world, the importance of the rule of law and
the feelings in Canada about American
interventions in Latin

the

Canada-Cuba

America and only recently have economic

relationship.”

68

issues been important in

Thus, there are more than trade considerations
at work.

The importance placed on Canadian sovereignty

vis-a-vis the U.S.

is

a factor, as are the

other ideas prevalent in the Canadian psyche.

“Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada- United
States: Trade
and the Economy,” ( http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?mid=l&cat=
1029 1 April 4, 2003.

“Canada
Canadian

Industry Canada, “Trade Data Online,” (http://strategis.gc.ca t

,

dollars.

“interview with Dr. David Malone,

New York

Ibid.
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City,

September

1,

1999.

April 4, 2003. Figures in

Conclusion

Canadian foreign policy

is

a complex reflection of many
variables. Without a

doubt, Canadian leaders have
manipulated the Canadian public
and have used these
variables to hide other

However,

more

self-interest

based policy objectives such as
furthering trade.

values, identity, and perceptions
play a leading role in most
Canadian actions

on the world

stage.

The motto “peace, order and good
governance” which

includes values

such as mediation, dialogue, respect
for international law and social
justice, among
others, is taken seriously by both the
foreign policy establishment and the
Canadian

public.

The Canadian

“distinct

identity as a

“good international

citizen,” “peacekeeper,”

and as

from the United States” are also deeply
interwoven into foreign policy

decisions. Everything from the Canadian
perception of Fidel Castro to the decision
to

negotiate the historic Joint Declaration

And

in the late

1990s are influenced by these variables.

while the traditional economic explanation
for Canada’s Cuba policy

weight,

we

variables.

cannot afford

Cuba

is

to

clearly an

ignore that this policy

is

example of the degree

be value and identity driven.

209

driven by

to

is

not without

more fundamental

which Canadian foreign policy can

CHAPTER 8

CUBA POLICY

IN

TANDEM: PERCEPTIONS, VALUES AND
IDENTITIES
Introduction

Americans and Canadians not only
share the world’s longest
undefended border
but are the closest of friends.

Over 200 million people

from both countries often work,

Most people on both

live or

sides of the

49

cross the border each year.

have friends or

1

People

relatives in the other country.

,h

view

parallel

nearest relative or friend. Consequently,
these

their

neighbor as

we might view our

two peoples share many world-views
and

values.

Yet, despite these similarities,
important differences exist. This

of foreign policy.

The United

States and

Canada have very

is

particularly true

different views about their

respective roles on the world stage. Clearly,
the fact that the United States

superpower and Canada

is

a relatively minor (or middle) power

the daily foreign policy calculations

country

s

more than

policy toward

Cuba

in

tandem,

own

identities,

As Chapter Five

1

in

Ottawa or Washington. By examining each
chapter will demonstrate that there

is far

two countries are

different in other

ways- they have

this island regime.

demonstrated, the American identity as an exceptional nation had

Canada Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Border- Update 2000, (Minister of Public

Works and Government
(

this

an important factor

values and perceptions that contribute to the formation of very

approaches toward

distinct

in

a

these strategic, realist calculations involved in the
formulation of foreign

policy. Differences exist because the

their

made

is

is

Services Canada, 2000)

http://www.cic.izc.ca/enulisli/nub/border2000/border2000.htmn (August 27, 2002).

210

a major influence on their
approach toward Cuba.

Canada's identity as an international
good

had a similarly important influence
on

And

citizen,

their

as Chapter

Seven showed.

peacekeeper and as “not American”

approach toward

this

same

will further illustrate, through
direct comparison, that these
identities

corresponding values contribute

to the disparate policies

We must remember that, especially
Ottawa and Washington claim
a more democratic and
routes to that

same

human

goal,

to

in the

in

rights respecting state.

resemble their neighbor’s approach-

in

and their

of isolation and engagement.

in

mind- the

Yet, the

transition

powers
to deal

that

movement

both countries to adopt policies
that

Canada many

to get their

of Cuba into

two have chosen opposite

feel the foreign policy

establishment has been naive and want a harsher
line taken with Castro;
States there is a strong

This section

post-Cold war era, policy makers
in

have the same ends

and despite movements

state.

government

to try

in the

engagement

United

- the

be continue to be relatively confident that
their policy remains the “best way

By examining

with Castro.”

profile post-Cold

War

the

American and Canadian reactions

two high-

issues that captured the attention of the
public and officials in both

countries this chapter illustrates

how the different

identities

and their associated ideas and

values translate into unique perceptions, distinct norms
and thus, policies.

examine the Brothers

to

to the

Rescue shoot-down

in

we

1996, and second, the renewed

speculation that Castro’s regime in involved in terrorism in
2002-2003,
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First,

and Helms-Rurtnn

On

February 24, 1996, the Cuban
government shot down two planes
flown by the

Cuban- American group. Brothers
initially

formed

to assist

the Florida Straits,

would spot these

to the

Rescue. This group, founded in
1991. was

Cubans who ventured out

in

often-unseaworthy vessels, across

headed for American shores. The
Brothers

rafts

and

alert the

U.S. Coastguard.

to the

The Coastguard

Rescue planes
ships would then

pick up the rafters and bring them to
the United States to be processed
by Immigration.

However, by the mid-1990s

They would

fly

over the Cuban mainland, dropping

government trom

their planes.

thousands ot these flyers
the government.

group was using these

this

As

On

in flights

a result, the

further incursions into

Cuban

against

international

unarmed

January 9 and 13,

1

of the Cuban

996 the planes

distributed

over Havana, obviously embarrassing
and angering

Cuban Air Force received

airspace. Thus,

community

civilian aircraft.

an additional purpose.

leaflets critical

when

largely

after

condemned

However, the

instructions not to tolerate

the Brothers to the Rescue planes

approached Cuba on February 24 the Air Force went

The

flights for

them and downed two.

this action

by a government

interpretation of the events and the degree

of condemnation varied considerably among nations. In

particular, countries disagreed

about whether the airplanes were over international or Cuban
waters when they were shot

down and

the degree to

The American motion
it

which the Brothers

to

condemn

to the

Rescue provoked the Cuban response.

the attack in the United Nations

was passed only

had been watered down, reflecting the different interpretations of the circumstances. 2

2

(

after

CNN, “U.N. ‘strongly deplores’ Cuban action,” CNN
http://www.cnn.com/US/96Q2/cuba shootdown/27/8am/index.htmn (July 2
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1

,

2002).

Reactions in Canada and the
United States differed significantly
and

illustrate the distinct

approaches toward Cuba and the
importance of the underlying
constructivist variables.

The American Response
Condemnation was strong and
government maintained
there

swift in the United States.

that the planes

was no possible justification

were

in international airspace
at the

for the shoot

Clinton began his speech that announced

new

They posed no

On

down.

February 26,

sanctions against

ago, in broad daylight and without
justification,
civilian planes in international airspace...

The American

Cuban

Cuba

996, President

with:

“Two

military aircraft shot

The planes were unarmed and

credible threat to Cuba’s security...” 3

1

time and that

days

down two

clearly so...

Members of Congress who were

vocal opponents of the embargo did not
challenge the administration’s interpretation
of
events. Democratic Senator, Christopher

armed plane

to attack

Dodd

unarmed commercial

stated: “It is inexcusable for a heavily

private planes under any circumstances.” 4

In response, the Clinton administration,

which

until then,

had been opposing a

bill

sponsored by lawmakers Jesse Helms and Dan Burton
that would tighten the embargo,
acted quickly to sign
events.

It

engaged

it

into law. This bill reflected

stated that: “Brothers to the

in searching for

Rescue

is

a

an

official

American perception of the

Miami-based humanitarian organization

and aiding Cuban refugees

in the Straits

of Florida, and was

“Remarks Announcing Sanctions Against Cuba Following the Downing of Brothers
Rescue Airplanes,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (February
26, 1996)
(

to the

http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov (April 15,2002).
')

4

U.S. State Department, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity [Libertad] Act
of 1996
Conference Report (Senate - March 05, 1996),”
(

http://www.senate.gov/~dood/press/Speeches/104 96/0303. htm ) (January 28, 2002).
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engaged
for a

in

such a mission on Saturday,
February 24, 1996.” 5 The U.S.
also campaigned

UN motion to condemn Cuba.

action against

Cuba was

In addition, though eventually
rejected, military

seriously considered in the
White House. 6

Most American policy makers on both
similar intetpretations of the incident.

most

felt

the

government had

sides of the

embargo debate adopted

No, everyone was supportive of
Helms-Burton bu,

to take significant action
against

Cuba. While there were

important political reasons (such as the
political clout of the CubanAmerican

community)
and

for the

American response,

this incident

involved deeply held U.S. values

identities.

Americans have always believed
and as such,

others,

is

America

is

a special nation, above

all

obliged to assist less fortunate nations
to follow the U.S. example.

This American exceptionahsm, with
ideas ot the

that

its

embodying American-centric world-view and

American moral mission, helped

to construct the U.S. response to
the shoot

down. Stuart Eizenstat, Clinton’s spokesperson on
Cuba, explained

to

an international

audience that the American reaction to the downing
could be traced to the fact that there
a moral core to our foreign policies.” 7

is

The Helms-Burton Act

United States has shown a deep commitment, and considers

PL

1

04-

1

1

it

itself states that

“The

a moral obligation, to

U.S. State Department, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity [Libertad] Act of 19964,” (http://usinfo.state.gov/reuional/ar/us-cuba/libertad.htm
(August 26, 200 ).
')

1

Richard Nuccio, Cuba. A U.S. Perspective,” in Trans-Atlantic Tensions
Richard N. Haass, ed.
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 7-28. See also
Dominguez, “U.S.-Cuban
Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War,” Journal
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39
no. 3 (Fall 1997): 62.

7

Quoted

in

Heather N. Nicol, “The Geopolitical Discourse of Helms-Burton,”

and Cuba Helms Burton and Its Aftermath Heather N. Nicol
Relations, 1999), 96.
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,ed.

(Kingston,

ON:

in

Canada, the

US

Centre for International

promote and protect human

and fundamental freedoms...” 8

rights

The passage of the Helms-Burton
Act showed
ttself as the “city

world

how to

on the

hill”

whose

responsibility

it

that the

was

to

United States

demonstrate

still

saw

to the rest

of the

correctly and morally respond
to the incident. Helms-Burton
declares: “The

Cuban people deserve

to be assisted in a decisive

manner

to

end the tyranny

that has

oppressed them for 36 years, and the
continued failure to do so constitutes
ethically

improper conduct by the international
community.” 9 As such. Helms -Burton
builds upon
the 1992

Cuban Democracy Act which

governments of countries
relations with

Cuba

in

“calls

upon the President

that conduct trade with

Cuba

to

encourage the

to restrict their trade

and credit

an manner consistent with the purposes
of that Act.” 10 Title

Helms-Burton allows for

citizens of other countries to be
punished in

for “trafficking” in property previously

owned by U.S.

III

of

American courts

nationals and confiscated by the

Castro regime, rule IV bars those people
from entering the United States. In accordance

with Title IV the State Department has informed
executives of Canadian and Mexican

companies engaged

in

such activity

entry into the United States. These

in

Cuba,

titles

that they will

be prevented from gaining

are designed to pressure other countries
into

adopting similar policies toward the island regime. These
extraterritorial elements

demonstrate that the United
to guide other

wayward

States,

states into

still

acting as the “city on the hill ” believes

it

needs

doing the right thing.

U.S. State Department, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996”
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-Cuba/libertad.htm) (August 26, 2001).

9

U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)
Act of 1996”
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-Cuba/libertad.htm) (August 26, 2001).

10

Ibid.
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Underpinning the Helms-Burton
Act
state in the

hemisphere and

thus,

is,

most

in

the belief that

is

Cuba

is

the

most wayward

need of American guidance.
This Act

is

an

evolution of a century-long
perception of Cuba as a less than
capable country that needs

American guidance. This perception
emanates from
Hemisphere as

part

American view of the Western

of the U.S. sphere of influence."
Since Cuba

miles from the United States"

of influence and hence, not
this perception.

the

i,

is

understood

fully sovereign.

Helms-Burton,

to

is

located “only ninety

be naturally within the
American sphere

The Helms-Burton Act was influenced
by

in part, justifies its

embargo tightening measures by

arguing that the United States led an
embargo against Haiti and since Haiti

of Cuba not as close

to the

United States as Cuba"

have a tighter embargo against Cuba

Cuba’s “special status”
Often Cuba

is

in relation to the

do not react

plight ot a stranger, but rather as

1

follows that the United States
should

12

United States

is

described in

many ways.

“American family.” For example, Michael

Ranneberger, the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs

“We

“a neighbor

.

referred to as part of the

policy this way:

it

is

to repression

we would

at

the State

and hardship

Department explained
in

Cuba

as

we would

their

to the

to a crisis that befalls a close family

'The idea of spheres of influence

is completely accepted by the United
States’ foreign policy
foreign policy communities in other countries do not as
readily accept
theories that place the United States at the center of
international relations. For example, see Robert M.A.
Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis eds. International Relations- Still an
American Social Science? (Albany
University if New York Press, 2001 ).

establishment.

The academic and

U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996”
(http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-Cuba/libertad.htm) (August 26, 2001).
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member.

As

such,

Cuban

‘bend’

illustrates the

in

Cuban

American policy makers assume

sovereignty. Helms-Burton

affairs.

Helms-Burton assumes

criteria for a

to

democracy

in

It

If Fidel

requires that the

and establish

free

and

all political

fair elections

permit the American broadcast of Radio and

system

OAS

15
.

or

by Washington. Furthermore,

Jorge

Dominguez argues

this

TV

14
.

lists

this perception

prisoners,

mandating them

transitional

in

US

of a legitimate

make

all political

The new government must

also

Marti or risk being declared not

Act dictates

that

Cuba

give up

legislation as defining characteristics

a

Helms-

Helms-Burton also

that these requirements well surpass

Cuban government makes

not

of Cuban

its

mockery of the pledge

socialist

any accepted

UN requirements tor the determination of democratizing governments.

believes:

if

numerous

fair election),

treat the election as invalid.

release

it

has a responsibility to oversee,

Castro was elected (even in a free and

Cuban government

rights to

its

has a natural right to intervene

Cuba. This piece of legislation

Burton forces the U.S. to automatically

activity legal,

it

stipulates that Fidel or Raul Castro
could not be part

Cuban government.

legitimate

US

that the

democratic Cuba that clearly demonstrate

sovereignty.

within

is

a product of this line of reasoning
as

is

degree to which the United States
believes

any transition

direct,

the United States

He

of a democratic or

to respect

Cuban

U.S. Department of State, Cuba: U.S. Policy Now and in the Future- Remarks
by Michael
Rannaberger, Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, before the Governor’s Cuba Advisory Group,
Miami, Florida,
February 28, 1997,” ( http://www.state.gov /www/regions/wha/970228 rannebenrer.html 1 fSentemhpr 0

2002 ).

14

U.S. House of Representatives, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
(Washington DC, 1996), Report 104-168, sec. 201.

15

Ibid, sec. 206.
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sovereignty." 16 This perception
that the United States
this

way beeause Cuba

is.

is

naturally entitled to intervene
in

more than any other eountry, within

their sphere

of intluence,

has greatly influenced the course
of American-Cuban relations.
In addition, the

the shoot

down

reflect

metaphors and symbolic references
used in the discourse about

and reinforce the good

vs. evil

comparison and moral reasoning

characteristic of discussions of
U.S.-Cuban relations. For example, in the
opening

statement

at the

hearing about the shoot

Chairman declared:

“We are

independence, because

and human dignity.”'

we

before the House of Representatives
the

here because we, as Americans, are
a Nation of freedom and

believe in liberty, and

we certainly believe

In contrast,

vultures awaiting their prey,

Cuba and Cuban

human

actions are demonized:

rights

Cuban MiGs

relations and influence

how

“On

that

of the Castro regime was clearly revealed.
Like
circled

and hovered

Cessna planes...” 18 These representations reinforce

- Cuban

in

7

fateful afternoon, the ruthless nature

frail

down

until they

locked on to the

the intense emotions about U.S.

those listening think about the incident and

consequently, greatly affect their response.

Thus, the American response to the February 24 downing
was a product of deeply
entrenched identities, values and perceptions. Though not
disputing the importance of
other factors (such as the political

16

power of the Cuban-American community nor

Dominguez, “U.S.-Cuban Relations,”

the fact

58.

17

U.S. House of Representatives, “Shoot-Down of the Brothers to the
Rescue Planes, Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary,” 106 Congress,
First session (July
19, 1999) (h ttp://commdocs.house.Kov/committees/iudiciarv/hiu63608.000/hiu6360
8 0 htm) (August
21
6

2002).

18

Ibid.
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that

US

citizens

were

killed) this section
revealed the significance

of other variables.

Factors such as American
exceptionalism and the long-standing
perception of the

legitimacy of Cuba's sovereignty
vis-a-vis the American sphere
of influence cannot be

discounted

in calculations

of the U.S. response

to the shoo,

down of the

Brothers to the

Rescue planes.

The next subsection

examine the Canadian response

will

to this

same

international incident, revealing the
influence of a different set of
perceptions, identities,

and values.

The Canadian Response

The Canadian response
identity

to the incident

and perceptions. Reaction

more mixed and muted than

down was given

in

was a

reflection of

Canada, though

critical

Canadian values,

of the Cuban action, was

American response. The Cuban justification

the

for the shoot

greater consideration in Ottawa. Canadians,
always sympathetic to

Cuban claims of American

interference in their sovereignty tended to
emphasize the

previous incursions by the Brothers’ planes. For
example, Keith Martin, a Canadian

Member of Parliament and

the Opposition Critic for Foreign Affairs, wrote
the following

about the incident:

However, as is often the case, all is not what it seems to be. Although
the shooting
down of these two planes was quite rightly condemned by the international
community, the dead pilots were not exactly on a quixoitic mission. They
... were
committed to overthrowing the regime of Fidel Castro by whatever means
necessary. This organization

was flying up to thirty-two missions per week,
Cubans fleeing their homeland so they could guide them
safely to U.S. shores. However, their activities have often taken on a much
more
invasive role... dropping leaflets over Cuba encouraging the people to insurrect
and depose Mr. Castro
These activities can hardly be looked upon favourably
ostensibly to look for

.

by Mr. Castro. In

.

.

fact, the

Brotherhood has been repeatedly warned

219

to stay

away

from Cuba airspace but has
19
refused.

He goes on
in the failed

to state that

1961

no, accepted by

”[m]a„y of its members are CIA
trained and some even took

Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.” 20
While

all

Members of Parliament, most of these

Dr. Martin’s interpretation

in

interviews

Rescue planes were inside Cuban
airspace on a mission

to

drop

and that the Cuban military warned
the planes to leave before they
were shot

leaflets

down.

was

points were no, disputed by
a

majority of Canadians. In fact,
high-level Canadian officials told
the author
that the Brothers to the

par,

21

This understanding of the events
of February 24, 1996, differs
considerably from

the perception reflected in

Helms-Burton

that the planes

humanitarian mission to rescue rafters and
were shot

were engaged

down

in

a solely

without warning.

The shadow of Canadian sovereignty and
perceptions of American encroachment

loom

large over a great deal

Canadian reaction

of Ottawa's foreign policy calculations.
As such, the

to the shoot

down became

principally focused

on the American

decision to pass Helms-Burton, which Canadians
saw as a direct challenge to their
sovereignty.

in

The following was heard on

the floor of the Senate and typifies the
reaction

Ottawa:

Canada, of course, strongly condemned the shooting
down of two
by the Cuban air force on February 24, the incident which
helped

civilian aircraft

the passage of

the Helms-Burton Act, and we were active in the
consideration of the incident by
the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO.
However, we do not think

Keith Martin, “America’s Cuban Debacle,” TV Times (Ottawa March
15, 1996). Posted on
Keith Martin’s website ( http://keithmartin.org/policv/foreign/foreign
cuba.shtmH (July 17, 2002).

20

Ibid.

21

Confidential interview with senior Canadian government official, Ottawa, Canada,
October

1999.
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Helms-Burton

is

way to

the

Similarly, Darrel Stinson

deal with the

Cuban problem.

Canadian foreign policy but

how to

tun our foreign policies.

that is for us, this

House and

1

Cuba

must not be dictated by another country.” 23
James Blanchard, the
this period recalled that in

the newspapers and

their executives

TV

told

wha,

to

may

no, agree with

or any other nation

US

ambassador

to

Canada, “Helms-Burton was a
headline story

reports, because

were being

do no, appreciate

“I

the other place representing
the

C anadtan people to decide. Canadian
foreign policy toward

all

[my emphasis]

(Reform MP) explained Ottawa’s
reaction:

another country’s telling Canada

Canada during

22

it

in

looked as though Canadian companies
and

do by the American government.

It

became a

sovereignty issue.” 24

Another

how

Member of Parliament,

Bill Blaikie

(New Democratic MP),

the issue of sovereignty vis-a-vis the
United States draws

and influences the Canadian response

Canada and Cuba together

to related international events.

about the Brothers to the Rescue downing and
Helms-Burton, he

Canada,

good

is in

little

the so-called

American sphere of influence and

neighbour. However,

independence

that

we do

when

not always

it

comes

show on

to

illustrates

is

During a discussion

stated, “...Cuba, like

supposed

to

behave

like a

Cuba, Canada has shown a streak of

other issues. .”
.

He went on

to

urge the

Canada Parliament, Foreign Affairs, Issue 11, Evidence Proceedings
of the Standing Senate
Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Ottawa, November 5, 1996)
('http://www.oarl.gc.ca/search/qfnllhitEJ}t w?CiWebHitsFile=/35/2/parlbiis/commbus/senate/com

23
"

~)

(April 16, 2002).

Canada Parliament, “Government Orders (071) 4507 Government Orders- Foreign

Extraterritorial

—

Measures Act,” (Ottawa, Friday September 20, 1996) (http://www.narl gc ca) (Anril 16

2002 ).

James J. Blanchard, Behind the Embassy Door: Canada, Clinton and Quebec (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1998), 147.
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c

Minister of Foreign Affairs to
continue to
the

American psyche."

especially

States.

when

it

resist ‘this latest

manifestation of the bully i„

25

comes

Canadians are quick
to

to identify

Canadian and Cuban

themselves with Cubans,

bilateral relations with the

This perception clearly had an
influence on their response

to the

United

downing

as

Canadians empathized with the Cuban
position.

The

discourse about Helms-Burton
reflects not only the emphasis
Canadians place

on protecting

their sovereignty

identification with the

from the United States and

Cuban predicament,

manifested

in foreign policy. Policy

Rescue tragedy reveals the influence of this

good

triad

international citizen and as a peacekeeper

example, Ottawa attempted

to

corresponding

but also reflects other Canadian
values.

Canadian mantra of "peace, order and good
government”
affairs is also

their

that is so evident in

toward Cuba

The

domestic

after the Brothers to the

and the corresponding

identities as a

on Canadian foreign policy. For

reduce the conflict between the Americans
and Cubans

over this issue. Officially and unofficially,
Canadian diplomats raised the issue with

Cuban and American

counterparts.

During a 1996

visit

their

by a group of parliamentarians

from Cuba, Senator Grafstein asked of the Cuban
delegation:

Please do not take this as being undiplomatic, but it
was a question that we, as
Canadians, could not answer in our private conversations with
senators and
congressmen. It is the theory of the Americans - which we do
not accept, but I
pass it on - that Cuba provoked the Americans by overreacting
to the planes that
were flying over Cuba. The suggestion is that there were other means,
other
forceful means, available to

Cuba

War

if,

Cuba

to

remove those planes from

indeed, those airplanes had invaded

Cuban

the airspace over

airspace. During the

Cold

Canada we were used to this. The Russians invaded our space, the
Americans invaded our space, and we tried to kick them out as gently as we
in

25

Canada Parliament, Thursday February 29, 1996 - Statements by Members (003) 128
Statements by Members [English], ( http://www.parl.gc. a/35/2/parlbus/chamhiis/liniise/dehatpc/ons 96-02'
~

29/003SM E.htmn
1

(April 16, 2002)
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could. That

a rather long prologue to
a very short question.

is

confljcts can be kept to a

We hone that

minimum between now and next year,
when we hope
lmPaCt ° f hiS terriWe
[^ e ms "^ urton bill. Wha, is your
‘

*

]

Another Canadian senator told the Cubans

in this

same meeting:

We have a dispute between two countries, Cuba
and the United States It has
always been my experience that, in a
dispute, nobody is 100 percent
right and
nobody is 100 percent wrong. Each side
has responsibility to try and resolve
ihe
dispute. I am not blammg either side
here, but 1 want to know what
efforts if any
Cuba ,s taking to resolve this dispute. There
are other ways to resolve
disputes
than speaking directly to the person
with whom you are having the
dispute. There
are what
known as - and you will know this - diplomatic
initiative. You can
go through third parties; you can ask other
people to try to broker a deal 27
As Senator

Grafstein alluded above, Canadians held
similar conversations with American

politicians.

down

Interviews confirmed that officials

with their American counterparts. 28

mediation

identity.

is

at a

number of levels discussed

As Chapter Seven demonstrated

the shoot

the belief in

a deeply entrenched Canadian value and an
intimate part of the Canadian

The attempt

to

mediate

this

dispute

makers, reflecting deeply held values and

natural reaction for Canadian policy-

identities.

Because Canadians give great weight
international incidents

was a

to peaceful

and orderly resolutions of

and international law, they pushed for the dispute

to be deliberated

by the International Court. Warren Allmand, a Liberal Member of Parliament,
argued:

“The shooting down of the two U.S. planes was indeed a deplorable

26

Canada Parliament, “Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign

Evidence,” (Ottawa,

May 28,

E/02EV-E.htm (April
')

28

incident.

t

•

16,

•

1996)

(http://

Both sides

Affairs Issue 2-

www.parUc.ca/35/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/FORE-

2002).

•

Interviews with senior Canadian government officials, Ottawa, Canada, October
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,

1999.

claim to be

right.

Consequently, that

(or unilateral action.-’ 2 ’ Similarly,

is

a matter for the International
Court and not one

one objection

to

Helms-Burton was

that the bill

was

contrary to international law and
-proper’ behavior. Mr. Charlie
Penson, a Canadian

Alliance

MP voiced this opinion:

to challenge

Cuba and

“I

make

the point that the United
States has every right

to put trade sanctions

of a binational nature

in place.

However,

it

is

simply not within the international
parameters of good citizenship or
international trade
to take that outside its borders

and apply

it

to countries

such as Canada .” 30 Arthur

Eggleton, the Minister for International
Trade, told parliament: “Helms-Burton

unacceptable because

it

is

flouts long established international
legal practices for settling

disputes between nations regarding claims
by foreign investors

property expropriated....

By choosing

to ignore

who

have had

them now, Helms-Burton

their

sets a

dangerous precedent .’' 31 Likewise, Canada
sought recourse against the United States
international law. Charlie

bully bullies us

to get

we do

Penson (Canadian Alliance

not have to put our

bloodied in the fight

29

either.

14/013SM1 E.html (April
~)

14,

declared:

between our legs and

We can take

Canada Parliament, “Thursday, March

by Members [Translation],

tail

MP)

in

“Nowadays when a

run.

We do not have

that bully to international court. Let us

1996 - Statements by Members (013) 703 Statements

(h ttp://www.parl. gc.ca/35/2/parlb us/chambiis/ion<;e/Hphatp<;/nn

96-03-

16, 2002).

30

Canada Parliament, “Government Orders (071) 4507 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Act,”
(Ottawa, September 20, 1996) (http://www.parl.gc.ca ) (April 16, 2002).
31

Canada House of Commons, “Government Orders Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act,”
(Ottawa, September 20, 1996) ( http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/2/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/071 96-0920/07 lG01E.html ) (August 20, 2002).
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take the Americans to court
to see if we can get
the Helms-Burton
fact that

citizens

overturned.”33 The

Canadians think of themselves as
peacekeeping, law abiding, good
international

had a significant influence on

and reaction

to

are inherent in the

down and

their

response to the events of February
24. 1996

Helms-Burton.

“Non-Americanism” and

shoot

bill

Canadian

the values of “peace, order,
and

identity largely determined
the

good government”

Canadian response

the ensuing Helms-Burton
legislation enacted

that

to the

by the American

government. Speaking about Helms-Burton,
Roger Simmons, a Liberal MP, rather
bluntly

summarized the influences on

fact that

it

flies in

the face of everything

territorial integrity

of sovereign

who would advance that

people

the

nations,

Canadian perception. He

we
it

Ottawa

also says

volumes about the arrogance of the

kind of legislation.” 33 Always fiercely
protective of any
that

on constant guard against American infringement,

to first, give the

“Apart from the

understand about the rule of law, about
the

American encroachment on Canadian sovereignty,
and perceiving
certain degree, also

said:

Cuba
it

is,

was

to a

natural for

Cuban “story" of the events more credence and second,

to react

very strongly against the American decision to
pass Helms-Burton. However, invariably

focused on international law, peace, and order

it

was

also natural for

Canada

to attempt to

resolve the dispute and call on the involvement of the
International Court.

Thus, the Canadian and American interpretations

of,

and reactions

to, that fateful

Canada House of Commons, “Foreign Affairs, Issue 1 Evidence Proceedings
of the Standing
1,
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs,” (Ottawa, November
5, 1996).
t
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Canada Parliament “Friday September 20, 1996- Government Orders (071) Foreign
Measures Act,” ( http://ww\v/parl.iic.ca ) (April 16, 2002).
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downing on February
and
and

24, .996 illustrate the crucial
role played by values,
pereeplions

identities in foreign policy.

identities rooted in

The American response was a

natural evolution of values

American exceptionalism and long
established perceptions of

Cuba’s place within the U.S. sphere
of influence. The Canadian reaction
had a great deal
to

do with

their

non-American

role as an international

good

identity

citizen

and the values and

identities associated with
their

and peacekeeper.

The Power of Percep tion

The popular phrase

‘perception

is

everything”

is

a

bit

of an exaggeration but

perception certainly carries a great deal
of weight over outcomes and

is

indeed an

important factor in foreign policy. Perception
plays a significant role in the
development

and continuation of Canadian and American
policies toward Cuba.

From

the earliest point in Ottawa and
Washington’s relationship with Castro’s

regime the two

sets

of policy makers perceived the situation very

differently.

At a 1960

meeting between the Canadian Secretary of State
for External Affairs, Howard Green,

and the U.S. Under Secretary of State, Norman Robertson,
the differences

in perceptions

of Cuba were clearly evident. Robinson reported, “the
Canadians spoke with such force

and candor

that the

Americans present were shocked

the Canadian analysis

and

their

own.

’3

at the extent

This difference caused

normally friendly neighbors. Americans protested

in front

of the division between

some

tension between the

of the Canadian embassy

in

Washington and were discouraged from vacationing north of the border, and Canadian
tourists in Florida noticed a colder reception. 35

34

35

Quoted

in

Kirk and McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations, 49.

Ibid, 49-50.
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Over
antithetical.

forty years later, Canadian
and

Both the State Department and the
Department of Foreign Affairs and

International Trade

Cuba

American perceptions of Cuba
remain

are telling.

(DFAIT) provide

The DFAIT

sheet on

fact sheets

Cuba

government: -Republic. 14 provinces
and

1

on

all

countries.

states the following

Assembly serve

Background sheet on Cuba
state; current

special municipality (Isle
of Youth).

5 year terms.”

states the following

36

Cuban Communist

sits

twice a year;

In contrast, the State
Department’s

under government type: “Communist

government assumed power by force
January

20, 1902. Political party:

descriptions of

under type of

Unicameral National Assembly of the
People’s Power. Assembly
representatives of the

The two

1,

1959. Independence:

May

Party (CCP); only one party allowed.

Administrative subdivisions: 14 provinces,
including the city of Havana, and
one special
municipality (Isle of Youth).” 37 Both descriptions
are presented as fact and neither
description

factually wrong.

is

Each

reflects a different perception

of the Cuban

government.

To most American

policy makers Cuba’s totally undemocratic
status

taken for

is

granted.

Cuba

represents the antithesis of democracy. Indeed,
most countries do not

consider

Cuba

to

disagreement

be a model of democratic governance. Yet, there

among

is

considerable

the countries of the world about Cuba’s democratic
status.

United States and Canada are both democracies that believe that
democracy

is

form of government. Yet, the United States believes more deeply than
Canada

36

37

the best

that there

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Cuba Fact Sheet,”
February 14, 2002.

( http://wvvw.infoexDort.gc.ca t

U.S. Department of State, “Background Note:

( http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/bgn/2886.htm t

Cuba

February 15, 2002.
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(09/01),”

The

is

one form of democracy and

Americans emphasize

that

it

is

their

duty to spread democracy.
Consequently, the

the undemocratic nature of
the

than Canada. This became especially
clear during
interview with a senior officer
sternly that they did not

that there

at the

presume

Cuban regime

my

in

Havana

I

was

my

told quite

Cuban form of government was undemocratic,

were “many forms of democracy .” 38
Although

this

does not represent the

Canadian policy, Canadians generally are
more receptive

official

a greater degree

interviews in Havana. In

Canadian embassy

that the

to

to

non-westem

conceptions of democracy. While most
Canadian officials believe that Cuba does
not

have

fair

and free national elections and

freedoms they perceive

that

that there are considerable restrictions

Cubans have considerable impact on

other democratic-like features.

They

are also

more sympathetic

about the failings of western democracies. In
contrast, the
interest section in

Havana

stressed that the current

local affairs

to Castro’s

officials at the

on press

and have

argument

American

Cuban regime was extremely

undemocratic.

Both Canadians and Americans reduce the revolution, Castro,
and the Cuban
people to caricatures that serve to perpetuate the two approaches
to the island. For

example,

in

most American discourse Castro

is

portrayed an evil tyrant and the

people are poverty-stricken victims of his tyranny

Whereas,
leader

in

who

much

ot Canadian discourse Castro

is

who

require

American

rescue.

described as a freedom fighter turned

has considerable support among the Cuban populace and

contend with the overwhelming presence of the United

38

Cuban

States.

who

has had

to

For decades, Canadians

This does not represent the official Canadian position vis-a-vis Cuba but demonstrates a much
greater diversity of acceptable views on the subject within the Canadian foreign policy establishment.
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have maintamed that while freedoms
are

restricted in

Cuba,

in

comparison to many other

regimes, Castro’s crimes are less
serious. They claim that
crimes like disappearances
prevalent in other regimes do not
occur in Cuba.

and Canadian perceptions of Cuba’s

Iwo

Perceptions:

connections and

terrorists,

engaged

seem

but

is

Cuba

Cuba has

speculated about Fidel Castro’s

Americans are concerned

activities.

American

as a Terrorist -Snonsorino s, al „o

actively trying to disrupt the U.S.
ability to

in biological

at all

section examines

ties to terrorism.

Recently, American discourse about
terrorist

The next

weapons research and development.

that Castro not only harbors

combat terrorism and

In contrast,

is

also

Canadians do not

worried about those charges. The Canadian
discourse about terrorism does not

single out Cuba.

The American Perception
Especially after September
threat to the

as

one of the seven

Iran, Iraq,

1,

American way of life. To

serious consequences for

Cuba

1

2001, terrorism

considered the most important

associate Castro with terrorism has potentially

American policy toward
state

is

the island.

The

State

Department

sponsors of terrorism. The other countries on the

list

lists

are

Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. In April of
1999, Michael Sheehan, the

Acting Coordinator for the Office for Counterterrorism

stated,

“Cuba, quite bluntly,

continues to provide safe haven for terrorists, period. They will remain
on the

list

while

they continue to provide safe haven for a number of terrorist organizations.” 39
After the
attacks

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, speculation about Castro’s

39

role in

U.S. State Department, Press Briefing on Release of "Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998"

(Washington, DC, April 30, 1999).
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international terrorism took center
stage in
nation, in the spring

many Washington

discussions about the island

of 2002, the Undersecretary of State,
John R. Bolton, suggested

Cuba was developing

biological weapons.

40

He

said,

“Cuba has

that

at least a limited,

offensive biological warfare
research-and-development effort.”41 In
September of that

year the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere
AfTairs accused the
Castro regime of supplying false information
to the United States’ investigation
into
terrorism, effectively sending

“impeding our

American

officials

efforts to defeat the threat

on “wild goose chases” and

thus,

of terrorism.” 42

These accusations and Cuba’s inclusion on the

list

of sponsors of terrorism are

challenged by many, calling into question the
security rationale for these charges.

According
specifics,

to

most estimates Cuba does not pose a

even American government sources

come up with

pressed to

government documents
though

its

place on the

terrorist threat and,

when pressed

that issued the various accusations are
hard

significant or recent evidence of such a danger.

that address terrorism

list

suggests

it is

Many

omit any mention of the Cuban threat even

one of the most serious offenders. For example,

though the State Department document entitled Patterns
of Global Terrorism
in its state-sponsored terrorism section,

40

Policy,”

for

it

lists

Cuba

does not discuss any threat posed by Cuba

in

Christopher Marquis and Eric Schmitt, “Bush Faces Pressure From Congress to Alter
Cuba
York Times May 19, 2002 ( http://www.nvttimes.com/2002/05/2Q

New

,

/intemational/americas/20CUBA.htmn (May 20, 2002).

U.S. State Department, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,
“The U.S. Position on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the BW Threat,” Remarks at Tokyo
America Center, Tokyo, Japan, August 26, 2002 ( http://www.state.gOv/t/us/rm/13090.htm ) (September 18
2002 ).
42

Christopher Marquis, “U.S. Accuses

Cuba of Trying

to Disrupt Antiterrorism Effort,”

New

Times, September 18, 2002
(

http://www.nvtimes.eom/2002/09/l 8intemational/18CUBA.html?tntemaill )(September
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18,

2002).

York

the section

which

details the specific terrorist
threats in Latin

America. This section

devotes significant space to discussing
the threats posed by Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia,

Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela,
none of which are

on the
Paul

list

of seven

Pillar,

states highlighted

by the State Department as
the most serious threats

the former deputy chief of the

following about Cuba's inclusion
on the

CIA

Counterterrorist Center wrote the

list:

Cuba s remaining links with terrorism
consist of providing a home for
a handfiil
members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty
group (ETA) and other
fugitives and providing some
accommodations to the Revolutionary
Aimed
Forces of Colombia and National
Liberation Army... The Castro
regime’s postco war retrenchment has been so
extensive that

^ " eX,ema

itspariah status^

When

aC ' ivitieS tha '

doing nothing either

W0U

'

d a PP ear ,0

pressed, Michael Sheehan also admitted
that Cuba’s inclusion

questionable.

He

could take what

stated, “It is true, in fact, that

we would

terrorist threat

What then

Cuba and

consider not difficult steps to

sponsorship.”'-' Thus, the inclusion

of the

is

it

’

of Cuba on the

emanating from the

list

on

the

in

V*® * for
was

list

several other states on that

move them

has

little

to

off the

list

list

of state-

do with the seriousness

island.

explains the inclusion of Cuba on this

list

of the

state sponsors

and the

frequent speculation about Castro’s terrorist activities?
Clearly, the political clout of the

Cuban-American community

is

partially responsible for this designation.

Five pointed out, the Cuban American community

is

Yet, as Chapter

not all-powerful. Recently,

CANF

has failed to stop the growing movement within Congress that favors
easing restrictions

Paul R.

Pillar,

Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution

Press, 2001), 161.

44

U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing on Release of "Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998"
(Washington, DC, April 30, 1999).
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on trade and

travel with

Cuba.

45

Thus, despite their influence
over the year 2000

presidential elections, this lobby
appears to be losing, not gaining,
strength. So, even

though they do their best

to publicize a link

between the Cuban regime and
tem>rism,

there are additional factors that
explain the frequent characterization
of the island as a
terrorist

and

haven. The prevalence of a certain

identities that underlie that thinking

way of thinking about Cuba and

the values

have influenced the popular and often

official

depiction of Castro as a terrorist.

Alter September 11, 2001 the United
States (and arguably the

world) had a

I

new

all-important

enemy-

terrorism.

The

horrific attacks

rest

of the western

on the World

rade Center and the Pentagon were
immediately understood by Americans as
an

deliberate attack

on American values;

in particular,

democracy and freedom.

It

was

believed that the terrorists attacked the United
States because the U.S. represents these
values.

46

Castro, seen as a long-term

on the side of the

terrorists.

enemy of these

American

values,

officials often

was

naturally perceived to be

compare Fidel Castro

to

Saddam

Hussein and other pariahs. For example, Dana Rohrabacher (RepCalif) told Congress
that Castro is

“demonstrably stronger than

(Iraqi President)

Saddam Hussein

in his

Cuban American National Foundation, “CANF Deplores Latest House Actions
on Cuba;
in President's Commitment to Maintain Policy” (July
25, 2002)

Expresses Confidence

(http://www.canfhet.org/News/020725releasea.htm) (September 20, 2002).

46

On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush told a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People that: “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right
here in
this chamber - a democratically elected government. Their leaders are
self-appointed. They hate our
freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and
disagree
with each other.” See: U.S. White House, George W. Bush “Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the

American People,”

(

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001092Q-8.html

26, 2002).
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)

(September

ability to hurt the

U.S .”

47

Dennis Hays, the former head of
the State Department Cuba

and now the Executive Vice-President
of CANF argued “Enlisting Castro

Affairs

light against terrorism is like
deputizing

crime .”

John Gotti

regime would be engaged in the
production of chemical or

that his

biological weapons, regardless of
international

production,

most

in the fight against organized

48

To assume

Castro

likely that he is

engaged

norms or agreements

make

if

doing

these

in biological

so.

Hence,

weapons

for

all

that

needs to be said

many Americans

that

do not unequivocally

island.

49

Cuba has

the

assume

is

developing biological weapons,

that

Cuba

is

indeed

threat almost

state that

it

Cuba has

is

these

more than

always

stress

Though most

weapons they do intimate

likely that they are being

For example, Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said the United

was concerned about Cuba's

research .”

that

it is

weapons production.

because Castro has the means to do so

States

is

the “capability or capacity” to produce these
weapons.

produced on the

that since

to

most statements made about Cuba as a biological
weapons

official reports

is

he has the means to produce biological
weapons, then

Since they do not have proof that Fidel Castro

Cuba has

against their

a natural evolution of that line of
thought. Thus, the logic

is

without morals,

is

capacity to

that

in the

“capacity and capability to conduct such [biological]

However, a few members of the administration have taken

this narrative to

47

Dan Morgan, “Federal Pay Raise Near House Passage: End to Cuba Travel Curbs Also
Backed,” Washington Post, July 24, 2002 ( http://www.washingtonpost.com') (September
18, 2002).
48

“CANF Deplores Interpol Chiefs Acceptance of Cuba Terrorism Ties,” Latnn.com (January 22,
2002) ( http://www.latnn.com ) (September 20, 2002).
49

“Powell Backs

Down

on Cuba Weapons Claims,” Comcast (May

(http://www.comcast.net/smedia/abcnews.com )

(May

14, 2002).
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14,

2002)

the next step. Undersecretary
of State, John Bolton asserted:

For tour decades, Cuba has maintained
a well-developed and sophisticated
biomedical industry, supported until
1990 by the Soviet Union. This
industry is
one of the most advanced in Latin
America and leads in the production
of
pharmaceuticals and vaccines that are sold
worldwide. Analysts and Cuban
defectors have long cast suspicion
on the activities conducted in these
biomedical
facilme, ... The United States believes
tha, Cuba has
a, least

bio ogical warfare research and development
biotechnology to other rogue states/ 0
Shortly after Bolton

made

this

remarks, stressing that the U.S. can only say
that
51

Cuba has provided dual-use

speech to the Heritage Foundation, both
Colin Powell and

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were careful

weapons.

effort.

to distance themselves

Cuba has

from Bolton’s

the capacity to produce these

Yet, most states with pharmaceutical
research capabilities have the

wherewithal to produce these weapons as Cuba. The
crucial difference

of Cuba

““

a limited

in the

is

same

the perception

United States. 52

Furthermore, Cuba’s location within the American
sphere of influence heightens

both the strategic and value-based rationales for these
concerns. The island’s location
only ninety miles from U.S. shores’
terrorist activities.

is

stressed in discussions about the regime’s

For example, Dennis Hays

stated,

“[w]e need to

John R. Bolton, “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from
Destruction,” Heritage Foundation Heritage Lecture #743 (May
6, 2002)
(http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/HL743.cfrn

51

52

know

if

a nation 90

Weapons of Mass

(September 26, 2002).

)

Marquis Schmitt, “Bush Faces Pressure.”

Other countries do not believe

that

Cuba

is

on the side of terrorism. Interpol

police organization) investigated Cuba’s ties to terrorism and
fight against terrorism. See:

was

satisfied that

Cuban American National Foundation,

“CANF

(the international

Cuba was committed

to the

Deplores Interpol Chiefs

Acceptance of Cuba Terrorism Ties,” Latnn.com (January 22, 2002) ( http://www.latnn.com ) (September
20 2002 ).
,
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miles from our shores

experimenting with deadly biological
53
agents.” John Bolton

is

asserted, “In addition to Libya

signatory, and

fact is

one

and

that lies just

emphasized both

weapons the proximity
However, the location

to the

coming from another

and normative reasons.

If

Cuba does have

United States would make delivery
somewhat

stressed for another implicit reason

American sphere of influence

from those of the United

BWC

90 miles from the U.S. mainland-namely,
Cuba

for strategic

is

intimately a part of the

Syria, there is a threat

States’, thus justifying

its

” 54

This

biological

easier.

- because Cuba

so

is

interests cannot be separated

American involvement

in

Cuban

affairs.

Lincoln Diaz-Balart (Rep-Florida) repeatedly
stressed the connection between the

Western Hemisphere and policy toward Cuba
Congress

vote

to

for sales to the

down

an 2002

amendment

Cuban government. He

said,

in

that

an attempt to convince other members of

would make public financing available

“Cuba

is

in this

hemisphere.

country oppressed by tyranny in this hemisphere.... Cuba
remains
despite what

some would

like

on

the other side of this debate.

It

in this

remains

It is

the only

hemisphere,

in this

hemisphere, and the Cuban people deserve our continued solidarity, and
not financing for
the terrorist regime...”

hemisphere
the island.

53

is

It

55

Diaz-Balart clearly believes that Cuba’s location within the

an important consideration

is

in the determination

also obvious that he thinks this fact

is

of American policy toward

important to the other members

Dennis Hays, “Inspect Cuba for Production of Biological Weapons,” Miami Herald July 29,
,

2002 ( http://www.canf.org/Nevvs/020729nevvsa.htm ) (September

54

10, 2002).

Bolton “Beyond the Axis of Evil.”

55

U.S. House of Representatives, Motion to Instruct Conferees on H.R. 2646, Farm Security Act
of 2001 (House of Representatives/Extension of Remarks - April 18, 2002) [Page: H1453] Hon. Lincoln
Diaz-Balart of Florida in the House of Representatives (April 18, 2002)
(

http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/fl2

1

diaz-balart/st0204 1 8.html ) (September 20, 2002).
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because he uses
the

it

in

an attempt to convince them
to oppose the amendment.
The idea of

American sphere of influence and Cuba’s

special place within that sphere
has

influenced the official debate about
American policy toward the island,
including the

discourse about Castro’s ties to terrorism.

The image of the Castro regime

Amencan
terrorist

as a pariah and the location
of Cuba within the

sphere of influence have contributed
to the American designation
of Cuba as a

sponsoring state and influenced the more
recent accusations about the
regime's

involvement

in biological

weapons production.
The View From North of the Border

In contrast, these perceptions are not
prevalent in

island even though terrorism

is

Canadian discussions about the

considered one of the top threats to Canadian
security.

1999 report put out by the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS)
in Terrorism'’ lists forty-two categories

America.

It

lists

Colombia and Peru

of terrorist threats including

entitled

threats

A

“Trends

from Latin

as potential sources of danger but does not
mention

any threat from Cuba.'^ 6

Though Castro
was, he

regime

is

is

is

no longer considered the honorable freedom

fighter

he once

not considered a pariah either, and Canadians remain highly
skeptical that his

engaged

in terrorist-friendly activities. Just as

the worst about Castro, Canadians are predisposed to

involved in terrorist

Americans

downplay

are inclined to believe

reports that he

is

activities.

A Globe and Mail article about U.S. -Cuban relations captures the Canadian
56

Canada Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, “Report #2000/01 Trends in Terrorism,”
A Canadian Security Intelligence Service Publication (December 18, 1999)

Perspectives:
(

http://www.csis-scrs.ac.ca/enu/miscdocs/20000

1

e.htmH (April
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5,

2002).

response to the charge that
the

Bush “axis of evil"

Cuba has

to include Cuba,

biological weapons. Conceivably
to

tell.

But more

likely

biological weapons:

it

is

not."

which Mr. Bolton claimed

- just - that

might be

issue

is

almost a nonstarter

International

true.

is

As with

Iraq there is

in

is

engaged

Canadian government

in

bioweapons production.

circles. In fact, the

Cuba’s biotechnology

sector.

For example,

CIDA

project between the Universidad Central
de Las Villas "Marta Abreu"

Cuba and

no way

Canadians remain highly skeptical
of the American

Development agency (CIDA) supports a
number of programs

directly or indirectly aid

Clara,

developing

57

characterization of Castro as a terrorist
or that he

The

“John Bolton, publicly widened

that either

funds a

(UCLV), Santa

the Institute of Biomedical Engineering
at the University of

Brunswick. The stated objective of the project

is

Canadian

New

“to establish a Biomedical Engineering

Education Infrastructure in Cuba.” 58

The Canadian tendency
supports terrorism

is

to disregard or

to

that Castro

causally tied to Canadian identities and values.
Canadians have a

great deal invested in their policy toward

American

minimize the possibility

Cuba

policy. Since the accusations are

as

it

represents independence from

coming from the United

States

and they want

be independent from the American position on Cuba, Canadians
are even more

skeptical of the reports. During a

CBC

interview about the September

1 1

attacks.

Prime

Minister Chretien mentioned Cuba, but only in the context of defending
Canadian policy

toward the island and

The Old Foe

(May

16,

to suggest

in

Havana,

how American

Globe and Mail,

foreign policy could be improved to deter

May

16,

2002 (http://www.the 2 lobeandmail conU

2002).

58

•

University of New Brunswick,

Biomedical Engineering Program

in

The Institute of Biomedical Engineering, “Developing a
Cuba,” (http://www.unb.ca/biomed/cida.htm (September 13, 2002).
')
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terrorism.

He

said that the United States
and the western world needed
to shoulder

of the blame for the attacks because
the West
satisfied,

greedy and with no limits.” 59

is

“looked upon as being arrogant,

He used Cuba

some

self-

as an example of how the

Americans, because they are so
powerful, should be “nicer.” 60

Canadians also have a history of identifying
with Cuba. Though they have
often

drawn tenuous comparisons (such

as the

one party

state

comparison discussed

in

chapter

seven) Canadians remain empathetic
to the Cuban situation and
thus would be prone
question the American accusations of
Cuban as a terrorist
terrorist” runs counter to the

to seriously question their

relationship with Cuba.

“American bully”

It is

Furthermore, “Cuba as a

deeply held perception of Castro as
essentially a well-

meaning, though misguided, leader. To
acknowledge a

would have

state.

to

much

terrorist connection,

Canadians

whole picture of the Cuban regime and

easier to chalk

it

up

to another

their

example of the

in action.

Discussions of terrorism in Canadian government
circles emphasize the values
that

have come to dominate Ottawa’s foreign policy.

Foreign Affairs told an audience in March of 2002

Bill

Graham, Canada’s Minister

for

that:

our challenge in responding to terrorism is to not lose
sight of the values and
norms we cherish. Respect for the rule of law underpins Canadian
society and is
fundamental to Canadian values and identity. Canadians believe
in the rule of law
and in legal institutions to remedy injustice. Throughout our history,
the rule of
law has been our strength and the foundation upon which we have
built this
country. It is a fundamental part of our democratic tradition and
is a principle that

Jean Chretien,

Corporation (September

1,” CBC News, Canadian Broadcasting
2002) (http://www.cbc .ca/news/features/chretien interview. html) (September

Chretien interview on Sept.

16,

18,2002).

60

Ibid.
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1

Canada promotes

The

fact that terrorism

is

internationally.

61

against international law dominates
most Canadian discourse on

terrorism.

Thus, the United States and Canada, in
different things about Castro’s

The

so

much

alike, believe

Cuba. Americans place the Cuban
regime on

sponsors of terrorism, insinuate he
global effort to

many ways,

is

combat terrorism and

their

very

list

of

developing biological weapons and
misleading the
the Canadians are skeptical of all
of these charges.

values, identities and past perceptions at

work

in both countries

have influenced

these different characterizations of Fidel Castro
and his connections to terrorism. Since

would be

difficult to

underestimate the affect of the designation of a
state as

friendly in a post-September

1 1

world, this perception

is

it

terrorist-

exceedingly relevant to policy

formulation.

Conclusion

Canada and
Cuba. Clearly,

we

the United States have long had distinct policies
toward Castro’s

cannot discount the effect of the Cuban- American community
nor the

death of American citizens on the response from the United States to
the downing of the
planes and the absence of those factors on the Canadian response. Likewise,
the Cuban-

American community has a

role in the identification of Castro as a terrorist in the United

States and the absence of such a clearly anti-Castro group in

Canada has

impact on the Canadian perspective on

examples

this issue. Yet, as the

likely

had an

in this chapter

61

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Notes for an Address by the
Honourable Bill Graham Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Terrorism, Law and Democracy Conference
Organized by the Canadian
(

Institute for the Administration

of Justice,” (Montreal, Quebec March 26, 2002)

http://webapps.dfait-maeci.i>c.ca/minipub/Publication.asp?FileSpec+/Min Pub/ 105049.htm ) (April

2002 ).
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5,

have demonstrated, neither poliey
ean be reduced to a simple
variable since they also reflect
a

By comparing

the Canadian and

complex

interplay

political or

of values,

American responses

to the

identities

same

further demonstrated the relevance
of constructivist variables.

economic

and perceptions.

issues this chapter

Both the shoot down of the

Brothers to the Rescue planes and the
perspective on Castro’s association
with terrorism

were understood differently

in

Canada and

the United States largely
because of the

unique combination of values, identities
and perceptions
In the U.S. the shoot

down was

at

work

in

both countries.

seen as an act of evil that demanded
an immediate

response. This interpretation reflected the
long-standing perception of Castro and
Cuba’s

place within the American “family.”
Helms-Burton

post-Cold

War

era explicitly reveals the degree to

more than any

other

document of the

which the Americans place Cuba

within their “sphere of influence” and the latitude
they believe that gives them to

determine the future of the island country. In contrast,
the Canadians, generally
sympathetic

to

sovereignty issues vis-a-vis the United States, saw the
downing more so as

an unfortunate overreaction to repeated incursions on Cuban
sovereignty. In typical

Canadian fashion they

tried to defuse the tension

between the U.S. and Cuba by talking

both sides. However, the Canadians were most concerned with the
enactment of the

Helms-Burton

bill

because they saw

it

as another attempt

by the Americans

to dictate

Canadian policy.
Similarly, both countries reacted very differently to suggestions that Castro has
ties to terrorism.

Based on long-standing views of Castro, Americans

are inclined to

believe the worst about the dictator and as such are receptive to charges that Castro
trying to scuttle the

American

efforts to

combat terrorism and
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is

involved in the

is

to

production of biological weapons.
Canadians, inclined to generally
have a

view of Castro (and tend

to question the

fairly positive

American version of events when
Cuba

is

involved) are highly skeptical of the
American charges.

However, as the next and
policies toward

Cuba

final

are changing.

chapter will reveal, both Canadian
and American

Each approach

reflects

new

perceptions of the island

nation that began to emerge in the late
1990s and are slowly gaining strength.
Ironically,
the

two

strategies are

and Castro evolve.
States

-

A

becoming more

number of incidents have spurred

the Pope’s visit

Prime Minister Chretien
island, the

similar as both sets of perceptions
about the island

and the Elian Gonzalez incident and;
to secure the release

- countered

new
in

images. In the United

Canada

of the dissidents during

Pan American games fiasco and the

ot the Americas

these

-

the failure of

his visit to the

rhetoric surrounding the

Quebec Summit

the popular narratives operating in both
countries.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
I

have painted a picture of two complex,
but very dissimilar policies

based on two different
cultures.

Does

this

identities, rooted in particular

mean

that these policies are

the United States continue

its

and ingrained values,

doomed

to

that are

ideas,

remain as they are today? Will

policy of isolation until Castro dies
or the regime

becomes

a model of liberal democracy? Will Canada
continue to engage the regime even
jails

and

if

Castro

even more dissidents?

The two
cultures,

policies are dynamic, like the underlying
identities, values, ideas,

and perceptions, they are constantly ebbing and
flowing. They are socially

constructed and thus open to change. Indeed, in the

shown a

potential for considerable change.

last five

years the two policies have

The next two subsections

recent alterations in both approaches, highlighting

how these changes

will describe the

are connected to

ideational factors.

Recent Developments in

The norms,

identities,

toward Cuba are not easily

and images

altered.

US Cuban

Policy

that underlie the construction

They have,

to different degrees,

of U.S. policy

become

internalized

or institutionalized. However, relatively recent international and domestic
events have

caused some re-examination of a few of these variables.

Having won the Cold War, Americans are

less likely to fear

Castro regime. Surveys indicate that most Americans
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still

communism and

perceive that

Cuba

is

the

an enemy

but that the numbers believing this
have deelined since the Cold

War

1

ended. Though

still

unpopular, Castro and his communist
regime are no longer seen as
threatening. Over half

of the Americans polled
the United States.

in

2000 thought

Cuba

that

Only 15 percent thought

did not represent a serious
threat to

the island

was

changing perception of threat, while
remaining important,

have caused some Americans

The
the island.

visit

is

The

only one of the variables that

re-examine their policy toward Cuba.

to

of Pope John Paul

Most Americans,

a “very serious threat.” 2

to

II

Cuba

also influenced

American perceptions of

believing in their country’s exceptional
character and

perceiving that the United States

is

taking the most morally correct
position, were

surprised by the Pope's message in Cuba.
Since the Vatican and the Catholic Church

have considerable moral authority, the Pope’s opinion
of the embargo as “deplorable”

made many people
Though

question whether their government

his visit did not cause a

was pursuing

major policy change, his remarks about the U.S.
embargo

and the plight of the Cuban people did influence many
Americans.
said the

Pope swayed

hard line

Pope

the

American

Got an awful

lot

A senior U.S.

public, the Clinton administration, and even

Cuban Americans. 4 Democratic

s visit

the best policy. 3

official

some

Representative Lee Hamilton said that the

of people thinking. The Pope’s approach

is

the exact

See for example, Darren Carlson, “Poll Analyses: 40 years After Bay of Pigs, Most
Americans
have Unfavorable Opinion of Cuba,” (April 17, 2001) The Gallup Organization
( http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/prO 04
7. asp ) (August 13, 2001).
1

2

1

Polling the Nations (1986-2001), “Cuba,” (June 16, 2000).

Donna

Cassata, Foreign Policy: Papal Visit Highlights Divisions

(January 24, 1998), 195.

4

Interview with senior U.S. government official, 2000.
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Over Cuban Embargo,”

CQ

opposite of the American
Government’s. The Pope

The U.S. policy

Cuba

to isolate the

is

for the Pope’s visit, the

change to the

US

Cuban

people.

The

is

trying to engage the

contras,

is

Cuban

people.

apparent.- After visiting

Archbishop of Boston, Bernard
Cardinal Law, argued

approach toward the

island.

He

stated that

for a

he was accompanied by

“heads of social service agencies
and representatives of foundations,
there were lawyers

and judges, congressmen, presidents
of colleges, a law school dean
and an university
professor, and the editor of a
national magazine.

but

we found

We were a wondrously diverse group,

unity in our conviction that the
time

is

now for a

Clinton stated after he introduced
a number of changes to

measures

I

have announced today are designed

The Pope’s

visit

was

still

to build

having an impact on

of Representatives’ Cuba Working Group
referred
2002. They stated:
his visit to

“we

Cuba, in

1

heartily

Cuba

on

US

to the

change.” 6 President

Bill

policy that “The

[the Pope’s] visit...” 7

policy years

later.

Pope’s message

embrace the message of Pope John Paul

in

II,

The House

Cuba

in

who began

998.” 8 The Pope’s remarks
prompted a reexamination of the

assumption that the United States’ policy toward
the regime was the morally correct
policy.

It

interrupted the logical

country (a moral leader) and the

January 2

mJ ^

Weiner

“
’

pathway between

the

norm

should be isolating the regime.

that the

Pope vs Embarg°
'

:

US

Sti H

America

identity as an exceptional

a Sharp Divide in U.S.,”

New

York Times,

Quoted by U.S. Senator Chris Dodd, “His Eminence Bernard
Cardinal Law, Archbishop of
Boston, Reflecting on Cuba, Senate -March 19, 1998,
(

http://www.senat e g ov/~dood/pres/speeches/105 98/03 9.htm J
January 28, 2000.
.

1

7

“Statement on Cuba,” Administration of William

g

(May

US House of Representatives, Cuba Working

15, 2002).

J.

Clinton,

March

20, 1998.

Group, “A Review of US Policy Toward Cuba,”
(http://www.cubafoundation.org/CWG-Review.htm ) April 13,2003.
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.

Furthermore, the media frenzy
surrounding the custody battle
over Elian

Gonzalez also caused many people

Cuban boy who was
mother when

part

their boat

of a group

to reconsider their
perceptions. This six-year old
that lied the island in

November of

1999, lost his

sank off the coast of Florida.
After he was rescued, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service
turned him over to

his relatives in

custody battle that ensued between
those relatives and Elian’s
father

in

Miami. The

Cuba made

headlines for months.

The
Americans.

publicity altered

First,

it

many

people’s perceptions of Cuba,
Cubans, and Cuban

served to humanize Cubans. Americans
identified with Elian’s father.

Juan Miguel Gonzalez and his family
just like us,”

and reported

in

that they felt

Cuba. People remarked

empathy

for

that they

“seemed

like

Juan Miguel. Additionally, many

people questioned their perception of life in
Cuba after Elian’s father refused an offer

remain

in the

United States. Lastly, during the custody

fight, the

community often appeared overly emotional and sometimes
growing skepticism ot the community and

government
that a

official

who remains

New Republic article

community. This

article

to

Cuban American

irrational.

their capacity for objectivity.

It

encouraged a

A

former senior

very influential in policy toward Cuba told the
author

correctly analyzed the impact of this

most recent

crisis

on the

claimed that the community’s reputation was tarnished
during

the custody battle. Their insistence that Elian’s survival

was an

actual miracle, and their

claims that he was saved by angels in the form of dolphins, as well
as by their passionate
outbursts on national television and the appearance that they seemed
to think the

community

is

above the law, hurt

Charles Lane,

Gonzalez,” The

And

their credibility.

a Child Shall

New Republic (January 24,

9

Lead Them: Miami’s passionate, self-defeating

2000) ( http://www.thenewrepublic.com L August
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fight for Elian
1

9,

200

1

Opinion polls taken
if

at the

time confirm these perceptions.
Americans were asked

they approved or disapproved
of the

way

people handled the Elian
Gonzalez case. “The

boy’s father” achieved the highest
approval rating- 67 percent said
they approved of his
actions. In contrast, only

relatives in

the wider

way

the

34 percent of those polled approved of
the way “the boy’s

Miami” handled

the case.

The

publicity also influenced the
public’s

Cuban American community. Only
27

community handled

the case.

even fewer respondents thought

10

percent of those polled approved
of the

A NBC/Wall

Street Journal poll reported
that

Cuban American

that the

view of

relatives (23 percent)

and the

wider community (20 percent) acted
responsibly. In contrast. 71 percent
of those polled
said they believed that Elian’s father
acted responsibly. 11 These events
have caused a re-

examination of some of the most prevalent
images, norms and ideas of Cuba and
the

Cuban American community. The custody
perceptions- that the

battled called into question

Cuban American community’s view of Cuba

are “different” from Americans; and that

life in

Cuba

is

as bad as

is

US

some long held

correct; that

Cubans

Cuban Americans

report.

Former President Jimmy

Carter’s visit to

people’s perceptions of Cuba and of the

American of this

stature since Castro

former presidents. He

l0

ABC News

is

US

Cuba

in

policy. This

2002 also had an impact on

was

assumed power. Carter

the

is

more popular now than he was during

Poll, April 24,

first visit

by an

one of the most popular
his presidency.

2000 “Elian Gonzalez,” PoIllingReport.com
(August 7, 200 ).

( www.pollingreport.com/oldnews.litm t

1

1

11

(

NBC/Wall

Street Journal Poll, “Elian Gonzalez,” April

www.pollingreport.com/oldnews.htm t (August

29-May

1,

2000

17, 2001).

12

Daniel Merkle, ABC News. Com “Carter Improves with Age,” (October ), 1999)
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/poll990929.html (April 14, 2003).
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12

His work

,

m human rights and other humanitarian issues
listened

when

Carter visited

Cuba and spoke out

Perceptions within the

conducted

in the

well respected. Thus,

is

in favor

of engagement.

Cuban American community

1970 and 1980s indicated

many Americans

are also changing. Surveys

that a large majority

of Cuban Americans

favored isolation or removing Castro
from power by force. Dialogue was
opposed by as

many

as 80 percent of the community. 13
In those days,

dialogue were harassed by others

promoting those views

Over

the last

in 1975.

few

Miami

community. One Cuban American was

community has become much

less united

growing divisions within the community.

behind a

A majority of Cubans

area are recent immigrants. These
“economic refugees” that arrived from

the 1980s on, are

known

to favor dialogue

much more

taken in 2003 indicate that more than half of all

approach toward Cuba has failed

to

improve the

believes that exiles should be talking to the

meeting between the two groups held
polls taken

killed for

14

years, the

single solution. There are

in the

in the

Cuban Americans who advocated

of Cuban Americans

than their predecessors. 15 Surveys

Cuban immigrants
lives

of people

in

believe that the

Cuba.

US

A majority also

Cuban government and approved of a

in April

of 2003.

in Florida during

16

The Miami Herald reports

2003 show “a major

shift

that

towards

13

Andrea Elliot and Elaine De Valle, “Cuban exiles shifting hard-line position,”
The Miami
Herald, February 12, 2003 (http;//www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/cuba/5
1 60039 htm) Amil
F
'

13,2003.

14

Ibid.

Policy,”

Christopher Marquis and Eric Schmitt, “Bush faces Pressure From Congress to Alter Cuba
York Times, May 19, 2002 ( http://www.nvtimes.com t (May 20, 2002).

New
l6

Dana Canedy, “Cuban

Exiles Finding Spirit of Reconciliation,”

2003.
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New

York Times March 23

moderation by Cuban exiles.”” The
an ideological

reflects

split

New

York Times reports

between the original Cuban exiles
and

grandchildren, a recent influx of
immigrants
reasons, and a concerted effort

by some

who

after a nationally televised
struggle

Gonzalez.”

18

its

a certain degree, the

virtually

Cuban government

in

Cuba.

to discuss

19

They only asked

It is

their children

economic

is

improve the image of Cuban

telling that

also

changed

now willing to meet with members of

democracy

issues. This

CANF

did not

that Carter raise the issue

American lobby group has caused divisions within

together in the

and

rather than political

would have been

come

of human

its

out in opposition

rights while he

These new views are not accepted by everyone.
The change

who have been

in attitudes

over the young shipwreck survivor
Elian

The organization

unheard of in the 1990s.

to Carter’s visit.

change

Cuban American National Foundation
has

views, rhetoric, and policies.

the current

fled for

exile groups to

Americans

To

that: “the

in the

was

main Cuban

former members. Those members

upset with the changes in the organization’s
hard line views have banded

new Cuban

the community, this group

Tiberation Council. 20 However, given the evolving
views of
is

unlikely to achieve the monolithic status achieved
by

CANF

in the 1980s.

17

Elliot

18

19

Times,

and De Valle.

Canedy.

David Gonzalez, “Carter’s Trip to Cuba Raises Many Hopes From All Sides,” The
11, 2002 ( http://www.nvtimes.com ) May 16, 2002.

May
20

Canedy.
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New

York

The Pope’s

visit to the island, the
effect

of Elian Gonzalez, the
declining

perception of threat, and dtvisions
with the cotntnunity have
changed perceptions and
influenced the nomrs directing
this policy. Significant
elements of the American
public
are now questioning
isolation.

For example, even though

Americans are

200

1

visiting

it is still

Cuba. Approximately 50,000
Americans

illegal,

illegally visited

Business leaders and lawmakers
are also travelling to the
island

.

more

in

Cuba

in

record

numbers. Over 700 American
business people, representing
almost 300 companies
participated in the

2002 Havana Trade Show. 22

There has also been a movement

in

Congress

ot Representatives and the
Senate have formed

purpose of
in

critically

In July

travel

to travel

in

its first letter

and the capacity of Cuba

2002 an amendment

Cuba working groups

in the

House

to

that they

of money Americans send

Though an amendment

to

to

remove

for the explicit

for the

“Former President Carter on landmark

May

13,

at the right

of

market for American products.

fiinding for the enforcement of
the
to

remove

Cuba won by 251-177. Other

end funding

(h ttp://www.theulobeandmail.com )

would look

to serve as a

ban passed by 262-187. Similarly, a measure

22

end the embargo. Both the House

examining American policy toward
Cuba. The Senate group formed

March of 2003, announced

Americans

to

restrictions

on the amount

similar measures also passed.

enforcement of the whole embargo did not

visit to

Cuba,” Globe and Mail,

May

12,

2002

2002.

Cuba Policy Foundation, Press Release, “At Least 04 U.S. Congressional
Havana Trade Expo,” (October 10, 2002) (April 13, 2003).
1

Seats Represented at

249

Districts,

66 Senate

1

win a
in

majority,

many

it

did

23
gamer 204 votes
voies.

quarters to normalize

Poliey

is

US

Thm
bus, tW.
there n
has u
been
I

relations with

an unmistakable
movement

Cuba

beginning to reflect these
changing perceptions and
norms. Americans

were given permission

to sell agriculture
products to

Cuba

in

2000. In 2002,

Cuba

purchased over $138 million in
U.S. agricultural products,
making the island one of the
top

fifty

markets for American
agricultural

perceptions and notms about
the island,
the

US

its

sales.

24

These policies

people, the

reflect

changing

Cuban Ameriean community,
and

approach. These perceptions
have the potential to have
a longer-term influence

over the direction of this policy.

However, there has also been an
increase

in countervailing
pressures in

1

isolation. Florida's pivotal
role in the

that the

the

2000 election and the perception

Cuban American community was a

Bush administration. Bush has

filled

crucial player in the

in

support of

Washington

outcome has influenced

openings in his administration with

representatives of the hard-line elements
of the community. Furthermore,
September

and the subsequent war on terrorism
created tension between the United
since the regime remains on the
State Department’s

As

chapter eight showed, the inclusion of
Cuba on

list

of states

this list

States and

1

Cuba

that support terrorism.

and charges

that

Cuba

supports bioterrorism are serious barriers
to normalization.

Furthermore, President Bush has taken a harder
line with Cuba than did his
predecessor. In 2001, he said that his administration
“will oppose any attempt to weaken

i r

.

Cuba Policy Foundation, Press Release “U.S. Congress
Votes Against Cuban Embargo
* LargeS ' Si " 8 e C ° ngreSsional Move ,0 Lift D^ades-Old Policy,"
'

U^y 24

2002) (IprU

‘4

MM)”"

Cuba Policy

Foundation, “Embargo Update,” (March 28, 2003)
(http://w ww.cubafoundation.org/Embargo Undate-0303.28w.htm
HApril 13,2003)
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sanctions against Cuba's
government.” 25 Bush has
increased support for
achvists in Cuba.

He has

definitely adopted a

human

rights

more confrontational approach,
and

according to some, has actively
goaded the Cuban government. 26

Much of the new tension
American diplomats

in the relationship

Havana and

in

Press, the Principal Officer
in

the

has taken place between the

Cuban government. According

Havana during Bush’s

first

two years

to the

in office,

Associated
Vicki

Huddleston, “has walked a rocky
road that turned sharply to the
right when President

Bush took

office in

200

1

.”

They

Huddleston kept a relatively low

report in contrast, “(djuring
the Clinton administration,
profile,

meeting quietly with dissidents and
traveling

to

provincial areas to ensure unsuccessful
migrants weren't harassed after being
returned

home by

the U.S. Coast Guard.” 22

programmed

to receive

Under Bush, Huddleston,

Radio Marti and books

to activists in

distributed short-wave radios

Cuba. Huddleston also

increased her criticisms of Cuban
government and her support of dissidents. 28

Huddleston’s replacement, James Cason,
has further increased the tension

between the

US

Interest Section

between the dissidents and

home and

also to the

US

US

and the Cuban regime by intensifying the
contact

diplomats. Dissidents were frequently invited
to Cason's

29
mission. Cason has also spoken at opposition
meetings.
Castro

25

Quoted in Cuba Policy Foundation, History
of U.S. Policy
(http://www.cubapo licyfoundation.org/policv.htmn ( April
1,2002).

26

2
.

?

PauI Knox,

Anita

Communist

“Why

Snow

“

u

did Washington

Goad Cuba?” Globe and Mail

,

April 9, 2003.

s Diplomat in Cuba Walks an Often Rocky Road as Chief
of Mission on
Island,” (June 7, 2002) (http://www.canfiiet.org/News/archived/020607newsa.htm
) (April 14,
’

-

28

Andrew Cawthome, “Cuba protests ‘Subversive” U.S. Radio Handouts,” (April
(http://www.canf.org) (April 12, 2003).
‘9
Paul Knox, “Why did Washington Goad Cuba?” The Globe and Mail

5,

2002) Cuba News

(April 9, 2003).
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ed by severely limiting the
movement of U.S. personnel

in

Cuba. The

hostility

between Havana and Washington
has been intensifying.

The regime also claims
began

in the spring

of 2003

of the Cuban government

in

is

that the

renewed

effort to harass

and jail dissidents

a reaction to the “American
offensive”.

that

A representative

Washington, Juan Hemadez Acen
claimed, “These people

have not been arrested for what
they think.

.

.

They were

arrested beeause they are
directly

linked to the active conspiracy
and subversion being done

firmly stating that Castro alone

is

by James Cason.” 30 Though

responsible for the 2003 crackdown,
Washington

insiders admit that Cason's
activities have given Castro
the excuse he needed to
engage

m this most

recent crackdown. 31

In

any case,

this series

described as the most serious crackdown
in years.
sentences as long as 27 years.

and much of the

rest

As

of the world

Iraq has

new preemptive approach

is

has been

dissidents were given jail

palpable.

made many Cubans

to

trials

a result of this repression, the
tension between Havana

Lastly, the seemingly easy victory
of the

Saddam Hussein’s

Some

of arrests and

Americans
nervous.

in the

2003 war versus

The American government’s

rogue regimes has spurred speculation that
Washington

might take unilateral action against the Cuban
regime. This conjecture has been fueled
by the growing jingoism of the Bush administration.

30

Knox,

“Why

did Washington

Goad Cuba?”
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US

April 10, 2003, the

David Gonzalez, “Cuba Arrests More Dissidents Amid Outcry,”

2003.

31

On

New

York Times March 22,
,

Ambassador

Cuba

to the

Dominican Republic warned

that Iraq

was

a “very

good example

for

.” 32

The American
moral and

self-identification as

political leader

internalized. Castro’s

an exceptional country, and
as such, as a

and as a defender of democracy
and human

Cuba does and

will, for the foreseeable
future,

the antithesis of the U.S. identity.
Likewise, a

number of the norms

rights, are

deeply

continue to represent

that provide the

foundation for this approach toward
Cuba are also stubbornly ingrained. The
norm that

Cuba

is

within the U.S. sphere of influence

is

unlikely to change.

are related to certain images
about Cuba, Cubans, and

However, norms

Cuban Americans

are

more

changed. Those perceptions and norms
have been evolving and have resulted

movement toward normalization

easily

a

that has influenced policy in that
direction.

However, whether the movement
end the embargo

in

that

will continue will

in

Congress and among the American public
to

have a great deal

do with what happens

to

in

Cuba.

If

Castro continues to increase the repression
on the island, few members of congress will
feel

confident arguing for a relaxation.

move

to

end the embargo was

dissident roundup

is

campaign,

we

message. Because of the

message of engaging Cuba

by U.S. Ambasador

will be lost .”

is likely to

Ann Louise Bardach, “A Purge

to statement

Cuba Policy Foundation put

in the

The

fear

fear, distrust

is

people will be

and justifiable

New

If this repression eases, the

it

very possible that specific

is

York Times, April

Dominican Republic,” Granma April
,

(htt p://www.granma.cu/inales/abril03/vierl 1/1 5respuest.html
) (April

33

“[i]f the

33

continue and

with a Purpose,”

it:

had a great candidate.... This

the candidate being caught with the intern.

pressure to change this policy

32

the

like a political

less inclined to listen to a positive

outrage, the

As

1

1,

13,

2003; “Fidel’s reply

2003

14,2003).

•

David Gonzalez, “Cuban Crackdown on

York Times April
,

13,

Critics Stalls a Drive to Ease U.S.

2003.
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Embargo,”

New

elements within the wider policy
will be altered (further
restrictions on

medical sales

etc. will

be

lifted,. If

eventually nullify “isolation

food and

they continue, these
piecemeal changes will

However,

if the trend

piecemeal changes will stop.
Furthermore,

toward repression continues
these

until there is significant

ingrained ideational factors will
continue to work against the

Cuban

travel,

full

change

in

Cuba

the

normalization of US-

relations.

Recent De velopments

Canada’s policy toward Cuba
variables push

is

in

Canada’s Cuba Policy

equally influenced by ideational
variables. These

Canadian policy toward engagement
with the

events have challenged the Canadian
identity in relation to

island.

Cuba

However, recent

policy,

undermining

this

approach.

During the mid-1990s, Canadian-Cuban
relations seemed
high. In 1997,

Ottawa and Havana signed a

Joint Declaration,

to be at

an all-time

which established

cooperation between the two governments in
a number of areas including on
rights

and good governance

issues.

34

However, by the end of the 1990s,
governments had cooled. The

in the

Canadian press. During

embargo

34

as genocide,

this

initial fallout

Chretien to Cuba. This was the

human

warming

trend between the

two

arose from the 1998 visit by Prime Minister

first visit at this level

since the 1970s and

was played up

that visit, Fidel Castro publicly referred to the

which put the Canadian Prime Minister

in

American

an awkward position.

See

Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada’s
Relations with
(http//www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/latin/cuba/81600-e.htm). In recent years the success of
the Joint
Declaration has been called into question as there appears to be little
progress on these

Cuba

Canadian government

constructive engagement

government

officials,

issues in Cuba.
respond that they did not expect rapid change in Cuba and maintain that
a long-term policy. Based on confidential interviews with senior
Canadian

officials
is

Ottawa and Havana, 1999 and 2000.
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Canadians wish to be seen as

distinct

from the U.S. bu, do not
respond well when others

publicly criticize this friend
and ally.

To make

matters

much

worse, Chretien

made

a point of raising with
Castro the

case of four dissidents .ha, were
scheduled to be tried in Cuba.
trial

and

felt fairly

summarily

tried

He

pressed for an open

confident tha, Castro would follow
through. However, the four
were

and convicted

in

a closed

trial.

35

This greatly embarrassed the
Prime

Minister and contributed to the
Canadian sense of disillusionment
with their efforts on
the island. This

was a

direct challenge to the

to achieve the desired release

levels.

Canadian identity since Canada was
no, able

even though the dialogue occurred

Canada immediately cooled

relations. Ministerial visits

at the

very highest

were suspended.

Relations worsened during the subsequent
1999 PanAmerican games held

Wtnnepeg. Fidel Castro was very angry about

He

said “never before had

sport competition.

second position

we

a

number of issues surrounding

seen such abusive and trickery actions

The whole purpose was

to harass

in order to benefit the host country

in

Cuban teams. Castro concluded
been competing
turned into

35

in the face

enemy ground.

“Cuban

trial

Cuba, to displace Cuba from the

and

to discredit

false charges,

our sport.”

and

36

He

athletes,

tried to disadvantage

his speech with, “it is in that spirit that our
athletes

of hostility, seduction and
So, be

step backward,

the games.

a Pan American

charged that Canada allowed sports scouts to promote
the defection of Cuban

withdrew medals from Cuban winners under

in

it.

traps,

The same has happened

Axworthy

says,”

on a

field that has

in other places

Globe and Mail, March

3,

have

been

where

1999.

36

“Castro: 1999 on PanAm Games, Excerpts from the speech given by Dr. Fidel
Castro, President
of the Republic of Cuba, related to the Pan American Games in Winnipeg, Cienfuegos,
th
Cuba, July 26
l" 9 -” (http://www.pbs.oriz/stealinuhome/sport/castro99b.htmn (January 3
,

.
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1,

2002).

authorities front the North
have been present. But, there
are

one

that

was already

there and another one further
North."”

two

in that

Nonh now;

Lumping Canada and

the

the

United States together was no.
only the most serious insult
.ha, Fidel Castro eould
muster
bu,

it

was also a challenge

to the

Canadian

identity. Relations

had reached a new low.

At the same time, Canadian
development programs were encountering
in

Cuba.

A number of Cuban students attending Canadian

difficulty

universities defected while in

Canada, creating tension between the
two countries. Furthermore, the

CIDA

program to

modernize the Cuban taxation system
backfired as the Cuban government
used

it

to

hinder the establishment of private
38
enterprise.
In 2000, Fidel Castro visited
Ottawa for
Pierre Trudeau’s funeral but he
did not

Canadian investors also began
reported as early as 1999 that, “[f]or

government,
Ritter, a

it’s

the

morning

to

shy away from Cuba. The Wall Street
Journal

many Canadian companies

after their love affair

well-known expert on Canadian-Cuban

confirmed the Journal report

New

meet with the Prime Minister.

York

that

in

as well as for the

with the island nation.” 39 Archibald

relations

from Carelton University,

2001 when he told an audience

at the

City University of

Canadian businesses were becoming more disillusioned
with Cuba. In

particular Ritter pointed out that Sherritt International,
the largest Canadian investor in

Cuba, had only invested half of what they expected

to invest in ventures

on the

island.

40

37

Ibid..

38

Archibald Ritter, Speech delivered
Graduate School, Cuba Project, 2001.

to the City University

of New York’s Queens College and

39

Jose de Cordoba and Carlta Vitzthum, “Canadian
(http;//www. fiu.edu/~fcf/cawo.html) (January 3 1, 2002).

40

Ritter.
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Woes

with Cuba,” June 28, 1999,

)

Cuba's exclusion from the
200, Summit of the Americas
meeting
caused even more tension

in the biiatera,
reiationship.

Foreign Affairs, told the
author
April of 2001, that

Cuba would

a, a

was no, a democracy. Manley’s
remarks
newspapers. Castro was infuriated.

Summit

at that

images of the

brutal

way

in

New York

in

Summit of the Americas because
in

He

it

Canadian

encouraging the protesters

as well as criticizing Canada’s
treatment of the protesters.

jus, seen the

in

meeting were pubiished

He responded by

Quebec City

John Maniey, the Minister
of

meeting of the Canadian
Society

not be invited to the

in

stated:

a, the

“We

have

which Canadian authorities
repressed the

peaceful demons, ra,io„s...They
cannot sustatn this unjust order
imposed on humanity.

We send you our total

solidarity.

Cuba supports you.” 4

However, when Castro released the

last

'

member of the “Group of Four”

in

August

of 2002, relations warmed. These
four dissidents were the same
four that Prime Minister
Chretien spoke to Castro about on
his visit to the island. Most
believe the worsening of
relations that followed that trip

explains: “In

were caused by Chretien’s embarrassment.

March 1999, Canada had suspended

dissatisfaction with Cuba's response
to our

DFAIT

ministerial visits as a signal

demarches on various human

of our

rights issues

(including the sentencing of four
prominent political dissidents, the "July
Four"). In

2002, the
the four

last

May

of the lour dissidents, Vladimiro Roca,
was released.” 42 Thus, the release of

was an important

Fidel Castro sends

step in the relationship.

Message of Solidarity

( http://www.radiohc.org ) ( January

M

to Protesters in

Quebec ”

(April 21 ’ 2001

7007)

’

^Canada Department of Foreign
t

9nn^ !

0nS

’

^

Affairs and International Trade, “Canada-Cuban
January 20Q3 ) (http://www.df
ait-maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/cubarelations-en.aspO
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/April 14,

1

The

first

evidence of a friendlier attitude
came

interview with the

Pnme

Canada had a “normal"
toward the

island.

High

September 2002 during a

CBC

Minister. During that interview.
Chretien emphasized that

relationship wit

Cuba and

criticized the

American approach

43

level visits

were resumed. In November
2002, Denis Paradis, Secretary
of

State for Latin America, Africa
and
International

in

Trade

Fair.

During

La Francophonie, wen,

to

Cuba

to attend the

that visit the secretary also
inaugurated

Havana

an exhibit

honoring Pierre Trudeau.-14 The
Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade
asserts:

“Denis Paradis visited Cuba

in

November 2002,

almost four years. Secretary of State
Paradis'
reinvigorate political dialogue with

Cuba.

In

Cuba, Paradis asserted

Cuban
:

"We

visit signals

officials

interview on

ministerial visit in

Canada's willingness to

and to support Canadian

The

large

interests in

numbers of Canadians

are testament to the affection between
our

importance of understanding each other

first

should be encouraging as wide a dialogue
as

possible, comparing perspectives and
values.

Cuba every year

the

better.

1

(SeptembeM^OOr/’

two peoples and

that visit

the

" 46
.

” (September 16, 2002)
(http://www.cbc.ca)

44

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
News Release “Secretary of
(November 1 2002) (http://webanps.dfa itm agci. g c.ca/minpub/Publicat io n.asp7FileSpec-/Min Pub Docs/105614 .htm^hPrint=F a l^v,. a r = ^,
anon
ageHE) (April 13, 2003).
State Paradis to Visit Cuba,”

,

45

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
“Canada-Cuban
Relations, ’’(http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/cubarelations-en.
aspO (April 14, 2003).
46

Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release,
Paradis
Promotes Trade, Investment and Canadian Values in Cuba,” (November
8, 2002) (http://webapps.dfaitma eci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min Pub Docs/ 105649.htm ! (April 14, 2003).
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In addition, in

March 2003,

exposition called "Canada-Cuba:

“The images

will cover the

the

Canadian Embassy

A View over One

in

Cuba

held a photographic

Hundred Years". DFAIT
explained:

wide diversity of contacts
between the two countries

including political visits,
commercial projects, development
programs, cultural, scientific

and educational exchanges and
sporting
its

activities.'^

Canada was once again celebrating

friendship with Cuba.

The American war with
relations.

Cuba

Kirk and

relationship

In other

Iraq

McKenna point

is

somehow

seems

out

it

is

to

have also prompted closer
Canadian-Cuban

“plausible that re-energizing
the Canadian-

linked to Canada’s increasingly

words, a political overture

to

muddled

position

on

Iraq.

Cuba- an arch enemy of Washingtonmay be

designed to convince Canadians that
our foreign policy

is

distinctive

of that of the

Americans.” 48
Nevertheless, this warming trend

came

to a halt in the spring

stepped up repression. According to
the Globe and Mail

Foreign Affairs Minister

Bill

of 2003 when Castro

:

Graham summoned Cuba's ambassador

Canada to
crackdown on
move came after

his office last night to express
"extreme concern" over a dramatic
peaceful dissent by Fidel Castro's regime.
The highly unusual

to

the sentencing of dozens of dissidents
to prison terms of 12 to
27 years. Their
had been brief and closed, some on charges
of co-operating with the United
Mates to oppose the Communist government 49

trials

47

Canada Department of Foreign

Peter

McKenna and John

Limited November
,

6,

Affairs and International Trade,

Kirk, “Canada,

Cuba melting

“Canada-Cuban Relations.”

the bilateral ice?” The Halifax

Herald

2002.

Paul Knox,

“Graham protests against Cuban trials,” Globe and Mail April 8
2003
d o beandmail.com/servlet/storv/RTG AM.20030408.ucuba0408/RNStor^/lntPm a t; fxn g |/9
,

(httB ://wvvvv.the
.

j

"

ry=Cuba) (April 14,2003).
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q „0

Canada’s push toward warmer
relations would have
continued as long as the regime
continued to

show an even

natural inclination to

construe,

slight willingness to

improve human

rights.

I,

is

Canada’s

engage Cuba because so many
elements of the Canadian

norms promoting

identity

friendship with the island.
However, the Canadian identity
as

an international good citizen
could not

let

such a severe and public crackdown
go

unnoticed. Unless, Castro seems
to be responding to the
international calls to end this

round ot repression

it

improve in the near

future.

is

unlikely that the Canadian-Cuban
relationship will continue to

Foreign Policy Im potence and Cnha

Cuba remains an
regime has kept a

island in

tight rein

many

senses of the word. For four decades,
the

Cuban

over events on the island regardless
of international events.

Castro survived being the only
survived the end of the Cold

Warsaw

War and

Pact country in the Western Hemisphere;
he

the death of the Soviet Union; he
survived

Helms-

Burton; and he survived chaotic relations
with various friends and enemies, including

Canada and the United
It

States.

seems as though Castro’s regime

and other countries’ foreign
just as the

relic

of the past; Castro

in years.

policies. Just as

embargo was under

Cuban Americans seem

is

the

relatively unaffected

Canadian-Cuban

by

relations

most serious congressional attack

to be moderating;

initiates the

international events

were warming;

in its history; just as

and just as the Miami Mafia seemed

most serious crackdown on

activists

to

be a

and journalists

Castro blames the 2003 crackdown on the Bush team in Havana
and

Washington but

Miami and on

his

argument ignores the serious warming trend

Capitol Hill.
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that

was underway

in

The crackdown

elicited the

expressed then opposition to

expected reactions. Countries

this latest repression.

all

Most countries

over the globe have

predict that their

with other countries’ policies
toward Cuba than everyone
else thinks. Castro
came to

power denouncing foreign

intervention and he has
apparently succeeded in

one of the most independent

on the globe. Neither the
Canadian nor

states

making Cuba

the

American

policy has been successful
in altering the
political landscape in
Cuba. Thus, isolation,

engagement or somewhere

fundamentally change things
invasion of Iraq,

democracy
to

Its

is in

is

between-

in

this study predicts

none of these approaches

Cuba. Even the improbable use
offeree, a

in

la

the

will

US

unlikely to produce the desired
transition to stable democracy.
If

Cuba

s

future

it

will

have to come from within.
However,

happen while Fidel Castro continues

to rule. Thus,

Cuba's future

this is unlikely

will look

much

like

past until nature forces an end
to the Castro regime.

Summary and
This study began with the question

Theoretical Implications

why Canada and

the United States have adopted
such

dramatically different approaches toward
Fidel Castro’s Cuba. This difference
especially apparent in the post-Cold

same end

in

War environment

is

as both countries claim to have
the

mind- greater respect for democracy and
human rights on the island yet

continue to employ drastically different
means. American policy contends that the
best

way

to

ensure change in Cuba

is

to isolate the current regime.

opposite approach; that engagement

and human

is

the

most

rights.
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effective

The Canadians

means

to

take the

promote democracy

The most widely accepted
explanations for both policies
ignore ideational
variables.

fully,

The Cuban American community’s
intluence over

and simply, explain the

US

elections

is

presumed

to

approach. This explanation
assumes the community

favors a hard-line, isolationist
policy toward their homeland.

because the Cuban American
population

is

concentrated in

Florida (and to a lesser extent
also in Jersey City,

It

then contends that

Miami-Dade county

New Jersey) they

in

have a

disproportionate influence over elections,
thus ensuring that their policy
preferences are

followed

economic

in

Washington. The Canadian policy of
engagement

interests.

is

attributed to

Canadian

This argument maintains that
because American businesses are

prevented from investing

in or selling to the

Cuban people, Canadian companies have
an

advantage and are keen to trade with Cuba.
Thus, the Canadian government,
wanting

to

support Canadian-Cuban trade follows a
policy of engagement.

This study adopted a constructivist approach
to this question.

It

problematized

both these explanations and examined the
role of ideational factors such as
identity,
values, norms, and perceptions in the two
policies. This study has demonstrated
that the

widely accepted reasons for the two policies are
inadequate explanations. Though each of
the traditional explanations offers

some

they are incomplete. For example, the

how

the

community

first

began

community was given

this

Cuban American

to wield

small, unorganized electoral base.

The

insight into the respective bilateral relationships,

power when,

electoral thesis cannot explain

at that time,

constructivist analysis can

power by Washington because

they represented a very

show

that the

their perceptions

and policy

preferences were directly in line with the views prevalent in Washington
during that
period. Furthermore, the fact that the

Bush administration’s policy toward Cuba
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is

more

hard-line than the previous
itself is

two administrations while the
Cuban American community

growing more divided also reveals
the incongruity between
Cuba policy and the

wishes of the community. As
attracting less

and

this

less support

chapter has shown, a pro-embargo
platform

among members of the Cuban American
community.

Thus, contrary to popular opinion,
policy toward Cuba
offices of the

and has

far

more

to

do with values,

not directed from

Miami or

the

with Cuba. Canadians trade more
If trade

have adopted an

in

and perception than most scholars

is far,

far

more important than any

one day with the U.S. than they do

was the main reason

isolationist policy

not a sole reflection of economic

is

identity,

maintain. Canadian trade with the
United States

with Cuba.

is

Cuban American National Foundation.

Likewise, the Canadian policy toward
Cuba
interests

is

trade

a whole year

in

for Canada’s policy toward Cuba,

Ottawa would

decades ago.

This study has not just pointed out the
weaknesses of the accepted explanations
but has

shown

The American

that ideational factors

have significant independent explanatory power.

identity as an exceptional nation that includes
an emphasis

on the values

of democracy and freedom; a belief in the natural
superiority of the United States and,
consequently greater rights as well as a commitment to
corresponding duties; encourages
a missionary outlook, especially in the Western Hemisphere.
These factors have a major
influence on the

way American

policy makers conceptualize

Cuba and

the U.S.-

Cuban

relationship. This study argues that Americans, believing
in their natural superiority in
political

and economic matters, and stressing the value of democracy and freedom,
are

affronted by what they perceive to be the total absence of democracy and
freedom in

Cuba. The United States believes

it

must take action
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in

Cuba because

it

has a duty to

promote democracy and freedom
globally, and especially
Furthermore.

Cuba

realize

it.

slow

little

ties to the

brother, the

United States. U.S. policy
suggests

Cubans need American guidance
even

understood

to

in

Cuba’s

if

an

they do not

future. In addition, since
Fidel Castro is

be the root of Cuban problems,
American policy reflects a determination
to

remove him from power. The very idea
of working with such an

many people

Isolation, thus,

in

Washington. In

becomes

many ways

evil

regime

is

abhorrent

the policy reflects this visceral
reaction.

the preferred policy.

Likewise, the Canadian approach toward
identities,

that, like

Thus, like a big brother, the United
States feels a responsibility
to ensure that

democracy and freedom are

to

Western Hemisphere.

has always been seen as
‘special’ to most Americans
because of its

geographical and historical
inferior or

in the

and perceptions. This study argues

Cuba

that the

international citizen, as a peacekeeper and
as distinct

the Canadian policy of engagement.

The Canadian

is

rooted in Canadian values,

Canadian

identity as a

good

from the United States contribute to

identity as a

good

international citizen

includes an emphasis on international law, a
strong preference for sovereignty and non-

interventionism and places a high value on communication,
dialogue, and social justice.

The

identity as a peacekeeper is closely related to the

emphasizes mediation. The importance of being
crucial element of the

Canadian

good

distinct

citizen role but also

from the United States

another

is

identity.

All these elements of the Canadian identity coalesce to produce
the Canadian

policy toward Cuba. The emphasis on communication and mediation
influence norms of

engagement. The importance given international law and sovereignty contributes

Canadian opposition

to

to the

Helms-Burton. The emphasis on sovereignty and social justice
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encourages empathy with Cuba,
and the desire to be distinct
from the United States
predisposes Ottawa to choose
engagement over isolation. Lastly,
Canadians see isolation
as an inherently hostile policy,
more likely to lead to instability
and international
disorder.

They believe

that

engagement

in the

Cuba case

is

compatible with peace and

order.

In

offers

sum, the examination of identity
and

its

related values, perceptions,

an alternative way of making sense
of US-Cuban and Canadian-Cuban

and norms
relations.

These two case studies reveal how these
variables influence foreign policy
and enable us
to better understand international
relations.

Further Applications

Policy toward

Cuba

is

only one example of the influence
of ideational variables

on foreign policy. These findings have
implications

American exceptionalist

identity,

with

its

States and perceptions of the political
and

for

many more

foreign policies.

belief in the natural superiority of the
United

economic

inferiority

belief that the United States has rights and
duties above and

of others, influences the

beyond those of other

This produces missionary norms that the United
States must assist other
particularly

this identity

for foreign policy. For example, the ideas,
values, perceptions,

norms associated with

the exceptionalist identity that portrayed

Cuba

states.

states,

where democracy and freedom are concerned. Consequently,

wide implications

The

has

and

as the absolute

opposite of the United States; demonized Castro; and predisposed
empathy with the hardline

Cuban American

narrative of life in Cuba, are probably influencing

American foreign policy establishment

how the

characterizes other leaders and regimes.

Constructivist case studies of U.S. policy toward other ‘rogue’ states would prove
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illuminating. For example,

was

still

why

did the United States
believe that

community believed

that Iraq

was disarming?

States had access to additional
information that

community, but

help

Iraq

producing biological and chemical
weapons when many other members
of the

international

case, a

Saddam Hussein’s

initial

possible that the United

could not share with the
international

observations also point to the role
of ideational factors. In any

comparison of American and,

make

it

I, is

for

example, French identities and
values would

sense of this international enigma.
Similarly, a constructivist
analysis of the

Canadian preoccupation with establishing
an international prohibition on
ami-personnel
landmines would be

Why

fruitful.

did

Canada take the lead on

this issue? Initial research

indicates that ideational variables
can offer considerable insight into
these policies.
Further, this approach to foreign
policy

American contexts but would

not limited to the Canadian and

offer insight into any country’s
foreign policies. For

example, a cursory examination indicates
to

is

do With South Africa’s commitment

that identity, ideas

to establishing

and values have something

diplomatic relations with

all

countries regardless of their political,
economic or social systems and often in the face
of

pressure to restrict this

commitment

to the principle

of ‘universality .’ 50 Likewise.

Michael Barnett makes a strong case for the influence
of identity on foreign policies of

Middle Eastern

states, including Israel

and the Arab

states

51
.

Thus, the addition of the

50

For example, see Peter J Schraeder, “South Africa: From
the Shadows,” in Comparative
Foreign Policy: Adaptation Strategies of the Great and Emerging
Powers, Steven W. Hook ed (Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 245-267.
.

Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliances
Security:

Norms and Identity

in

in the Middle East,” in The Culture
ofNational
World Politics Peter Katzenstein, ed. (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1996).
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study of domestic values,
identity, perceptions, and
norms will improve our

understanding of a plethora of foreign
policies.

A

more self-consciously

constructivist approach to the
study

of foreign policy and

comparative politics would also
benefit these subfields. Though
there has been a
resurgence in the study of ideational
variables in Comparative
Politics, the dependent
variables continue to be domestic
politics or
culture. This study has

rich literature.

shown

However, accusations

1940s and 1950s are often
research

still

that the

still

factors as not static, constructivism

ideational factors,

Comparative

that

variables,

most often

Politics’ study

(i.e.

political

of political culture

haunted the national characteristic
studies

leveled at today’s cultural studiesthat

resorts to stereotypes

Though they

economic

South Koreans are

thrifty).

By

is

a

in the

some of the
seeing ideational

works against these types of characterizations.

are accustomed to addressing
domestic level variables, including

most foreign policy studies

dialogue with comparative

politics,

that address these topics, reflect
their

and thus, focus primarily on

political culture

and

public opinion. Adding constructivist analyses
would not only broaden their research but

would also open up

the study

of foreign policy

factors. Foreign policy studies

of international ideational

have tended to ignore the influence of international
norms,

values, and perceptions. Foreign policy studies

on epistemic communities or

to the influence

would

studies of international

benefit, for example,

norms such

by research

as those against

chemical weapons.
Lastly,

opening up constructivist theorizing

to the

methods, concepts, and

questions prevalent in comparative politics and foreign policy studies
will help answer

some

constructivist critics. For example, Jeffrey Checkel criticizes constructivism
for not
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considering cases

“when

the presence of a norm,

‘the

dog doesn't

bark,’ that

where

is,

do not change .” 52 Comparative

state tdentity/interests,
in

politics studies that

examine

domestic level attributes and foreign
policy analyses that take these
variables and apply

them

to foreign policy

can help constructivists point
out

why

the

“dog doesn’t always

bark.” Also, a focus on domestic
level ideational variables
addresses another, related,

common

criticism

nationally.”

5

’

Domestic

variation. Further,

and

of constructivism- why “social
construction... varies cross

it

is

that often requires

factors are

most

likely at the heart

important to understand

how

of much cross-national

international

norms

initially

develop

an examination of domestic variables.

This study has only touched the
surface of what borrowing from
Comparative
Polities, International Relations,

and Foreign Policy can offer

international interactions. Furthermore,

many

to our understanding

of

other disciplines such as psychology,

anthropology, sociology and economics
are treasure-troves of information
regarding
ideational variables. Research that borrows

comprehension of the

from these

fields will further

our

role of ideational factors in foreign
policy.

52

Jeffrey T. Checkel,

“The Constructivist Turn

50 (January 1998): 324-48.

53

Ibid.
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in International

Relations Theory,” World Politics

APPENDIX

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

My
City,

one

IN

THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND
CUBA

research for this study included
numerous trips to Washington

trip to

Ottawa and one

trip to

New

DC,

Havana over 1999 and 2000. During
my

York

trips

I

interviewed government and
non-government officials knowledgeable
about Canadian or

American policy toward Cuba. All

the interviews listed in the
table

confidential. In an effort to provide
the reader with

interviewed

I

have categorized them by

level.

below were

some sense of the

types of people

I

Senior level government officials
include

current or former ambassadors,
high-ranking State Department officials
including Deputy
Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries
in the United States or Ministers
or Secretaries of
State in

Canada and

similar level officials in Cuba.
Mid-senior officials include current or

tormer Program managers or similar high level
consular officers
or

Desk Officers

at the

staff to those

Canadian embassies

Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade.

United States, mid-senior level officials include
Senior Advisors

and high-level embassy

at

officers. Mid-level officials include

at the State

Department

everyone from senior support

people working just below the mid-senior level people.

Senior non-government officials include directors or
senior people
or similar organizations

researchers in

In the

all

who

specialize in

Cuba

three countries.
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issues

in

foundations

and well-known academics or

8

Table

American Government

4: Confidential Interviews

Officials

Canadian Government Officials

Cuban Government

Non-Government

Senior Level

Mid-Senior Level

5

3

3

Officials

Officials

Conducted

Level
1

7

1

(Any

Mid

5

1

9

Nationality)

I

also conducted

less senior, but

people

at

numerous informal interviews

in all three countries, usually
with

knowledgeable people. These unofficial interviews
include speaking with

conferences, luncheon meetings, short
conversations before or after fonnal

interviews held with others in the organization,
and email correspondence. Most of these
I

kept confidential. However, the non-confidential
informal meetings include speaking

with the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
John Manley,

Canadian Consulate
Huddleston

in

in

New

York

City; a

1

Havana; a lunch with a Canadian

of these informal interviews. There

informative, but did not influence

a lunch hosted by the

few words with Principle Officer Vicki
official at the

discussions with officers from the Canadian consulate in
least

at

were

my research.
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New

UN

in

York.

others, that were,

New
I

York; as well

participated in at

somewhat,

^
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